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Abstract
This thesis is the first step in a research project which aims to develop an accurate 
and robust theory of global justice. The thesis concerns the content of our duties of global 
justice, under strict compliance theory. It begins by discussing the basic framework of my 
theory of global justice, which consists in two aspects: duties of minimal wellbeing, which 
are universal, and duties of fairness and equality, which are associative and not universal. 
With that in place, it briefly discusses the nature of duties of fairness and equality. I shall 
argue that they are associative, because they are derived from the form of cooperation at 
hand;  and that  there  are  three  kinds  of  them in  our  contemporary  world:  states,  local 
cooperation and trans-state cooperation. It is from their forms of cooperation that these 
duties are derived.
After that, the thesis focuses exclusively on duties of minimal wellbeing. Against 
the usual account of these duties - the human-flourishing account - I argue for my human-
life account. This account argues that the function of these duties is to secure a human life 
for individuals; and it begins with a Razian conception of wellbeing, which states that the 
wellbeing  of  an  individual  is  fundamentally  constituted  by:  (a)  the  satisfaction  of  his 
biological  needs,  and (b)  his  success  in  whole-heartedly pursuing socially  defined and 
determined goals and activities which are in fact valuable. An account of what constitutes a 
human life is then derived from this conception of wellbeing – it is a life that consists in 
having a level of wellbeing that is higher than the satisfaction of biological needs, where 
this is constituted by the pursuit of goals and activities with a sense of what is worth doing; 
and this in turn consists in: (a) being able to forms ideas of what is worth doing, (b) being 
able to revise them in light of further reasons, and (c) being able to coordinate one's actions 
according to them. I then determine the specific objects of duties of minimal wellbeing 
(means for the satisfaction of biological needs, education, physical security,  freedom of 
belief,  association  and  expression,  freedom  of  non-harmful  conduct,  and  minimal 
resources), by determining what is involved in securing such a human life for individuals.
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We're all here in this world for some reason or another. If you're aware of injustice, 
you can either ignore it, say there is nothing you can do about it, complain about it  
and not do anything, or put your energies into doing something about it. And for 
me, the only thing that is a meaningful use of my life is to work to improve the 
quality of life for people who are disadvantaged. I don't believe that just because 
one person is born on one side of some imaginary line and another person is born 
on the other side means that a lot of people should be getting screwed through no 
fault of their own.
Ben Cohen1
We do not live in a just world. This may be the least controversial claim one could 
make in political theory. But it is much less clear what, if anything, justice on a 
world scale might mean, or what hope for justice should lead us to want in the 
domain of international and global institutions, and in the policies of state that are 
in a position to affect the world order.
Thomas Nagel2
1. - Introduction.
The subject  of  this  thesis  is  global  justice.  By ‘justice’  here,  I  do  not  refer  to 
criminal justice or retributive justice. Rather, I am referring to distributive justice broadly 
construed. Thus I am not narrowly concerned with the just distribution of economic goods. 
My  thesis  is  also  concerned  with  the  just  distribution  of  advantages,  opportunities, 
liberties,  freedoms,  capabilities,  protections  and  other  non-economic  goods.  More 
1 American Businessman, Social Activist. Assessed on 20 Dec 2010 at URL = 
<http://www.betterworldheroes.com/pages-c/cohen-quotes.htm>.
2 Nagel 2005: 113.
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specifically, this thesis is an attempt to develop and argue for a theory of global justice. 
Such a theory specifies what everyone, as a matter of (broadly distributive) justice, owes 
towards each other person around the world; and thus it also specifies what constitutes 
(broadly distributive) justness and unjustness in the global arena.
However, given the extensiveness of this subject matter,  this thesis cannot even 
pretend to have a complete theory of global justice, so construed. It is therefore only the 
first step, which began with my M. Litt. Dissertation,3 of a research project, one that I hope 
will lead to a robust and accurate theory of global justice. This thesis therefore restricts 
itself to first discussing the basic framework of my theory of global justice, which can be 
summarized  as  consisting  in  two  aspects:  duties  of  minimal  wellbeing  and  duties  of 
fairness and equality.  The bulk of the thesis then focuses in detail on one of these two 
aspects – duties of minimal wellbeing.
2. - Assumptions of the Thesis.
Before I explain in detail the structure of this thesis, allow me to first discuss a 
couple of assumptions behind it.
2.1 – Justificatory Thinness & Justificatory Minimalism.
I take it as a basic requirement that whenever we would like to impose something 
on others, we need to be able to justify it to them. And this is no different with a theory of 
global justice,  since it  imposes obligations  on everyone around the world.  Seen in this 
light, this thesis is not just merely developing and arguing for a theory of global justice, it  
is an exercise in justification,  that attempts to justify a theory of global justice,  and its 
demands, to everyone around the world. The arguments in this thesis must therefore be 
understood against this background.
Because there is such a background, we therefore need to know what it means to 
3 Lee 2007.
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justify something to others. This is a notoriously difficult and deep issue, which requires a 
whole research project in its own right. Without offering a full-fledged account of what it 
means to  justify something to others,  I  believe we can make (for the purposes of this 
thesis)  the  following few points,  that  would be  accepted  by any plausible  full-fledged 
account of what it means to justify something to others.
To start with, since it is a theory of global justice that we are attempting to justify,  
and we are attempting to justify it  to everyone around the world, we are therefore not 
attempting to justify it to a group of homogeneous individuals, who share the same values, 
beliefs, commitments, conceptions of the world etc. Rather, we are attempting to justify it 
to a group of heterogeneous individuals who hold different, if not incompatible, values, 
beliefs, commitments, conceptions of the world etc. 
The reason why justification has to take that into account, is because of reasonable 
pluralism. There are a variety of different, but incompatible and irreconcilable, reasonable 
conceptions of the good, values etc., because of the burdens of judgement.4 Thus if that is 
not taken into account, when trying to justify something as normative as a theory of global 
justice, the justification would not acknowledge the burdens of judgement. 
As a result,  I therefore take something like Rawls’s overlapping consensus as a 
working model  that  reflects  this  kind of heterogeneity.  According to it,  we are able to 
justify a theory of global  justice to everyone around the world,  if  the theory could be 
agreed  upon  by  individuals  who  hold  different  and  incompatible,  but  reasonable, 
comprehensive doctrines.5 We are only asking that the theory  could be agreed upon by 
individuals, since they might not actually agree on it for reasons of ignorance, self-interest 
4 For reasonable pluralism, see Rawls 1996: 36-37. The general idea here is that given the nature of 
judgement  - its burdens – there can be, and indeed there are, reasonable disagreements concerning them. For 
burdens of judgement and its relation to reasonable pluralism, see Rawls 1996: 54-58.
5 This is not exactly what Rawls means by overlapping consensus. For him, the end that is secured by 
overlapping consensus is stability (or legitimacy according to some, see Muhall & Swift 1996: 184-188), not 
justification. However, what is significant about Rawls’s overlapping consensus for my purposes is the 
explicit acknowledgement of reasonable pluralism, something that we cannot ignore when talking about 
global justice, even though Rawls discussions of it seems to confine it to free democratic societies. See Rawls 
1996: 133-172 & 2001: 32-38.
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or  plain  irrationality.6 Yet  something  cannot  be  rendered  unjustified  because  of  such 
reasons. We are also asking that the theory could be agreed upon by individuals who hold 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Such individuals recognize the need to be able to 
justify impositions to those on whom one imposes, and the need to have a theory of global 
justice that takes into account the fact that all individuals around the world have some kind 
of  normative  status  that  is  worthy  of  consideration.7 An example  of  an  unreasonable 
comprehensive doctrine would be one which dogmatically asserts that some individuals of 
a  certain  race  are  basically  pests  that  reside  in  one’s  garden.  Individuals  with  such 
unreasonable comprehensive doctrines most probably could not agree with any theory of 
global justice. But just as individuals who hold the unreasonable view that they have the 
absolute divine right to kill whoever they want are not exempted from the obligation not to  
kill just because one wants to, even when they would not agree to the obligation at all, so 
individuals who hold unreasonable comprehensive doctrines are not exempted from the 
impositions of a theory of global justice, insofar as the theory could be agreed upon by all 
those who hold reasonable comprehensive doctrines. 
In any case, I do not believe that whether a theory of global justice could be agreed 
upon by individuals who hold different and incompatible but reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines is something that can be resolved from the armchair. This is because it involves 
taking all the reasonable comprehensive doctrines around the world, and asking, for each 
of them, whether the theory could be agreed upon by individuals who hold them. But this 
cannot be done, unless we know what various reasonable comprehensive doctrines there 
are  around  the  world.  This  is  not  something  that  can  be  known  in  an  armchair. 
6 I take this to mirror Rawls’s claim that the political conception of justice is supported (e.g. Rawls 2001: 32) 
or can be supported (e.g. Rawls 1996: 145) by different and incompatible but reasonable doctrines. Although 
Rawls does sometimes talk in terms of affirmation when he talks about overlapping consensus (e.g. Rawls 
2001: 33), he seems to be talking about the affirmation of citizens in a well-ordered society, who are 
idealized individuals rather than actual individuals. 
7 I take this to be analogous to Rawls’s claim that a reasonable comprehensive doctrine is one where the 
individual who holds it is ready to propose principles that specify the fair terms of cooperation and comply 
with them even at the expense his own interests as circumstances require, when others are moved to do 
likewise. See Rawls 2001: 191.
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Nevertheless,  I  believe  there  are  certain  commitments  that,  if  incorporated  while 
developing a  theory of global  justice,  will  result  in a theory that  most  likely could be 
agreed  upon  by  individuals  who  hold  different  and  incompatible  but  reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines. 
As I shall argue later in chapter 3 when I discuss the human flourishing account of 
duties  of minimal  wellbeing,  trying  to achieve overlapping consensus on something as 
normative as a theory of global justice is not just about offering it on the table, and asking 
whether everyone could reasonably agree with it. Rather, it involves making explicit one’s 
comprehensive doctrines, elucidating and justifying one’s beliefs,  commitments,  values, 
and weaving them all together into a theory of global justice. It also involves engaging the 
reasonable  comprehensive  doctrines  of  others,  to  understand  their  elucidation  and 
justification of their  beliefs,  values and commitments,  and understand them by relating 
them to one’s theory of global justice. The hope is that through such a process, a theory of 
global justice will eventually emerge which everyone could reasonably agree with. If that 
is the case, then I believe that if we bear in mind the following two commitments, when 
developing a  theory of  global  justice,  it  would be easier  for  it  to  achieve  overlapping 
consensus.
• Justificatory thinness:  the less rich and the less pervasive are  the concepts  that  are 
involved in a theory of global justice,8 the more likely that overlapping consensus can 
be achieved with that theory, and vice versa.
• Justificatory minimalism: the fewer are the starting ideas from which everything else is 
derived  in  a  theory  of  justice,  the  more  likely  that  overlapping  consensus  can  be 
achieved with that theory, and vice versa.
These two commitments mirror the intuitive idea that if there is less we need to agree on,  
8 As will become clearer when I argue against the human flourishing account in section 3 of chapter 3, I take 
a concept being rich to mean that it involves many other concepts, some of which are themselves also rich in 
this sense. The concept is therefore also pervasive in the sense that its meaning is intricately tied up with the 
meaning of many other concepts. One cannot understand its meaning independent from the meanings of its 
connected concepts, and a shift in the meaning of one will lead to a shift in the many others that are 
connected.
Page 13 of 222
and if the things on which we are trying to agree on are simpler, then we are more likely to  
reach agreement on them. More specifically, the less rich and the less pervasive are the 
concepts involved, the easier it would be to elucidate and justify them. It would also be 
easier for others to understand their elucidation and justification, and relate them to one’s 
beliefs, values and commitments. Furthermore, if the end on which we are trying to seek 
agreement is derived from fewer starting ideas, then (assuming the end is derived validly 
from those starting ideas) it would be easier for us to agree on the end. This is because 
there would be fewer things that we need to agree on, before we can do so. In contrast, if  
the end is derived from more starting ideas, then it would be harder for us to agree on the 
end. This is because there would be more that we need to agree on, before we can do so. 
Thus  the  less  starting  ideas  there  are  from which  the  end  is  derived,  the  easier  (and 
therefore the more likely) it is that agreement on the end can be achieved.
These two commitments - justificatory thinness and justification minimalism – are 
assumed in the background throughout this thesis. In places where they are particularly 
relevant  -  for example  in  my criticisms  of the human flourishing account  of  duties  of 
minimal wellbeing (chapter 3) and in my discussions on the objects of these duties (chapter 
7) - I shall make explicit reference to them.
2.2 – Strict Compliance Theory.
In  advancing  a  theory  of  global  justice,  this  thesis  is  also  restricted  to  strict 
compliance theory.  It concerns what global justice demands from individuals, assuming 
that all of them comply with its demands. In contrast, partial compliance theory does not 
assume that all individuals comply with its demands. Thus it further considers what global 
justice  demands  when that  happens.  Since  not  complying  with  the  demands  of  global 
justice constitutes an injustice, partial compliance theory is therefore concerned with what 
global justice demands, when there are injustices.9 An example of a theory of global justice 
9 The distinction between strict compliance theory and partial compliance theory is also drawn by Rawls. See 
Rawls 1971: 8.
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as a partial compliance theory is Miller's position.10  
One might doubt the value of strict compliance theory,  for two reasons: First, it 
seems too unrealistic an assumption, that all individuals would comply with the demands 
of global justice. Second, when we apply a theory of global justice, we are not creating a 
world from scratch according to the theory. Rather, we apply it in the world as we find it.  
And in the  world as  we find it,  there  are  already a lot  of  injustices  (recall  the Nagel  
quotation in the beginning). Thus the application of a theory of global justice - as a strict 
compliance theory - is rather limited, if not having no application at all.
I agree with the above two reasons. However, that just means we should never see 
strict compliance theory as a complete theory of global justice, not that there is no point in 
working on strict compliance theory. Indeed, insofar as partial compliance theory concerns 
what global justice demands when there are injustices, strict compliance theory is needed 
to  specify what  constitutes  injustices  -  the demands  of  global  justice  that  ought  to  be 
fulfilled  but  are  not  fulfilled  in  reality.11  It  is  only  when  we  know  what  constitutes 
injustices  that  we can  identify  when there  are   injustices,  and ask what  global  justice 
demands with regard to them. Thus at the very least, strict compliance theory supplements 
partial compliance theory. A complete theory of global justice must therefore include both 
of them. Given the limited space in this thesis, I therefore limit  it  to strict  compliance  
theory,  and leave  out  partial  compliance  theory for  future research (see Chapter  8  for 
further research).
2.3 – Individuals as Primary Duty Bearers.
This thesis is also only concerned with the content of our duties of global justice 
(under strict compliance theory). Thus it will not discuss who exactly bears these duties. 
Nevertheless, I believe that the primary bearers of these duties (the subsequent chapters of 
10 Miller 2007. Miller does not draw this distinction between strict compliance theory and partial compliance 
theory. But remedial responsibilities are what global justice demands from us when there are injustices.  
11 In the case of Miller, this role is played in part by his account of basic human rights. See Miller 2007: 163-
200 (chapter 7). 
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this thesis will discuss what exactly are these duties) are individuals themselves, subject to 
certain qualifications (e.g. in so far as they are not incapable to fulfil  them). To avoid 
complicating the discussions in this thesis with qualifying clauses, I shall proceed under 
the assumption, that it is individuals who are the primary bearers of these duties. 
The issue of who are the primary bearers of duties of justice, is a very extensive 
and complicated issue. Given the limited space in this thesis, it is impossible to adequately 
argue for and defend the above assumption.  I shall therefore leave this task for further 
research (see Chapter 8 for further research). To lend some plausibility to my assumption, I 
shall now briefly discuss an alternative but prominent position - the primary bearers of 
duties of justice are states, rather than individuals themselves.
To begin with, note that by holding individuals as the primary bearers of duties of 
justice, it does not follow that it should be they who have to discharge those duties, or that 
states do not have any duties of justice. Although individuals are the primary bearers of 
duties of justice, it seems plausible to suggest that for a variety of reasons (e.g. efficiency,  
issues of collective action, informational issues, economies of scale, costs, the legitimacy 
of  coercion  etc.),  it  is  best  that  states  discharge  these  duties  of  justice  on  behalf  of 
individuals. Thus states are the secondary bearers of duties of justice.12 Insofar as states 
appropriately discharge these duties of justice on behalf of individuals, then individuals 
can  be  seen  as  having appropriately  discharged  their  own duties  of  justice.  Thus it  is 
compatible with my position to hold states as the bearers of duties of justice rather than 
individuals, for a variety of instrumental reasons. The challenge for the alternative position 
– that  states  are  the primary bearers  of duties  of  justice -  is  to  offer  non-instrumental 
reasons for why that is the case.
Let me now briefly discuss the reasons that Rawls offers, who seems to hold the 
position that states are the primary bearers of duties of justice, when he argues that the 
12 Secondary in the sense that the duties that they bear are derived from the duties that individuals bear.
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primary subject of justice is the basic structure.13 Rawls offers two sets of reasons for his 
position.  The first  set  concerns  division of  labour,14 while  the second set concerns  the 
profound and pervasive influence that states have on the lives of individuals.15 Let me start 
with the first set.
According to Rawls, even if a society started out as just (because all the duties of 
justice  are  fulfilled),  as time goes  on together  with the actions  of  each individual,  the 
society would be less just. As he says, “Even though the initial state may have been just, 
and subsequent social conditions may also have been just for some time, the accumulated 
results of many separate and seemingly fair agreements entered into by individuals and 
associations  are  likely  over  an  extended  period  of  time  to  undermine  the  background 
conditions required for free and fair agreements. Very considerable wealth and property 
may accumulate in a few hands…”.16 To ensure that does not happen, individuals need to 
assess their every act, to see whether it compromises the justness of the society. This seems 
rather costly and practically impossible. A better alternative is to have a division of labour. 
States work constantly in the background to maintain the justness of the society, and lay 
down laws that prevent the actions of individuals from compromising that justness. From 
the perspective of justice, all individuals are required to do is to abide by those laws when 
they  act.  This  alternative  is  more  practically  possible  and  less  costly,  than  where 
individuals are required to assess their every act. As Rawls says, 
“we  rely  on  an  institutional  division  of  labour  between  principles  required  to 
preserve  background  justice  and  principles  that  apply  directly  to  particular 
transactions between individuals and associations. Once this division of labour is 
set up, individuals and associations are then left free to advance their (permissible) 
ends within the framework of  the basic  structure,  secure in  the knowledge that 
13 Rawls 1971: 7-11 & Rawls 2001: 10-12. For the purposes of the argument, I shall take the state to refer to 
the basic structure of the society. I do not think that any of my subsequent critical discussions depends on this 
claim. 
14 Rawls 2001: 52-55.
15 Rawls 2001: 55-57 & Rawls 1971: 7.
16 Rawls 2001: 53.
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elsewhere in the social  system the regulations necessary to preserve background 
justice are in force…. This allows us to abstract from the enormous complexities of 
the innumerable transactions of daily life and frees us from having to keep track of 
the changing relative positions of particular individuals”.17 
I agree that it is costly and practically impossible, for individuals to assess their every act 
to  see  whether  they  are  violating  duties  of  justice,  or  divert  all  their  actions  to  the 
fulfilment of duties of justice. However, these are just instrumental reasons for making 
states the bearers of duties of justice. Acknowledging them is therefore compatible, at least 
in theory, with holding individuals as the primary bearers of duties of justice. Rawls’s first 
set of reasons, therefore does not necessarily support holding states as the primary bearers 
of duties of justice.
The  second  set  of  reasons  that  Rawls  offered  for  holding  states,  rather  than 
individuals,  as  the  primary  bearers  of  duties  of  justice,  is  the  profound and pervasive 
influence that states have on the lives of individuals.18 As he explains, 
“The basic  structure  is  the  primary subject  of  justice  because  its  effects  are  so 
profound and present from the start. The intuitive notion here is that this structure 
contains various social positions and that men born into different positions have 
different expectations of life determined, in part, by the political system as well as 
by economic and social circumstances. In this way the institutions of society favour 
certain starting places over others. These are especially deep inequalities. Not only 
are they pervasive, but they affect men’s initial chances in life…”.19
It does seem to be true that states have a profound and pervasive influence on the lives of 
individuals. But so do many other things in the lives of individuals (e.g. his community, his 
workplace, his church, his friends etc. and the actions of other individuals). Thus at most 
the state has a more profound and pervasive influence on the lives of individuals,  than 
17 Rawls 2001: 54.
18 Rawls 2001: 55-57 & Rawls 1971: 7.
19 Rawls 1971: 7.
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other things in individuals’  lives.20 But that is just a difference in degree rather than a 
difference in type. Mere difference in degree does not seem to warrant making states the 
primary bearer of duties of justice, but while denying that other things in individuals’ lives, 
which also have the same feature but to a lesser degree, are also primary bearers of such 
duties. Furthermore, even if states do have so profound and so pervasive an influence on 
the lives of individuals - markedly discontinuous with the influence other things have on 
the lives of individuals - this can be taken into account by paying particular attention to 
states and their effects on individuals when fulfilling duties of justice, whoever the bearers 
of those duties are. Thus the fact that states have a profound and pervasive influence on the 
lives of individuals does not necessarily support holding states as the primary bearers of 
duties of justice. Neither of the two sets of reasons that Rawls gives necessarily support 
holding states as the primary bearers of duties of justice.
All this therefore lends plausibility to my assumption that it is individuals who are 
the primary bearers of duties of global justice. This assumption must be borne in mind 
when reading through this thesis.
3. - Structure of Thesis.
With the above three assumptions in place, the structure of this thesis is as follows: 
Chapter 2 starts by illustrating the basic framework of my theory of global justice, which 
consists in two aspects: duties of minimal wellbeing and duties of fairness and equality 
(sections 2 to 3). The rest of the chapter (sections 4 to 7) puts duties of minimal wellbeing 
aside, and focuses on duties of fairness and equality. In particular, it tries to illustrate the 
content of these duties, by discussing the different kinds of them that we have. After that, 
the rest of the thesis exclusively focuses on duties of minimal wellbeing. Chapter 3 starts it  
off  by  arguing  against  one  common  account  of  these  duties  –  the  human  flourishing 
20 Even this claim might be doubtful. It seems plausible to suggest that in some remote communities, it is the 
community rather than the state that has a more profound and pervasive influence on the lives of those who 
live in them. 
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account - in favour of my human-life account. According to my account, the function of 
duties of minimal wellbeing is to secure a human life for all individuals; and an account of 
what a human life consists in is derived from a conception of wellbeing.  This sets the 
overall  direction  for  the  subsequent  chapters  in  this  thesis.  Chapter  4  argues  for  and 
explains  my  Razian  conception  of  wellbeing.  According  to  it,  the  wellbeing  of  an 
individual is fundamentally constituted by: (a) the satisfaction of biological needs, and (b) 
his  success  in  whole-heartedly  pursuing  socially  defined  and  determined  goals  and 
activities which are in fact valuable. This is the conception of wellbeing from which an 
account of what a human life consists in is derived. Chapter 5 then defends my Razian 
conception of wellbeing against two alternative accounts of wellbeing – the Quality-of-
experience  View  and  the  Desire  Fulfilment  Theory.  With  my  Razian  conception  of 
wellbeing  defended,  chapter  6  first  derives,  from it,  an  account  of  what  a  human  life 
consists  in.  This  is  followed by a  discussion of  how the  objects  of  duties  of  minimal 
wellbeing are determined from the account. Using this as a background, chapter 7 then 
goes on to determine what exactly are the objects of these duties. Chapter 8 concludes the 
thesis, with a discussion on possible lines of further research, which includes revisiting the 
above two assumptions mentioned in section 2.2 and 2.3 of this chapter. 
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Chapter 2
Duties of Minimal Wellbeing and Duties of Fairness and 
Equality
1. - Introduction.
This  chapter  sets  out my basic  framework,  according to  which global  justice is 
concerned with the following two sets of things: (a) minimal wellbeing and (b) fairness and 
equality.  It  is because of this  that global justice is, generally speaking, concerned with 
individuals and the quality of their lives. This basic framework is broadly sufficientarian in 
character.  This means that although global justice requires us to do certain things with 
regard to minimal wellbeing and fairness and equality, once those are done, global justice 
requires no more, even if we can do more to improve the wellbeing of individuals, or to 
make things more fair or equal. This basic framework is also intended for a conception of 
global justice. Thus it is applicable to everyone around the world, whoever they are; no 
matter their race, nation, political affiliation etc.  
In section 2 below, by considering the contemporary literature on global justice, I 
introduce two sets of distinctions: duties of minimal wellbeing vs. duties of fairness and 
equality,  and  the  cosmopolitans  vs.  the  neo-cosmopolitans.  While  the  cosmopolitans 
believe  that  both  duties  of  minimal  wellbeing  and  duties  of  fairness  and  equality  are 
universal, neo-cosmopolitans believe that the latter duties are associative. In section 3, I 
side  with  the  neo-cosmopolitans  by  arguing  that  duties  of  fairness  and  equality  are 
associative because they are derived from the form of cooperation at hand, unlike duties of 
minimal wellbeing. I then set duties of minimal wellbeing aside and focus the rest of this 
chapter on duties of fairness and equality, in particular the kinds of duties of fairness and 
equality that we have. To that end, I first discuss in section 4 the nature of cooperation, 
from which  duties  of  fairness  and  equality  are  derived.  In  section  5,  I  identify  three 
different kinds of cooperation in our contemporary world: states, local  cooperation and 
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trans-state cooperation. In section 6, I argue that states, comparatively speaking, have a 
more significant and important role for duties of fairness and equality than the other two 
kinds of cooperation. I finally address the kinds of duties of fairness and equality that we 
have in section 7.
As I said in chapter 1 - Introduction, this thesis is concerned with the content of our 
duties of global justice under strict compliance theory. It will not talk about who exactly 
bears these duties. Nevertheless, as I have also said there, I do believe that it is individuals 
who are the primary bearers of these duties.21 To avoid complicating the rest of the thesis 
with qualifying clauses, the following discussions proceed under the assumption that it is 
individuals who are the primary bearers of these duties. 
2. - Contemporary Literature on Global Justice.
2.1 – Two Sets of Duties & Two Contrasting Positions on Them.
Two generalizations can be made when we survey the contemporary literature on 
global justice.
First, global justice is concerned with individuals in two different ways. On the one 
hand, it is concerned with individuals independently from other individuals - for example, 
whether their basic needs are fulfilled, whether their basic rights are protected, whether 
they have the means for a flourishing human life etc. On the other hand, global justice is 
also concerned with individuals in relation to other individuals - for example, whether they 
have equal or fair opportunities in life, whether they have a fair or equal share of resources 
etc.  What  is  common  between  the  former  concerns  is  that  if  X  is  something  about 
individuals that global justice is concerned about, e.g. basic needs, basic rights, means to a 
flourishing human life etc., then it is concerned with how they fare with regard to X – 
period. Contrast this with the latter concerns. What is common between them is that if X is 
21 I also briefly considered Rawls's alternative view there, that the primary bearers of these duties are states 
rather than individuals.
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something about individuals that global justice is concerned about, e.g. opportunities in 
life, share of resources etc., then it is concerned with how they fare with regard to X in 
relation to other individuals, where this relation is specified in terms of fairness or equality. 
These two kinds of concerns of global justice therefore give rise to two kinds of duties of 
justice: the former to what I call ‘duties of minimal wellbeing’, the latter to what I call 
‘duties of fairness and equality’. 
Second, we can roughly divide the various positions in the contemporary literature 
on global justice into two camps. On the one hand, there are the cosmopolitans; and on the 
other hand, there are what I call the ‘neo-cosmopolitans’. They are neo-cosmopolitan in the 
sense that  they are responses to and in  opposition to  the cosmopolitans.  But  they also 
accept a crucial cosmopolitan claim about duties of minimal wellbeing, which is why they 
are neo- rather than non-cosmopolitan. Both the cosmopolitans and the neo-cosmopolitans 
believe that duties of minimal wellbeing are universal. These duties are directed towards 
all individuals around the world. It is on duties of fairness and equality that the two camps 
are divided. On the one hand, cosmopolitans believe that duties of fairness and equality, 
like duties of minimal wellbeing, are universal. They are directed towards all individuals 
around the world, and are concerned with how individuals fare with regard to X in relation 
to  all other individuals around the world. The positions of Caney, early Beitz and early 
Pogge are examples of this.22 On the other hand, neo-cosmopolitans believe that duties of 
fairness and equality, unlike duties of minimal wellbeing, are not universal but associative. 
These  duties  are  only  held  by  and  directed  towards  individuals  who  have  certain 
associative relationships among themselves, where these associative relationships are more 
substantive than merely being members of the same species or living on the same planet.  
Furthermore, these duties are only concerned with how individuals fare with regard to X in 
relation to other members of the same associative relationship. Different neo-cosmopolitan 
positions identify different associative relationships as being relevant here. For example for 
22 Caney 2005, Bietz 1979 & Pogge 1989.
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Nagel, it is sovereign states that act in their subjects’ name;23 for Blake, it is states with 
coercive property laws;24 while for Rawls’s Law of Peoples, it is peoples.25 A less clear 
case of neo-cosmopolitanism is David Miller.26 He also argues against universal duties of 
fairness  and  equality;27 but  for  duties  of  fairness  and  equality  among  members  in 
instrumental  associations  and  citizenship.28 But  a  set  of  basic  human  rights  must  be 
protected  for  everyone  everywhere  regardless  of  where  and  who  they  are.29 What 
distinguishes  Miller  from  other  neo-cosmopolitans  is  his  concern  with  national 
responsibilities,  according  to  which  individuals  of  a  nation  can  be  collectively  held 
outcome responsible for a certain state of affairs;30 and how these national responsibilities 
affect what basic human rights demand.31
There  are  exceptions  to  the  above  generalization.  Certain  positions,  e.g. 
Nussbaum’s,32 agree  with  the  cosmopolitans  and  the  neo-cosmopolitans  that  there  are 
universal duties of minimal wellbeing. Yet it is unclear whether she thinks that duties of 
fairness and equality are universal or associative. As she says, 
“A list of the central capabilities is not a complete theory of justice. Such a list 
gives us the basis for determining a decent social minimum in a variety of areas. I  
argue that the structure of social and political institutions should be chosen, at least 




26 It is not obvious in the sense that in contemporary literature, he is usually not placed alongside the other 
neo-cosmopolitans, i.e. Nagel, Blake and Rawls’s Law of Peoples.
27 Miller 2007: 12-17, 27-43 & 51-80. I shall briefly discuss his arguments against the cosmopolitans in the 
next section.
28 Miller 1999: 25-32. There are also duties of justice among members of solidaristic communities, which are 
characterized in terms of needs. But this is not a duty of fairness and equality as I understand them.
29 Miller 2007: 163-200. 
30 Miller 2007: 111-161.
31 It is true that beyond his basic human rights, Miller also endorses fair terms of cooperation between 
societies (Miller 2007: 267). But this is very different from the kind of universal duties of fairness and 
equality advocated by cosmopolitans. This is because first, it is directed towards societies, while the 
cosmopolitans’ universal duties of fairness and equality are directed towards individuals. Second, even if it 
gives rise to universal duties of fairness and equality that are directed to individuals (Ibid: 75-80 & 267), 
these duties are not grounded in a concern for individuals, unlike those advocated by the cosmopolitans. And 
these duties are only concerned with excessive inequalities and unfairness between individuals, and are thus 
arguably much more restricted than the cosmopolitans’ universal duties of fairness and equality.
32 Nussbaum 2000, 2006.
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capabilities. But the provision of a threshold level of capability, exigent though that 
goal is, may not suffice for justice, as I shall elaborate further later, discussing the 
relationship  between  social  minimum  and  our  interest  in  equality.  The 
determination of such additional requirements of justice awaits another inquiry”.33 
However, in her next book on this topic,34 rather than these additional requirements 
of  justice,  she  discusses  how  her  Capabilities  Approach  can  solve  three  problems  of 
contractarian approaches. 
Beitz's position, in his recent book on human rights,35 is also like this. In discussing 
his  practical  conception  of  human  rights,36 he  made  it  explicit  that  his  account  is  not 
committed to the cosmopolitan and neo-cosmopolitan divide.37 One must also note that he 
explicitly argued that his account of human rights is also not minimal, in the sense that is 
taken in contemporary literature.  As he says, “... these considerations do not argue that 
human rights are in any other way “minimalist” - for example, they do not support the idea 
that human rights are protections of conditions for “a minimally good life” or “for any life 
at  all.”  For  human  rights  can  be  said  to  be “minimalist”  in  any sense,  it  is  that  they 
constitute only a “proper subset” of the rights of social justice”.38 Accordingly, his account 
of universal duties of 'minimal' wellbeing, which are basically the corresponding duties of 
his account of human rights, would be more extensive than the ones we have considered so 
far.
Other positions seem to deny duties of fairness and equality altogether, even though 
they  agree  with  the  cosmopolitans  and  the  neo-cosmopolitans  that  there  are  universal 
duties of minimal wellbeing. Brock seems to be of this kind when she argues for a needs-
33 Nussbaum 2000: 75.
34 Nussbaum 2006.
35Beitz 2009.
36For his practical conception of human rights, see Beitz 2009: 102-117.
37Beitz 2009: 113. The distinction that Beitz draws himself is between 'statist' and 'cosmopolitan' conceptions 
of global justice. I take it that the latter refers to what I have called the cosmopolitans, while the former refers 
to one kind of what I have called the neo-cosmopolitans – political conceptions of justice. For a discussion on 
political conceptions of justice, see section 6 of this chapter. 
38Beitz 2009: 143.
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based minimal  floor  principle  rather  than  a  global  difference  principle,  and argues  for 
ensuring  that  everyone  has  a  decent  set  of  opportunities  rather  than  equality  of 
opportunities.39 The later position of Pogge is also an example of this kind,40 given the 
Libertarian  framework  that  he  is  working  under.  Accordingly  his  duties  of  minimal 
wellbeing are even more minimal than other accounts. They only involve negative duties 
while other accounts usually involve both negative and positive duties.41 
Finally, there are positions that explicitly deny the universal duties of fairness and 
equality advocated by the cosmopolitans. But while they advocate something similar to the 
neo-cosmopolitans - i.e. that there are associative duties of fairness and equality - I am 
reluctant to classify them as neo-cosmopolitans. This is because they do not endorse the 
kind of universal duties of minimal wellbeing that are accepted by both the cosmopolitans 
and the neo-cosmopolitans. Take for example Richard Miller, who denies cosmopolitans’ 
universal duties of fairness and equality.42 He argues for duties of minimal wellbeing and 
duties  of  fairness  and equality  among  compatriots;  these are  characterized  in  terms  of 
duties of civic friendship (which involve a special concern for compatriots’ needs), fair 
provision  of  benefits,  mitigation  of  socially  created  disadvantages,  and  territorial 
trusteeship (which involves a special concern for those who are severely disabled).43 But 
global justice for Miller has the aim of global civic friendship;44 and it is concerned with 
exploitation in the transnational economy, inequity in international trade arrangements,45 
negligence in climate harms and imperial  irresponsibility.46 This is because all  of them 
involve taking advantage of individuals, and that is contrary to global civic friendship.47 
39 Brock 2009: 73.
40 Pogge 2002b.
41 Pogge 2002b: 13. There is a complication here. Pogge argued that if there is a coercive social order under 
which individuals do not have secure access to the objects of their human rights, then not only is there a duty 
to not participate in that social order, there is also a duty to reform that social order. (Ibid: 62-63.) Arguably 
this latter duty to reform is a positive rather than a negative duty. However, it has been argued that this duty 
to reform is actually inconsistent with the Libertarian framework that Pogge is working under.  
42 Miller 2010: 233-234.
43 Miller 2010: 43-57.
44 Miller 2010: 230-234.
45 Miller 2010: 58-83.
46 Miller 2010: 84-117 & 118-209.
47 Miller 2010: 230-231.
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Thus it seems that for Miller there is a universal duty not to take advantage of others. This 
however is not a duty of fairness and equality as I have understood it, which is concerned 
(intrinsically) with how individuals fare with regard to X in relation to other individuals. 
This is because insofar as this universal duty (to not to take advantage of others), leads us 
to be concerned with how individuals fare with regard to X in relation to other individuals, 
we are only concerned with it instrumentally – as a cause for instances of taking advantage. 
Thus insofar it is not a cause for any such instances, we would not be concerned with it. 
This would not be the case with duties of fairness and equality. Furthermore, even though 
this universal duty (to not take advantage of others) grounds universal duties of justice to 
relieve individuals from dire needs, because that is one of the main reasons why they can 
be taken advantage of;48 it would be a mistake to understand these duties as the universal 
duties  of  minimal  wellbeing  that  are  accepted  by  the  cosmopolitans  and  the  neo-
cosmopolitans. This is because these duties are ultimately grounded on how individuals 
should relate  to each other,  rather than a concern for individuals.  It is  true that Miller 
(besides global civic friendship) also endorses the Principle of Sympathy, which grounds 
duties based on the neediness of others.49 However, these duties are also unlike universal 
duties of minimal wellbeing. This is because first, if these duties are directed towards one’s 
compatriots, they might have more priority than those that are directed towards foreigners; 
and second, these duties can be outweighed by other (special) duties that are grounded in 
one’s special relationships with others.50 Neither of these holds in the case of universal 
duties of minimal wellbeing.
In  spite  of  the  above  exceptions,  the  two  distinctions,  i.e.  duties  of  minimal 
wellbeing  vs.  duties  of  fairness  and  equality  and  the  cosmopolitans  vs.  the  neo-
cosmopolitans, cover enough ground to be accurate and plausible. I therefore take them as 
48 Miller 2010: 231-232.
49 Miller 2010: 10-30.
50 Miller 2010: 23-30.
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my starting point, and begin with the disagreement between the cosmopolitans and the neo-
cosmopolitans.
2.2 – The Cosmopolitans vs. the Neo-cosmopolitans.
Cosmopolitans tend to argue for universal duties of fairness and equality by taking 
domestic theories of justice and applying them on a global scale. Along the way, they also 
establish universal duties of minimal wellbeing. But we can leave the latter for now, since 
both the cosmopolitans and the neo-cosmopolitans agree on them. Cosmopolitans usually 
take the best arguments for duties of fairness and equality in the domestic arena, and use 
them to argue for universal duties of fairness and equality in the global arena. Thus for 
example, Beitz and early Pogge take Rawls’s argument for his Difference Principle in the 
domestic  arena  (i.e.  the original  position),51 extend the  parties  involved in  the original 
position to include everyone around the world, and use it to argue for something similar to 
Rawls’s Difference Principle in the global arena.52 Caney also does this when he argues for 
his  global  norms  of  distributive  justice,  which  include  subsistence  rights,  equality  of 
opportunity, a principle of equal remuneration for equal work, and a priority for the poor.53 
As he said in the beginning of the chapter where he argues for them:
“… I now want to introduce a general claim about the character of the arguments 
employed  to  defend  cosmopolitan  principles  of  justice…  the  scope2 claim:  the 
standard  justifications  of  principles  of  distributive  justice  entail  that  there  are 
cosmopolitan principles of distributive justice. The latter maintains that the very 
logic that underpins most domestic theories of justice actually implies that these 
theories  of  distributive  justice  should  be  enacted  at  the  global,  and not  (or  not 
simply) the domestic, level”.54
51 Beitz 1979: 125-176 & Pogge 1989: 240-280. 
52 The difference between Beitz’s and Pogge’s positions is just that, while Beitz contends that the resulting 
universal duties of fairness and equality are exactly the same as Rawls’s Difference Principle in the domestic 
arena, Pogge contends that they would be less stringent than their domestic analogues. See Beitz 1979: 151 & 
Pogge 1989: 272-273.
53 Caney 2005: 20.
54 Caney 2005: 107. See also Ibid: 121-125.
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Against the cosmopolitans, the neo-cosmopolitans argue that arguments for duties 
of fairness and equality in the domestic arena cannot and should not be seamlessly moved 
into the global arena to argue for universal duties of fairness and equality. Some of their 
arguments target a specific cosmopolitan. For example, against Beitz, Barry argues that 
trading in the global arena is not the relevant kind of cooperation that grounds Rawls’s 
arguments for his Difference Principle in the domestic arena.55 Thus Beitz cannot just use 
Rawls’s argument to argue for a Difference Principle in the global arena. There are also 
arguments  targeting  certain  approaches  that  cosmopolitans  widely  use.  For  example, 
against  the  prospect  of  extending  Rawls’s  theory  of  justice,  i.e.  the  two principles  of 
justice, from the domestic arena to the global arena, Wenar argues that the global public 
political culture is different from the public political culture of a liberal democratic society. 
While the latter supports Rawls’s theory of justice in the domestic arena, the former does 
not  support  it  in  the  global  arena.56 Against  those  he  calls  the  ‘global  extrapolators’, 
Richard  Miller  argues  for  a  view  similar  to  Barry’s,  that  the  mere  fact  of  economic 
interdependence  in  the  global  arena  does  not  sustain  a  demanding  duty  to  help  the 
disadvantaged. This is because what primarily ground this duty in the domestic arena are 
not facts of economic interdependence, but facts of political interaction.57 Finally, there are 
arguments targeting cosmopolitans in general. For example, Blake argues that there are 
duties of fairness and equality in the domestic  arena,  i.e.  states that  coercively impose 
property laws. This is because those duties are required to justify this kind of coercion. But 
this kind of coercion does not exist in the global arena. Thus there are no duties of fairness 
and equality in the global arena.58 Nagel also argues for something similar.59 According to 
Nagel,  there are duties of fairness and equality in the domestic  arena, i.e.  the arena of 
55 Barry 1982.
56 Wenar 2006.
57 Miller 2010: 31-57.
58 Blake 2001.
59 I believe that the main difference between Blake’s and Nagel’s position is how they understand the kind of 
coercion that is at stake here. For Blake, it is the coercive imposition of property laws by states. While for 
Nagel, it is the coercion imposed by sovereign states in the name of their subjects.
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sovereign states. This is because sovereign states impose coercion in the name of their 
subjects, and those duties are required to justify such an imposition. But there is nothing in 
the global arena that imposes coercion in the name of the individuals around the world. 
Thus there are no duties of fairness and equality in the global arena.60 David Miller also 
offers arguments against the cosmopolitans. According to his first argument,61  there are 
duties of fairness and equality in the domestic arena because justice involves establishing 
the conditions under which individuals within a domestic arena can continually act as free 
and equal citizens. In contrast, nothing in the global arena is equivalent to that. Rather, 
individuals relate to each other in the global arena “... as citizens of independent national 
communities, where each citizen body has a collective interest in determining the future of 
its  own  community”.62 In  his  second  argument,63 Miller  argues  that  as  long  as  the 
cosmopolitans argue for their case by arguing that nationality is a morally arbitrary feature 
of individuals, then the cosmopolitans can be refuted by showing that nationality is not a 
morally arbitrary feature of individuals.64
2.3 – Siding with the Neo-cosmopolitans. 
This  debate  between  the  cosmopolitans  and  the  neo-cosmopolitans  runs  deep. 
Resolving it therefore requires a whole research project, of which a PhD thesis can at most 
be a part. As a first step towards this project, I therefore focus this thesis on where the 
cosmopolitans and the neo-cosmopolitans agree – that there are universal duties of minimal 
wellbeing. This is the subject of the subsequent chapters in this thesis. Nevertheless, I still 
would  like  to  take  a  stand  in  the  debate  between  the  cosmopolitans  and  the  neo-
cosmopolitans. In the rest of this chapter, I side with the neo-cosmopolitans and suggest 
another argument for why duties of fairness and equality are associative, which turns on 
60 Nagel 2005.
61 Miller 2007: 15-16.
62Miller 2007: 15.
63 Miller 2007: 16-17 & 27-343.
64 Miller’s third argument directly challenges some of the specific principles underlying certain alleged 
universal duties of fairness and equality. See Miller 2007: 51-80. 
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the nature of duties of fairness and equality. In the section below, I suggest that duties of 
fairness and equality are  derived from the form of cooperation at  hand. Thus they are 
associative in two senses: first, they are only held by and directed towards individuals who 
are members of the cooperation from which those duties are derived; and second, these 
duties are only concerned with how individuals fare with regard to X in relation to other 
members of the cooperation from which those duties are derived. Furthermore, this relation 
that  is  specified  in  terms  of  fairness  and  equality  is  determined  by  the  form of  that 
cooperation.  This  is  how  I  think  the  debate  between  the  cosmopolitans  and  the  neo-
cosmopolitans can be resolved. 
3. - Duties of Fairness and Equality & Forms of Cooperation
Rawls seems to have suggested that duties of fairness and equality are derived from 
the form of cooperation at hand. In the beginning of A Theory of Justice before he argued 
for his two principles of justice, he said, “The various forms of justice are the outgrowth of 
different  notions  of  society  against  the  background  of  opposing  views  of  the  natural 
necessities  and opportunities  of  human life”65.  Since  Rawls  conceives  the  society as  a 
social  cooperation,66 the  various  conceptions  of  justice  are  therefore  the  outgrowth  of 
different notions of social cooperation. I take it that different notions of social cooperation 
incorporate  different  views  of  the  natural  necessities  and  opportunities  of  human  life. 
Rawls continues, “[f]ully to understand a conception of justice we must make explicit the 
form of social cooperation from which it derives”.67 He therefore seems to be suggesting 
that  conceptions  of  justice  are  generally  speaking  derived  from  forms  of  social 
cooperation. Accordingly, if we have different forms of social cooperation, then we would 
also have different conceptions of justice. This is the idea that I shall discuss.68 I suggest 
65 Rawls 1971: 9.
66 Rawls 1971: 4.
67 Rawls 1971: 9-10.
68 This idea has also been discussed in relative detail by David Miller, though in different terms. See Miller 
1976: 253-344.
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that duties of fairness and equality are derived from the forms of social cooperation at 
hand;  and  accordingly,  different  forms  of  social  cooperation  yield  different  duties  of 
fairness  and  equality.  This  lends  plausibility  to  the  claim  that  duties  of  fairness  and 
equality are associative, while duties of minimal wellbeing are universal. 
3.1 – Duties of Fairness and Equality as Deriving from Forms of Cooperation.
What is the form of social cooperation on which Rawls focuses, from which his 
two principles of justice are derived? In the beginning of A Theory of Justice, he says:
“Let  us  assume,  to  fix  ideas,  that  a  society  is  a  more  or  less  self-sufficient 
association of persons who in their relations to one another recognize certain rules 
of conduct  as binding and who for  the most  part  act  in  accordance  with them. 
Suppose  further  that  these  rules  specify  a  system  of  cooperation  designed  to  
advance the good of those taking part in it. Then although a society is a cooperative 
venture for mutual advantage, it is typically marked by conflict as well as by an 
identity of interests. There is an identity of interests since social cooperation makes  
possible a better life for all than any would have if each were to live solely by his  
own efforts. There is a conflict of interests since persons are not indifferent as to 
how the  greater  benefits  produced by their  collaboration  are  distributed,  for  in  
order to pursue their ends they each prefer a larger than lesser share. A set of 
principles is required for choosing among the various social arrangements which 
determine this division of advantages and for underwriting an agreement  on the 
proper distributive shares. These principles are the principles of social justice...”69
Rawls seems to have something like the following form of social cooperation in 
mind,  from  which  his  two  principles  of  justice  are  derived:  It  is  a  form  of  social 
cooperation that advances each individual’s pursuit of their own ends, beyond their ability 
to do so individually by themselves without cooperating. With this, it seems plausible to 
69 Rawls 1971: 4. My Italics.
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suggest  that  the  best  way  to  fairly  distribute  the  burdens  and  benefits  of  the  social 
cooperation, is to distribute them unequally to the greatest advantage of the worst off. That 
is basically the Difference Principle, which is part of Rawls’s second principle of justice.70 
This seems plausible for the following reasons: Even if everyone’s pursuit of their own 
ends  is  already  advanced  by  the  social  cooperation  beyond  their  ability  to  do  so 
individually,  it  still  seems plausible that for those who are in a better  off position,  the 
pursuit of their own ends is advanced more by the social cooperation, than it is for those 
who are in  a  worse  off  position.  If  distributing  the benefits  and burdens of  the  social 
cooperation in a way that best advances the worst offs’ pursuit of their own ends would 
also advance the better offs’ pursuit of their own ends,71 then the best way to ensure that 
the social cooperation advances each individual’s pursuit of their own ends beyond their 
ability to do so individually,  is to distribute its burdens and benefits in a way that best 
advances the worst offs’ pursuit of their ends. In other words, to the greatest advantage of 
the worst off.72
Earlier I said that different notions of social cooperation incorporate different views 
of  the  natural  necessities  and  opportunities  of  human  life.  Rawls’s  form  of  social 
cooperation is also informed by his view of the natural necessities and opportunities of 
human life. It is because he sees each individual as having their own ends to pursue,73 and 
that we are finite beings who can better  pursue our own ends if we cooperate,  that he 
conceives  social  cooperation  as  advancing  each individuals’  pursuit  of  their  own ends 
beyond their  ability to do so individually.  But one might  have a different  view of the 
70 Rawls 1971: 75-83.
71 This is the idea of ‘chain connection’ that Rawls painstakingly argued for. See Rawls 1971: 81-82. 
However, it is doubtful whether it necessarily holds.
72 Note that here I am not trying to argue that it is justified to think that the Difference Principle is the most 
fair way, to distribute the benefits and burdens of the kind of social cooperation that Rawls had in mind. That 
would require a systematic assessment of all the arguments that Rawls offered for his two principles of 
justice, and that is beyond the scope of this thesis. What I am trying to show here is how one can see Rawls’s 
conception of justice as arising from, or as derived from, his conception of social cooperation. This is 
illustrated by considering the plausibility of his conception of justice in relation to the conception of social 
cooperation he had in mind. 
73 Recall Rawls’s idea of ‘Free and Equal Persons’, who have ‘two moral powers’. One of these powers being 
the capacity for a conception of the good. See Rawls 2001: 18-24.
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natural necessities and opportunities of human life, and subsequently a different form of 
social cooperation in mind than that on which Rawls focuses. If that is the case, then it 
seems plausible to suggest that at least under that alternative form of social cooperation, 
some  conception  of  justice  other  than  Rawls’s  is  the  best  way to  fairly  distribute  the 
burdens and benefits of that social cooperation. Let me illustrate this with three examples.
a) One might have a view that a human life is a life that is only authored by the individual 
whose life it is.  This might lead to a form of social cooperation that is aimed at only 
mitigating the effects of the ‘natural lottery’ on each individual’s pursuit of their own 
ends.74 Under such a form of social cooperation, it seems plausible to suggest that the 
best  way to fairly distribute the burdens and benefits  of the social  cooperation is to 
make the distribution sensitive to individuals’ choices.75 
b) One might have a view that a human life is a life that is devoted to the achievement of 
some impartial end. One can imagine people who devote their lives to the service of 
God as examples of this. One might then have a form of social cooperation that is aimed 
at achieving that impartial end. It then seems plausible to suggest that the best way to 
fairly distribute the burdens and benefits of such a social cooperation is to make the 
distribution  sensitive  to  each  individual’s  contribution  to  the  achievement  of  that 
impartial end. 
c) One might have a view that a human life is a life that has to have a certain specific good, 
for example basic healthcare. One might then have a form of social cooperation that is 
aimed at securing that certain specific good for each individual. It then seems plausible 
to suggest, that the best way to fairly distribute the burdens and benefits of such a social 
cooperation, is to distribute them in a way that secures this certain specific good for 
each individual.76     
74 By the effects of ‘natural lottery’, I refer to the effects that originate from things over which individuals 
have no control. For example their level of inherent natural talents. 
75 Such a conception of justice is basically the position of Luck Egalitarianism. See Dworkin 2000: 65-119 
for an example of such a position. 
76 I think a good example of this is the National Insurance Scheme for NHS in U.K. 
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If the above are true, then they lend plausibility to the following: Since duties of 
fairness and equality are derived from the form of cooperation at hand, these duties are 
therefore associative in the sense that they are restricted to members of the cooperation 
from which they are derived. More specifically, they are only held by and directed towards 
individuals who are members of the cooperation from which they are derived, and they are 
only concerned with how individuals fare with regard to X in relation to other members of 
that  cooperation.  Furthermore,  given that  different  forms of cooperation  yield  different 
duties of fairness and equality, when these duties are concerned with how individuals fare 
with regard to X in relation to other members of the cooperation, this fairness and equality 
relation is determined by the form of that cooperation.
In contrast, duties of minimal wellbeing are not derived from forms of cooperation. 
Of course, that is not to say that what they amount to is blatantly obvious, or that there is 
nothing  from which  they  are  derived.  As  I  shall  argue  in  the  next  chapter,  duties  of 
minimal wellbeing are concerned with securing a human life for individuals. One might 
flesh this out in terms of an account of human flourishing, and subsequently see duties of 
minimal wellbeing as deriving from it.77 But I shall argue that a better way to do so is 
through an account of wellbeing, or more specifically my Razian conception of wellbeing. 
All of this will be discussed in the next chapters. Nevertheless, we can talk about what is 
involved  in  securing  a  human  life  for  individuals  without  appealing  to  any  form  of 
cooperation or even notions of fairness and equality. All we need is some general account 
of what it means to live a human life, and that all human beings are entitled to live a human 
life. The duties of minimal wellbeing that are derived from that general account are then 
applicable to all individuals, in virtue of the fact that they are human beings. Duties of 
minimal  wellbeing  are  thus  universal,  in  the  sense  that  they  are  directed  towards  all 
individuals around the world. Of course, notions of fairness and equality might appear as a 
result of this process. For example, one might think that what the above leads to is that it is 
77 Nussbaum’s approach of the ten central capabilities is an example of this. See Nussbaum 2000 & 2006.
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unfair,  if  some individuals have less of the things that securing a human life involves, 
while  some other  individuals  have more.  Or that  all  individuals  should  have  an  equal 
amount of those things. Nevertheless, even if notions of fairness and equality do appear as 
a result of this process, they are not derived from forms of cooperation. Duties of minimal 
wellbeing  are  therefore  universal,  in  contrast  to  the  duties  of  fairness  and  equality  I 
mentioned in the previous paragraph, which are associative because they are derived from 
forms of cooperation.
3.2 – Forms of Cooperation.
I  take  the  above  examples  -  (a)  to  (c)  together  with  Rawls  –  as  paradigmatic 
examples of different forms of cooperation.78 Each of them incorporates a different view of 
the natural necessities and opportunities of human life, and different duties of fairness and 
equality are derived from each of them. A view of the natural necessities of human life is a 
view of what is needed for us to lead a human life, given the kind of being that we are;  
while a view of the opportunities of human life is a view of what (very broadly understood) 
people can do, or ought to do, with their  lives.  It can refer to something as minute as 
writing  a  book  or  taking  up  a  hobby,  to  something  as  grand as  lifelong  plans  or  the 
structure  and  direction  of  peoples'  lives.  A scheme  of  cooperation  aims  to  realize  its 
corresponding view (of the natural necessities and opportunities of human life) among its 
participants. This is the specific aim of the scheme of cooperation - what the cooperation is 
specifically about.  Its  form of cooperation  is  abstracted from its  specific  aim.  It  is  the 
general aim of the scheme of cooperation – what the cooperation is generally about. It is in 
this  sense  that  forms  of  cooperation  incorporate  views  of  the  natural  necessities  and 
opportunities of human life. The above example (b) best illustrates this difference between 
the specific aim of a scheme of cooperation and its general aim. The specific aim of that 
scheme of cooperation is  realizing,  among its  participants,  a life  that is devoted to the 
78 They are not exhaustive though.
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service of God. Its abstracted form of cooperation - its general aim - is the achievement of 
an impartial end.  
My  claim  is  that  duties  of  fairness  and  equality  are  derived  from  forms  of 
cooperation. The kind of derivation that I have in mind is something like this: given this 
form of cooperation,  it  follows there are such and such duties of fairness and equality, 
whether or not in fact participants of the corresponding scheme of cooperation recognize 
them.
As I shall argue later in section 4.2 of this chapter, the forms of cooperation (and 
subsequently their incorporated views of the natural necessities and opportunities of human 
life),  are  expressed,  if  not  defined  by,  the  rules  of  their  corresponding  schemes  of 
cooperation. But I take that to mean, generally speaking, that the forms of cooperation are 
implicit  in  the  values  that  are  (widely)  shared  among  the  participants  of  their 
corresponding schemes of cooperation.79 This is because of the following: As I shall argue 
later in section 4.1 of this chapter, a scheme of cooperation cannot be said to exist, unless 
most of its participants abide by its rules. They might do so freely and voluntarily, or they 
might do so out of coercion. But they would not do so freely and voluntarily, unless they 
accepted  those  rules,  and by extension,  the  form of  cooperation.  But  why would  they 
accept  them?  The  most  straightforward  explanation  is  that  those  rules  (and  their 
corresponding  form  of  cooperation)  exhibit  values  that  they  hold.  Something  similar 
happens in the case of coercion, but with a twist. Since coercion is involved, we need to 
ask whether it is legitimate - whether the coercion is justified to those who are subject to it. 
But how might one proceed with such a justification? The most straightforward way is to 
appeal to the values that they hold, and show that the rules (and their corresponding form 
of cooperation) also exhibit those values. Thus it is justified to coerce them to abide by 
these rules,  because these rules  (and their  corresponding forms  of  cooperation)  exhibit 
79 Since duties of fairness and equality are derived from forms of cooperation, I take this as one way of 
understanding Rawls’s claim, that his conception of justice is expressed in terms of certain fundamental ideas 
that are implicit in the public political culture of a democratic society. See Rawls 1996: 13-15 & 2001:5-7.   
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values that they (implicitly) hold. As one can see, in both cases, forms of cooperation are 
implicit  in  the  values  that  are  (widely)  shared  among  the  participants  of  their 
corresponding schemes of cooperation.80 
I do think that there is a variety of different views of the natural necessities and 
opportunities of human life. But not all of them are on par with each other. There might be 
some views that are harmful, immoral or just plain evil. An example of this might be a 
view that is predicated on racial superiority and the extermination of ‘inferior’ races. There 
might also be some views that are false, for example a view that is predicated on serving a 
non-existent  being.  Are there  duties  of fairness  and equality  that  are  derived from the 
forms of cooperation, which incorporate such kinds of bad or false views?
I think there are. Just as there are duties to fairly and equally distribute stolen goods 
among a group of thieves, there are duties to fairly and equally distribute the benefits and 
burdens  of  the  cooperation  between  participants  of  a  cooperation,  even  if  its  form of 
cooperation incorporates a bad view (of the natural necessities and opportunities of human 
life). It is just that since the participants are cooperating to do bad, they incur other duties,  
e.g.  duties  of  compensation,  that  override  the  duties  of  fairness  and  equality  among 
themselves. But that is not to say that there are no duties of fairness and equality among 
them, just because they are cooperating to do bad. The reason behind this is rather simple. 
What grounds the requirement to fairly and equally distribute the benefits and burdens of a 
scheme of cooperation, is not what the cooperation is about, i.e. the content of its form of 
cooperation.  Rather,  it  is the fact that its participants  play their  roles in the scheme of 
cooperation, and therefore do not only contribute, but are also benefited or burdened by it. 
If that is the case, then even if the participants of a scheme of cooperation are cooperating 
to do bad, there are still duties of fairness and equality among them, in virtue of the fact 
that they, as participants, play their role in the cooperation. But if that is the case, then for 
80 Of course this only holds generally, since it might not apply in cases of illegitimate coercion, and in certain 
cases of legitimate coercion which involve different kinds of justification.
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exactly the same reasons, there are duties of fairness and equality also in cases that involve 
false views. Even though its form of cooperation incorporates a false view, the participants 
of such a scheme of cooperation have played their roles in the cooperation. Insofar as their 
contributions, benefits or burdens are real, that already grounds the requirement to fairly 
and equally distribute among them the benefits and burdens of the cooperation, regardless 
of the fact that its form of cooperation incorporates a false view. Thus to answer the above 
posed question: Yes, there still are duties of fairness and equality that are derived from the 
forms of cooperation, which incorporate bad or false views of the natural necessities and 
opportunities of human life.  
3.3 – Summary: The Basic Framework of My Theory of Global Justice.
I have been laying out the basic framework of my conception of global justice. It is 
a neo-cosmopolitan position, which holds that there are duties of minimal wellbeing and 
duties of fairness and equality in the global arena. While the former duties are universal, in 
the sense that they are directed towards all individuals around the world, the latter duties 
are associative. I suggested that the reason for this is that they are derived from the form of 
cooperation at hand. Thus they are associative in the sense that first, they are only held by 
and directed towards individuals who are members of the cooperation from which those 
duties are derived. And second, these duties are only concerned with how individuals fare 
with  regard  to  X  in  relation  to  other  members  of  that  cooperation.  Furthermore,  this 
fairness and equality relation is determined by the form of that cooperation.
This  can  also  explain  why,  contra  the  cosmopolitans,  arguments  for  duties  of 
fairness and equality in the domestic arena cannot and should not be seamlessly moved 
into the global arena, to argue for universal duties of fairness and equality in the global 
arena. This is for two reasons. First, insofar as there are no schemes of cooperation in the 
global  arena  that  include  everyone  around  the  world,  there  are  no  universal  duties  of 
fairness and equality in the global arena. This is because there is no form of cooperation at 
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hand, from which duties of fairness and equality are derived. Second, even if there were 
schemes  of  cooperation  in  the  global  arena  that  included  everyone  around  the  world, 
universal duties of fairness and equality might still  be very different from the duties of 
fairness and equality in the domestic arena. This is because the form of cooperation from 
which they were respectively derived might be very different.
However as of now, the claim that duties of fairness and equality are derived from 
the form of cooperation is at most  a suggestion.  Much more needs to be said for it to 
constitute  a  plausible  position  against  other  rival  neo-cosmopolitan  positions,  or  argue 
against the cosmopolitans. 
One potential objection that needs addressing is this: Even if duties of fairness and 
equality are derived from the form of cooperation at hand, it does not necessarily follow 
that they are associative. One might think that it is their contents that are derived from the 
form of cooperation at hand, but not the duty itself. Accordingly, one might hold (despite 
my above arguments) that there is an abstract and general  universal duty of fairness and 
equality, of which its specific contents are determined by the form of cooperation at hand. 
I do not have a decisive response to this yet.  But I have reservations against an 
abstract and general duty of fairness and equality. I take it that duties have to be action 
guiding. Not only do they guide those who bear them with regard to what they should do 
(or should not do), they also guide third parties with regard to the assignment of blame and 
remedial  responsibilities.  The  problem with  the  above  mentioned  abstract  and general 
universal duty is that it seems too general and abstract for it to be action guiding. All it tells 
us is that we should fairly and equally distribute the burdens and benefits of cooperation, 
without telling us anything more about what constitutes a fair and equal distribution in 
cases at hand. It therefore offers no guidance as to who should get what for what amount; 
and accordingly it offers no guidance as to when people can be blamed for not fulfilling 
their  duty,  and what can be done to rectify the situation.  I do not deny that there is a 
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general and abstract universal requirement to fairly and equally distribute the burdens and 
benefits of cooperation,81 but given how abstract and general it is, I am inclined to think 
that it is not a duty  proper. As a result, given my above arguments about how duties of 
fairness and equality are derived from the form of cooperation at hand, I am inclined to 
think that, partly for this reason, these duties are associative. Of course, much more needs 
to be said to establish this as a valid response against the potential objection. However, 
given the limited space in this thesis, and that this thesis is mainly concerned with duties of 
minimal wellbeing,  I cannot settle the issue here. I shall leave it for further research.    
Nevertheless, there are also a couple of pertinent questions concerning my position 
on duties of fairness and equality: How and in what way are duties of fairness and equality 
derived from the form of cooperation at hand? What are the different kinds of forms of 
cooperation? Are they all reducible to one form?82 Or should all schemes of cooperation be 
set  up according to  one particular  form of cooperation?  Do we have a  duty to set  up 
schemes of cooperation with a particular form of cooperation? An affirmative answer to 
the last three questions might even undermine the argument against the cosmopolitans.
As I said before in section 2.3 of this chapter, as a first step towards a research 
project  that  aims  at  resolving  the  debate  between  the  cosmopolitans  and  the  neo-
cosmopolitans, this thesis will focus on duties of minimal wellbeing. As a result, the above 
questions  will  be  bracketed  to  one  side  and  will  not  be  dealt  with  in  this  thesis.  
Nevertheless,  since this  thesis  is  concerned with the content  of duties of global justice 
(under  strict  compliance  theory),  I  therefore  devote  the  reminder  of  this  chapter  to 
discussing the kinds of duties of fairness and equality that  we might  have,  in order to 
illustrate the content of these duties. 
81 This requirement can be seen as one of the grounds for duties of fairness and equality. 
82 For example, one might think that they can all be re-described as merely aiming to achieve certain ends. 
Take for instance examples (a) and (b) in section 3.1 of this chapter. One might think that both of their forms 
of cooperation can be re-described as merely aiming to achieve certain ends. In (a), that end is the mitigation 
of the effects of the 'natural lottery' on each individual's pursuit of their own ends; while in (b), that end is the 
impartial end of serving God. If that is the case, then both of them have the same form of cooperation, i.e. 
aiming to achieve certain ends.  
Page 41 of 222
To that end, section 4 discusses the nature of cooperation, from which duties of 
fairness and equality are derived. This is then applied to the contemporary world in section 
5, identifying three different kinds of cooperation in our contemporary world, from which 
duties  of  fairness  and  equality  are  derived:  states,  local  cooperation  and  trans-state 
cooperation. Section 6 argues that states, comparatively speaking, have a more significant 
and  important  role  for  duties  of  fairness  and  equality  than  the  other  two  kinds  of 
cooperation. Section 7 finally discusses the kinds of duties of fairness and equality that we 
have.
4. - The Nature of Cooperation.
There are two points concerning the nature of cooperation. The first is that for a 
cooperation to exist among a group of individuals, those individuals have to abide by the 
rules of that cooperation.  The second point is that the rules of a particular cooperation 
express, if not define, the form of that particular cooperation.
4.1 – Rules.
The first point consists in two sub-points. First, cooperation requires the existence 
of rules; and second, for a group of individuals to be said to cooperate, most of them have 
to abide by the rules of the cooperation. 
For a group of individuals  to cooperate,  there must be certain rules that aim to 
guide the actions of those individuals. They might originate from agreement between the 
participants of the cooperation. Or they might originate from the nature of the particular 
cooperation in question, such that to engage in that particular cooperation is to be guided 
by those rules. Where these rules originate from is not particularly important here. What is 
important here is the necessity for such rules to exist in schemes of cooperation. A group 
of individuals who do whatever they happen to want cannot be said to be cooperating. It is 
necessary to have some rules that aim to guide their actions if they are to be said to be 
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cooperating. This seems evident by looking at how we cooperate in our daily lives. For 
example, if you and I agreed to cooperate to write a book, we need to set up some rules 
that aim to guide our actions in cooperating to write the book. For example,  we might 
agree that I write the first half of the book while you write the second half of it. Such rules  
might be explicit or implicit,83 but that is also not important here. What is important is the 
necessity for such rules to exist in schemes of cooperation, either explicitly or implicitly. 
One can imagine that if there were no rules whatsoever in our cooperation to write the 
book, we would have no idea how to act in cooperating with each other to write the book 
(e.g. which part should I be writing?). And we are definitely not cooperating to write the 
book, if each of us acts in whatever way we want with regard to writing that book. This not 
only applies to our everyday cooperative ventures that involve the production of certain 
things. It also applies to cooperative ventures that are coordinative in nature, for example 
the coordination of traffic. Traffic is coordinated through the existence of certain rules that 
aim to guide the actions of drivers, e.g.  driving on the left side of the road on a two-way 
traffic  road.  One  can  imagine  that  traffic  would  not  be  coordinated,  and  would  most 
probably be in a total mess, if there were no rules that aim to guide the actions of the  
drivers.
However, even if there are rules in a scheme of cooperation that aim to provide 
guidance  for  individuals  to  act,  it  is  still  hard  to  see  that  a  group  of  individuals  are 
cooperating, when most of them do not abide by those rules. This brings me to the second 
sub-point. Consider again the above example of us cooperating to write a book. Let us 
assume that we have agreed that I write the first half of the book, while you write the 
second half of the book. It does not seem that we are cooperating when we are not abiding 
by that rule. Thus for instance, if I just write half of the first half of the book, or I write  
your half instead of mine, or I just write nothing; then it is hard to see how I am actually 
cooperating with you to write a book. And this is evidenced from the natural response you 
83 Conventions are examples of implicit rules in schemes of cooperation. 
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might offer, when I do any one of the above three things, “you are not cooperating at all!”.  
The same goes for coordination of traffic. If most drivers do not abide by the traffic rules, 
then traffic is not coordinated and it would most probably be in a total mess. Thus for a 
cooperation to exist between individuals, it is not only necessary to have rules that aim to 
guide the actions of those individuals, most of them also need to abide by those rules. 
Of course,  it  is  not necessary for most  individuals  to abide by the rules  of the 
cooperation to  achieve the original intended end of that cooperation.84 Thus even if I do 
not abide by the rule in our cooperation to write a book, a book might still result from our 
‘cooperation’, maybe because you wrote my half of the book also. Similarly, even if most 
drivers do not abide by the traffic rules, the traffic would not necessarily be in a total mess. 
However,  the point that  I  am making here is  not  that  the original  intended end of the 
cooperation can only be achieved if most individuals abide by the rules of the cooperation. 
Rather the cooperation between those individuals cannot be said to exist, if most of them 
do not abide by its rules Thus it is hard to see how we are cooperating to write a book,  
when I do not write my half of the book. And it is also hard to see how traffic is being 
coordinated, when most drivers do not abide by the traffic rules. Traffic might happen to 
be in coordination when that happens. But it is not being coordinated.
It  follows  from  the  above,  that  the  nature  of  cooperation  is  such  that  for  a 
cooperation to exist among a group of individuals, it is not only necessary to have rules 
that aim to guide the actions of those individuals; most of them also need to abide by those 
rules.  This leads to a contingent  feature of schemes of cooperation.  There is  usually a 
coercive structure behind them that exercises coercive power, to ensure that at least most 
of their respective participants abide by their respective rules. This is because, although we 
can imagine that it is possible for participants to freely and voluntarily abide by the rules of 
their cooperation, it is most probably not the case in our real world. As a result, at least in 
our  real  world,  there  is  most  probably  a  coercive  structure  behind  a  cooperation  that 
84 This is why it is possible to have problems of the ‘Free Rider’. 
Page 44 of 222
exercises coercive power, to ensure that at least most individuals abide by the rules of the 
cooperation.  The  kind  of  coercion  might  be  explicit  or  implicit;  and  can  range  from 
something as mild as being frowned upon, to something as serious as physical punishment.  
What determines the level and kind of coercion used to back up any rule of a cooperation 
is  a  function of  (a)  the significance  or  importance  of  the cooperation  at  hand,  (b)  the 
willingness of the individuals to abide by that rule, and (c) the role that rule plays in the 
cooperation. In any case, no matter what the level and kind of coercion that we ultimately 
decide to use, most probably some coercive structure is needed, to ensure that at least most 
of  those  individuals  abide  by the  rules  of  the  cooperation.  Otherwise,  insofar  as  most 
individuals do not abide by them, then the cooperation cannot be said to exist. As a result,  
at least in our real world, if there are any schemes of cooperation, then most probably there 
is a coercive structure behind them that exercises coercive power, to ensure that at least 
most participants abide by their respective rules.
One  additional  note  concerning  this  before  I  move  on:  since  the  existence  of 
cooperation  usually  implies  the  existence  of  a  coercive  structure,  the  existence  of 
cooperation usually gives rise to issues of legitimacy - there is a requirement of legitimacy 
for cooperation that has a coercive structure. Accordingly, if there is already cooperation in 
place within a group of individuals, the corresponding coercive structure, if there is one, is 
required to be legitimate in exercising coercion over that group of individuals. If there is no 
cooperation in place within a group of individuals, but there is a reason to set up one, then 
the corresponding coercive structure that is to be established, if it requires one, is required 
to be legitimate in exercising coercion over that group of individuals.
4.2 – Rules & Forms of Cooperation.
The second point about the nature of cooperation is that the rules of a cooperation 
express, if not define, the form of that particular cooperation. Since the purpose of the rules 
of a scheme of cooperation is to guide the actions of the individuals who participate in it,  
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insofar as the cooperation is not concerned with a certain thing, then there is no point for it 
to have rules that aim to guide the participants’ actions in relation to that thing. But if the 
rules of a cooperation extend to that thing (and thus they aim to guide the participants’ 
actions  in  relation  to  it),  then  what  the  cooperation  is  concerned with  also  extends  to 
include it as well, and vice versa. Since the form of cooperation is what its corresponding 
scheme of cooperation is generally about (what it is generally concerned with), it is in this 
sense that  the rules of a  cooperation  express,  if  not  define,  the form of that  particular 
cooperation. 
The two examples I used before can illustrate this. If we look at our cooperation to 
write a book, it is hard to imagine why there would be a rule in our cooperation that is 
something like this: I prepare and deliver the first half of a lecture, while you prepare and 
deliver the second half of a lecture; but the lecture has nothing to do with the book.85 The 
reason why it is hard to imagine so is because what that rule is about is not something that 
the cooperation is concerned with. There is no point in a cooperation guiding the actions of 
its participants in relation to the things it is not concerned with. However, if there indeed is 
such a rule in our cooperation, then it is not just a cooperation to write a book. It is also a 
cooperation  to  prepare  and  deliver  lectures.  Thus  when  the  rules  of  a  scheme  of 
cooperation  extend  beyond  what  it  originally  is  concerned  with,  the  form  of  that 
cooperation also extends accordingly. The reverse is also true. If we imagine that now we 
void the rule that I write the first half of the book, while you write the second half of the 
book, and only retain the rule that I prepare and deliver the first half of the lecture, while 
you  prepare  and  deliver  the  second  half  of  the  lecture,  then  we  are  not  cooperating 
anymore  to  write  a  book  and prepare  and deliver  lectures.  We are just  cooperating  to 
prepare and deliver lectures. All this applies also to the example of traffic coordination. It 
is hard to imagine that there is a rule in there which is something like this: drivers are not  
85 It is possible that the lecture is a lecture about the book that we are cooperating to write. In that case, it is 
not hard to imagine why there would be such a rule.  
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allowed to drive cars that have emission levels higher than a certain level. This is because 
such a rule does not pertain to traffic coordination anymore. But insofar as there is such a 
rule, then we are not just cooperating to coordinate traffic, but also to reduce emission 
levels (maybe because we are cooperating to reduce environmental damage).   
All this does not only apply to our everyday concrete schemes of cooperation like 
the two I have described above. It also applies to more general kinds of cooperation that I 
have discussed in section 3. For the sake of brevity, I shall only illustrate one of them here  
- the one from Rawls: a kind of social cooperation that advances each individual’s pursuit 
of  their  own  ends,  beyond  their  ability  to  do  so  individually  by  themselves  without 
cooperating.  Under such a scheme, the ends that individuals pursue are not generally a 
matter of concern. Though only generally, since some of the ends that individuals pursue 
might prevent other individuals from pursuing their own ends, or they might disrupt the 
cooperation itself, or they might impede the advancement of individuals’ pursuit of their 
own ends  beyond  their  ability  to  do  so  individually  etc.  But  insofar  as  the  ends  that 
individuals pursue do not have any of the above negative effects, then the cooperation is 
not concerned with what ends these individuals specifically pursue. Thus it is not hard to 
imagine that under it,  there is no rule that specifies what specific ends that individuals 
pursue are advanced by the cooperation; insofar as the ends that they pursue do not have 
any of the above negative effects. Indeed, one would imagine that it would have a rule 
which forbids exactly such a specification. This is to ensure that any ends that individuals 
pursue, whatever they might be, are advanced by the cooperation, insofar as those ends do 
not have any of the above negative effects. But suppose the cooperation voids that rule,  
and establishes something like the following restriction as a rule: there is a certain list of 
ends the pursuit of which is to be advanced by the cooperation; but for any ends outwith 
the list, the cooperation is not concerned with advancing individuals’ pursuit of them, even 
if  those  ends  do  not  have  any  of  the  above  negative  effects.  In  that  case,  then  the 
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cooperation is not anymore a kind of cooperation that advances each individual’s pursuit of 
his own ends, beyond his ability to do so individually. Rather it is a kind of cooperation 
that  advances  each  individual’s  pursuit  of  certain  ends,  beyond  his  ability  to  do  so 
individually.86 As one can see, the idea that the rules of a particular cooperation express, if 
not define, the form of that particular cooperation, also applies to more general kinds of 
cooperation.
4.3 – Summary: The Nature of Cooperation.
This  section  was  concerned  with  the  nature  of  cooperation.  A  scheme  of 
cooperation cannot be said to exist between individuals, if there are no rules that aim to 
guide the actions  of  those individuals.  Furthermore,  the particular  rules  express,  if  not 
define,  the  particular  form  of  their  respective  cooperation.  However,  a  scheme  of 
cooperation can only be said to exist between individuals, if most of them actually abide by 
those rules. And in the real world, not all individuals voluntarily and willingly abide by the 
rules of the schemes of cooperation that they participate in. There usually are coercive 
structures behind schemes of cooperation that exercise coercive power, to ensure that at 
least most individuals abide by the rules of the cooperation that they participate in. Thus at 
least  in  the  real  world,  the  existence  of  cooperation  usually  implies  the  existence  of 
coercive structures. However, this gives rise to issues of legitimacy. And I argued, it is 
required that the coercive structure of a scheme of cooperation, if there is one, is legitimate 
in exercising coercion over the participants of the cooperation.87
5. - Three Kinds of Duties of Fairness and Equality in the Contemporary World.
This section applies my discussion in section 3 to the contemporary world. There I 
suggested that duties of fairness and equality are derived from the form of cooperation at 
86 A concrete example of this is a liberal society moving from being strictly neutral with regard to reasonable 
conceptions of the good to being perfectionist. 
87 Note that this requirement is not a requirement of justice. I take issues of legitimacy and issues of justice as 
two separate and different sets of issues.
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hand.  This section identifies  the kinds of cooperation  in  the contemporary world from 
which duties and fairness are derived. Note that in the following discussion, I shall  be 
using concepts – e.g. legitimacy, authority – in their normative (moral) sense, rather than in 
their legal (political) descriptive sense. 
The most conspicuous feature of our contemporary world is that there are states. 
For  the  purposes  of  this  thesis,  I  assume that  a  state  is  an  entity  which  has  effective 
coercive power over its purported subjects. This, as I said earlier, gives rise to issues of 
legitimacy. I also leave it open as to what are the conditions for an agent or entity to have 
legitimate authority over others, and consequently to be legitimate in exercising coercive 
power against others. Thus what are the conditions for a state to be legitimate is also left 
open in this thesis. Nevertheless, the following seems true, with regard to what it means for 
a state to be legitimate or illegitimate. If a state is legitimate,  then it implies three things. 
First,  a legitimate  state  has  justified  supreme  authority  over  its  purported  subjects.88 
Second, since a state is an entity which has effective coercive power over its purported 
subjects,  a  legitimate  state  therefore  has  legitimate  effective  coercive  power  over  its 
purported subjects.89 And thirdly, the legitimacy of the coercive power exercised by any 
entity under a  legitimate state is grounded in the  legitimate  state’s authorization. On the 
other hand, if a state is illegitimate, then it implies the negation of the above three things.  
First,  an illegitimate  state  does not have justified authority over its  purported subjects. 
Second, an illegitimate state has illegitimate effective coercive power over its purported 
subjects. And thirdly, the legitimacy of the coercive power exercised by any entity under 
an illegitimate state is not grounded in the illegitimate state’s authorization.
States are also schemes of cooperation of some kind. I shall refer to these schemes 
of cooperation as ‘state-level cooperation’. Each state has its own rules, that aim to guide 
88 By 'justified supreme authority', I mean normatively justified supreme authority. Furthermore, I take it that 
even if an entity has justified authority, it does not follow that it necessarily has coercive power over its 
subjects. 
89 Cf. Above fn. The reason for why a legitimate state has legitimate effective coercive power, is not because 
it has normatively justified supreme authority. Rather, it is because a state is an entity which has effective 
coercive power over its purported subjects.
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the actions  of individuals  within it;  and these rules  express,  if  not  define,  the form of 
cooperation  of  the  state-level  cooperation.  Most  of  the  time,  states  also  utilize  their 
effective coercive power, to ensure that at least most of their respective subjects abide by 
their respective rules. If the state is legitimate, then it is legitimate in utilizing its effective 
coercive power to do so. If it is not legitimate, then it is illegitimate in utilizing its effective 
coercive power to do so.
However,  states  are  not  the  only  schemes  of  cooperation  that  exist  in  our 
contemporary world. There are also many schemes of cooperation within states, which I 
shall  refer  to  as  ‘local  cooperation’;  and  schemes  of  cooperation  that  are  beyond  the 
boundaries of the state, which I shall refer to as ‘trans-state cooperation’. Each of these 
schemes of cooperation has its own rules, that aim to guide the actions of the individuals 
who participate in them; and their respective rules express, if not define, their respective 
form of cooperation. Sometimes these schemes of cooperation have a coercive structure 
behind them that exercises coercive power, to ensure that at least most of their participants 
abide by their respective rules. This also gives rise to issues of legitimacy. However, the 
presence of legitimate states does complicate these issues a bit more here.
Given that the legitimacy of the coercive power exercised by any entity under a 
legitimate state is grounded in the legitimate state’s authorization, if the local cooperation 
is under a legitimate state, then its coercive structure, if there is one, is legitimate only if it 
is authorized by the legitimate state under which it falls. Something similar goes on with 
trans-state cooperation. Insofar as trans-state cooperation exercises coercive power over its 
participants, who are subjects of a legitimate state, the legitimacy of that is grounded in the 
authorization of the legitimate state under which those participants fall.90
What if there were no legitimate states? Of course, it is not only under legitimate 
90 Here I have assumed the primacy of states (over trans-state cooperation) with regard to legitimacy. This is 
not uncontroversial. However, it is a complicated and extensive issue that requires an extended discussion in 
its own right. Given the limited space in this thesis, together with the fact that its topic is on global justice, 
rather than on political legitimacy, I shall reserve this issue for future research. For a critical discussion on 
my assumption here, see Buchanan 2004: 289-327 (chapter 7).    
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states that coercive structures or exercises of coercive power can be legitimate. Under what 
conditions they are legitimate depends on one’s theory of legitimacy,91 which is something 
I leave open for the purposes of this thesis, as I said before. Nevertheless, whatever those 
conditions are, this seems to be the case: In the absence of legitimate states, the coercive 
structure of a local cooperation, if there is one, is legitimate insofar as it satisfies those 
conditions for legitimacy.  Similarly,  in the absence of legitimate states,  the exercise of 
coercive  power  in  trans-state  cooperation  is  legitimate,  insofar  as  it  satisfies  those 
conditions of legitimacy.
In  any  case,  duties  of  fairness  and  equality  are  derived  from  the  forms  of 
cooperation  of  all  these  kinds  of  cooperation  -  states  (or  what  I  call  ‘state-level 
cooperation’),  local  cooperation and trans-state  cooperation -  whether  or not they have 
legitimate  authority,  and  subsequently  whether  or  not  their  corresponding  coercive 
structure or their exercises of coercive power are legitimate. Insofar as these schemes of 
cooperation  have  different  forms  of  cooperation,  they  would  yield  different  duties  of 
fairness and equality.
6. - Duties of Fairness and Equality & Political Conceptions of Justice.
The previous section argued that duties of fairness and equality are derived from 
the  forms  of  cooperation  of  states,  local  cooperation  and trans-state  cooperation.  Thus 
states are but one source of duties of fairness, and therefore these duties are not only held 
among those who are within the same states. But states do play a more significant and 
important role with regard to these duties than the other two sources. This section first 
argues for this more significant and important role of states. It then critically discusses 
certain  political  conceptions  of  justice,  which  are  prominently  held  by  some  neo-
cosmopolitans. Political conceptions of justice are a kind of statist theory which maintains, 
91 One possible example of this is when all the participants of a scheme of cooperation freely, willingly and 
voluntarily submit themselves under a coercive structure, that enforces their abidance to the rules of that 
cooperation.  
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contra my own position, that states are the only source of duties of fairness and equality. 
For adherents of political conceptions, duties of fairness and equality are therefore only 
binding between those within the same state.
6.1 – The Significance of States
There are three reasons for states being more significant and important with regard 
to duties of fairness and equality, even though they are only one among three sources of 
these duties.
6.1.1 – Their Effective Coercive Power.
First, whether states are legitimate or not, they wield effective coercive power.92 
Although it might be possible for other kinds of cooperation to wield coercive power, it is 
not effective coercive power that they are wielding. Thus accordingly, although it is the 
case that in all schemes of cooperation,  individuals are most probably,  in some way or 
another, prevented from leaving the cooperation, it is only in state-level cooperation that 
they are  effectively  prevented  from leaving.  The effective  coercive  power  of  the  state 
leaves fewer, if not no, means of escape from the state-level cooperation than other kinds 
of cooperation. One might think that because of this, it is more important to ensure that the 
burdens and benefits of state-level cooperation are distributed fairly, than they are in other 
kinds of cooperation. Thus the duties of fairness and equality that are derived from the 
form of cooperation of state-level cooperation are, in this sense, more important than those 
that are derived from the form of cooperation of other kinds of cooperation.
6.1.2 – Their Ability to Control Forms of Cooperation.
Second, since states, whether they are legitimate or not, wield effective coercive 
power, they can control the schemes of cooperation that are under them. Thus they can 
control those schemes’ forms of cooperation. But since those schemes' duties of fairness 
92 By effective coercive power, I mean that it extends to and reaches more aspects of peoples' lives than does 
the power exercised in other modes of cooperation. It therefore also leaves fewer means of escape.
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and equality are derived from their respective forms of cooperation, the fact that the state 
can control their forms of cooperation also means that, their duties of fairness and equality 
can also be under the control of the state. I shall explain this with legitimate states first, 
then with illegitimate states.
Recall  that  a  scheme  of  cooperation  can  only  be  said  to  exist,  if  most  of  its 
participants  abide  by  its  rules.  Thus  there  is  a  need  for  a  coercive  structure  in  the 
cooperation, to ensure that at least most of its participants abide by its rules, when it is not 
the case that most of them do so voluntarily. However, given that the legitimacy of the 
coercive  power  exercised  by  any  entity  under  a  legitimate  state  is  grounded  in  the 
legitimate state’s authorization,93 in the presence of legitimate states, the coercive structure 
of a scheme of cooperation (whether it is a local cooperation or a trans-state cooperation) 
can legitimately exercise coercion to ensure that at least most of its participants abide by its 
rules only when it has gained the authorization from the legitimate state to do so. And it 
can  gain  the  authorization  of  the  legitimate  state  to  do  so,  only  if  it  conforms  to  the 
requirements,  i.e.  the rules,  of the legitimate state.  Insofar as the cooperation does not 
conform to the rules of the legitimate state, it has to alter its rules according to the rules of 
the  legitimate  state,  so  that  the  coercive  structure  of  the  cooperation  then  has  the 
authorization  to  legitimately  exercise  coercion.  If  the  cooperation  does  not  do  so,  its 
coercive  structure  is  exercising  illegitimate  coercion.  A legitimate  state  would  then  be 
required to exercise its effective coercive power to curtail  that.  But without a coercive 
structure, the cooperation cannot be said to exist, when most of its participants do not abide 
by its rules voluntarily.  As a result, if there are any schemes of cooperation that have a 
coercive structure in the presence of legitimate states, their rules have to conform to the 
rules  of  the  state-level  cooperation.  Otherwise,  it  cannot  be  said  to  exist,  when  most 
individuals do not abide by their respective rules voluntarily. Since the rules of a scheme of 
93 As discussed in section 5 of this chapter, this is one of the three things that I take as what it means for a 
state to be legitimate.
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cooperation express, if not define, its form of cooperation, it is in this sense that legitimate 
states can control the form of cooperation of the other kinds of cooperation.
Of course it is also possible to have schemes of cooperation which do not have 
coercive structures, because their participants all abide by their respective rules willingly 
and voluntarily. However, in cases like these, in the presence of legitimate states, states can 
still control the form of cooperation of these kinds of cooperation. This is because since 
legitimate states have justified supreme authority and legitimate effective coercive power 
over their purported subjects,94 the participants in these kinds of cooperation should not 
and cannot, willingly and voluntarily, abide by those rules, if the rules in the state-level 
cooperation disallow that. Thus if there is a scheme of cooperation which has rules that 
participants are forbidden to abide by, because of those of the state-level cooperation, the 
cooperation has to alter its rules according to the ones of the state-level cooperation, so that 
its participants are allowed to abide by them voluntarily and willingly. To the extent that 
the cooperation does not do so, its participants should not and cannot abide by them (even 
if they would do so willingly and voluntarily); and the cooperation in question cannot be 
said to exist. Thus in the presence of legitimate states, even if there are schemes of local 
cooperation or trans-state cooperation which do not have coercive structures, because their 
participants  willingly  and  voluntarily  abide  by  their  respective  rules,  their  forms  of 
cooperation are also under the control of the legitimate state.
Something  similar  happens  in  the  presence  of  illegitimate  states.  Even  though 
illegitimate  states  are  illegitimate,  they  still  have  effective  coercive  power  over  their 
purported subjects. As a result, in the presence of illegitimate states, insofar as the rules of 
the  cooperation  (whether  they  are  local  cooperation  or  trans-state  cooperation)  do  not 
conform to those of the state-level cooperation of the illegitimate state,  the illegitimate 
state  can  always  exercise  its  effective  power,  which  would  lead  those  schemes  of 
94 As discussed in section 5 of this chapter, these are basically the other two of the three things that I take as 
what it means for a state to be legitimate.
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cooperation to alter their rules according to those of the state-level cooperation. This can 
be  done  in  two  ways:  (a)  prevent  the  cooperation  from exercising  their  legitimate  or 
illegitimate coercion, in cases where not all their participants voluntarily abide by their 
respective rules; or (b) prevent their participants from abiding by their respective rules, in 
cases where the participants would willingly and voluntarily abide by them.
Since (a) states (whether they are legitimate or not) wield effective coercive power 
over  their  purported  subjects,  (b)  legitimate  states  have  justified  authority  over  their 
purported subjects, and (c) the legitimacy of the coercive power exercised by any entity 
under a legitimate state is grounded in the legitimate state’s authorization, insofar as other 
kinds of cooperation  (be it  local  or trans-state)  have states’  purported subjects as their 
participants, then states can control their form of cooperation, and subsequently their duties 
of fairness and equality. It is because of this, together with the inescapability of state-level 
cooperation,95 that states (or state-level cooperation) play a more significant and important 
role with regard to duties of fairness and equality than local cooperation and trans-state 
cooperation.
6.1.3 – Their Ability to Resolve Conflicting Duties.
There is another reason why states play a more significant and important role, with 
regard to duties of fairness and equality, than other kinds of cooperation. This concerns the 
possible conflicts between different duties of fairness and equality.
Duties of fairness and equality are derived from the form of cooperation at hand. 
But in our contemporary world, there are generally three kinds of cooperation: state-level 
cooperation, local cooperation and trans-state cooperation. There is no guarantee that these 
three kinds of cooperation would have the same form of cooperation. Neither is there any 
guarantee  that  instances  of  the  same kind of  cooperation  would have  the same forms. 
However, it seems plausible to suggest that an individual would participate in more than 
95 As discussed earlier in section 6.1.1 of this chapter, this is because they have effective coercive power over 
their purported subjects.
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one of those schemes of cooperation. Thus insofar as the schemes of cooperation that the 
individual participates in do not have the same forms of cooperation, then different duties 
of fairness and equality would bear on him. What should he do when these duties conflict? 
Here lies the other reason why states, or more particularly legitimate states, play a 
more significant and important role with regard to duties of fairness and equality than other 
kinds  of  cooperation.  Since  a  legitimate  state  has  justified  supreme  authority  over  its 
subjects,  insofar  as  an  individual  is  a  subject  of  a  legitimate  state,  the  state-level 
cooperation  in  which  he  participates  (in  virtue  of  the  fact  that  he is  a  subject  of  that 
legitimate  state)  has  justified  supreme  authority  over  him;  while  other  schemes  of 
cooperation (be it local or trans-state), that he might happen to participate in do not. Thus 
the duties of fairness and equality which are derived from the form of cooperation in the 
state-level cooperation bind him in a way that other duties of fairness and equality, which 
are  derived from the  form of  cooperation  in  the other  schemes  of  cooperation  that  he 
participates  in,  do not.  Accordingly,  if  his  different  duties  of  fairness  and equality  do 
conflict,  he  should  follow  the  ones  that  are  derived  from  the  (legitimate)  state-level 
cooperation of which he is a participant - rather than the ones that are derived from the 
other kinds of cooperation that he happens to participate in. Thus legitimate states have this 
function that can resolve conflicts which arise from having different specified duties of 
fairness and equality bearing on individuals. 
6.1.4 – Summary: The Significance of States.
Although I do not endorse the claim that states are the only source of duties of 
fairness and equality,  and therefore these duties are not only held among those who are 
within the same states, I do believe that states play a more significant and important role,  
with regard to these duties, than the other two kinds of cooperation - local cooperation and 
trans-state cooperation. This is mainly because (a) as states, they wield effective coercive 
power  over  their  purported  subjects;  and  (b)  as  legitimate  states,  they  have  justified 
Page 56 of 222
supreme authority over their purported subjects. It is because of (a), and the inescapability 
that it implies, that we are particularly concerned with the duties of fairness and equality 
that are derived from the form of our state-level cooperation.  It  is also because of (a),  
together with the claim that the legitimacy of the coercive power exercised by any entity 
under a legitimate state is grounded in the legitimate state’s authorization, that states can 
control  the  duties  of  fairness  and  equality  that  are  derived  from  the  other  kinds  of 
cooperation. Finally, it is because of (b) that legitimate states have this function that can 
resolve conflicts which arise from having different duties of fairness and equality bearing 
on individuals.
6.2 – Political Conceptions of Justice.
My neo-cosmopolitan position contends that states are but one source of duties of 
fairness and equality among others, i.e. trans-state cooperation and local cooperation, even 
though states play a more significant and important role than them with regard to these 
duties. It is therefore at odds with political conceptions of justice, which are prominent 
among some neo-cosmopolitans. According to them, states are not one, but the only source 
of  duties  of  fairness  and equality.  This  section  briefly  discusses  two specific  political 
conceptions of justice: Nagel’s and Blake’s.96 I shall argue that the reasons they each offer 
for their claim that states are the only source of duties of fairness and equality do not seem 
to warrant it. In fact, if one looks at their position closely, they point in the direction of my 
contention.
6.2.1 – Nagel.
Nagel’s  political  conception  of  justice  draws  a  distinction  between  basic 
humanitarian demands and the more demanding requirements of justice.97 The former are 
structurally similar to my duties of minimal wellbeing,98 while the latter are structurally 
96 E.g. Nagel 2005 & Blake 2001.
97 For the distinction between basic humanitarian demands, and the more demanding requirements of justice, 
see Nagel 2005: 125-126.
98 There is the issue of whether basic humanitarian demands are demands of justice, but I think we can set 
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similar to my duties of fairness and equality.  Although basic humanitarian demands are 
universal,  i.e.  they  bear  on  everyone  against  everyone  else,  the  more  demanding 
requirements of justice are not.99 This is because it is only within sovereign states that there 
are the more demanding requirements of justice. The reason is that sovereign states impose 
coercion in the name of their subjects, and that requires justification in terms of the more 
demanding requirements of justice. Otherwise it would be no different from pure coercion. 
As Nagel explains,
“I submit that it is this complex fact – that we are both putative joint authors of the 
coercively  imposed  system,  and  subject  to  its  norms… that  creates  the  special 
presumption against arbitrary inequalities in our treatment by the system… Without 
being given a choice, we are assigned a role in the collective life of a particular  
society.  The  society  makes  us  responsible  for  its  acts,  which  are  taken  in  our 
name… and it  holds  use responsible  for obeying  its  law and conforming to its 
norms,  thereby  supporting  the  institutions  through  which  advantages  and 
disadvantages  are  created  and  distributed.  Insofar  as  those  institutions  admit 
arbitrary  inequalities,  we  are…  responsible  for  them,  and  we  therefore  have 
standing to ask why we should accept them… The reason is that its requirements 
claim  our  active  cooperation,  and  this  cannot  be  legitimately  done  without 
justification – otherwise it is pure coercion”.100
Since Nagel believes that it  is only sovereign states that impose coercion in the 
name of their subjects,101 the more demanding requirements of justice therefore only arise 
in the context of sovereign states. Thus under Nagel’s political conception of justice, states, 
or more specifically sovereign states, are not just the more significant and important source 
of  duties  of  fairness  and equality.  They are  the  only  source  of  duties  of  fairness  and 
that aside for the purposes of this discussion.
99 Nagel 2005: 130.
100 Nagel 2005: 129.
101 Although Nagel never said this explicitly, it seems rather evident in his discussion on why the more 
demanding requirements of justice are not applicable in the global arena. See Nagel 2005: 136-140.
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equality.
However, it might be true that it is only sovereign states that impose coercion in the 
name of their  subjects,  and this  can only be justified in terms of the more demanding 
requirements of justice. But why think that it is only acts of imposing coercion in the name 
of individuals that require justification in terms of the more demanding requirements of 
justice? Nagel never seems to have defended this assumption. And intuitively, it seems that 
there are a lot of other acts that also require justification in terms of the more demanding 
requirements of justice,  which do not involve coercion in the name of individuals.  For 
example, a capitalist does not usually coerce his labourers in their name. However, when it 
comes to distributing the profits that he made by selling the products that his labourers 
have  produced,  he  needs  to  justify  the  distribution  in  terms  of  the  more  demanding 
requirements of justice; i.e. he and his labourers should all have, in some sense, a fair and 
equal share of the profit. Thus contra Nagel, it is not the case that sovereign states are the 
only sources of duties of fairness and equality, even though they might very well be the 
only entities that impose coercion in individuals’ names. This points us at least back to the 
direction that states are but one source of duties of fairness and equality, even though they 
do play a more significant and important role.
6.2.2 – Blake.
Blake’s  political  conception  of  justice  is  concerned  with  the  distribution  of 
economic resources. He draws a distinction between two types of deprivation of economic 
resources,  that  individuals  suffer from,  which justice can be concerned about:  absolute 
deprivation and relative deprivation.102 When justice is  concerned about  them, they are 
structurally similar to my duties of minimal wellbeing and duties of fairness and equality 
respectively. This is because if there are deprivations that duties of minimal wellbeing and 
duties  of  fairness  and  equality  are  concerned  about,  duties  of  minimal  wellbeing  are 
102 Blake 2001: 258-260.
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concerned  with  the  absolute  kinds  of  them,  while  duties  of  fairness  and  equality  are 
concerned with the relative kinds of them. According to Blake’s political conception of 
justice, justice is concerned with absolute deprivation universally. But it is not concerned 
with relative deprivation universally, since it is only within states that justice is concerned 
with  relative  deprivation.  Thus  similarly  to  Nagel,  states  are  not  simply  the  more 
significant and important among other sources of duties of fairness and equality. They are 
the only source of these duties. The reason is that states exercise a very distinctive kind of 
coercion, namely a pattern of law that defines how we may hold, transfer, and enjoy our 
property  and  our  entitlements;103 and  this  can  be  justified  to  their  subjects  only  if  it 
generates  a  fair  and  equal  pattern  of  distribution.104 It  is  in  this  sense  that  justice  is 
concerned with relative deprivation, but only within states. 
Central  to  Blake’s  position  is  the  principle  of  autonomy,  which  states  that  “all 
human beings have the moral  entitlement  to exist  as autonomous agents,  and therefore 
have entitlements to those circumstances and conditions under which this is possible”.105 
Blake adopts a Razian understanding of autonomy, where an autonomous agent is an agent 
who is capable of selecting and pursuing plans of life in accordance with his or her own 
conception of the good.106 It is this principle of autonomy that grounds the concern that 
justice has for absolute deprivation and coercion. As he says, “There is, I think, a threshold 
to decent human functioning, beneath which the possibility of autonomous human agency 
is removed. It seems to be a matter of moral gravity whenever we might prevent someone 
from falling below that line and fail to do so.”;107 and “… coercive proposals violate the 
autonomy of those against whom they are employed… A question therefore arises about 
103 Blake 2001: 281.
104 Blake 2001: 281-285. It is true that Blake uses Rawls’s original position as a device for justification here. 
However, given that Rawls’s original position is also a device that is used to flesh out what it means to fairly 
and equally distribute the goods in question, in saying that Rawls’s original position is a device for 
justification here, Blake is inter alia saying that the justification is to be done in terms of a fair and equal 
distribution of the goods in question. 
105 Blake 2001: 267.
106 Blake 2001: 266-273.
107 Blake 2001: 259.
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the appropriate forms of justification,  by which an otherwise impermissible invasion of 
autonomy might be legitimated”.108 I agree that given the principle of autonomy, justice is 
concerned with certain kinds of absolute deprivation and coercion, especially the kind of 
coercion exercised by states; and it is not concerned with relative deprivation, unless there 
is the kind of coercion that is exercised by states, for the reasons that Blake gives.
However, what I disagree with is the assumption that Blake holds in his arguments.  
He assumes that all  justice requires is the principle  of autonomy.  Justice,  according to 
Blake, is  only concerned with the ‘global protection of individual autonomy’.109 But why 
think that is true? If my arguments in this chapter are sound, then justice is also concerned 
with the fair and equal distribution, among the participants, of the benefits and burdens of 
schemes of cooperation. If one further accepts my arguments that states are just one kind of 
cooperation among many (I argue that there are also local and trans-state cooperation), 
then justice is also concerned with relative deprivations among the participants in these 
other  kinds of (non-state)  cooperation,  even if  these other  kinds of cooperation do not 
exercise the kind of coercion that is typically exercised by states. Of course, as I have 
argued before, given the nature of the kind of coercion that is typically exercised by states, 
justice  should  be  more  concerned  with  the  relative  deprivations  among  the  citizens  in 
states, than with those among the participants in other kinds of cooperation. But it does not 
follow from this that justice is only concerned with the relative deprivations among the 
citizens in states.
As one can see, it is because Blake unduly restricts justice to only the principle of 
autonomy,  that  he  is  led  to  conclude  that  justice  is  only  concerned  with  relative 
deprivations among the citizens in states. But since Blake did not argue for his assumption, 
given my arguments in this chapter I am inclined to maintain that (contra Blake and going 
back to my analogy between duties of fairness and equality and justice being concerned 
108 Blake 2001: 272-273.
109 Blake 2001: 266-267.
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with relative deprivations) states are but one source of duties of fairness and equality, even 
though they play a more significant and important role with regard to these duties than the 
other sources.
7. - The Kinds of Duties of Fairness and Equality We Have.
We are now finally in the position to identify the kinds of duties of fairness and 
equality  that  we  have.  Among  members  of  any  one  of  the  following  three  kinds  of 
cooperation - states (state-level cooperation), local cooperation and trans-state cooperation 
– there are duties of fairness and equality, which are derived from the form of cooperation 
that they are participating in. These duties of fairness and equality are owed towards the 
respective fellow members of the same cooperation that one is in. Thus, if one is a member 
of a state, then one owes the respective duties of fairness and equality to fellow members 
of  that  state.  If  one  is  also  a  member  of  a  local  cooperation,  then  one  also owes  the 
respective duties of fairness and equality to the respective fellow members of that local 
cooperation; the same goes for trans-state cooperation,  and so on and so forth. If these 
different duties of fairness and equality conflict, and if the state that one is a member of is 
legitimate, then the duties of fairness and equality that one owes to the respective fellow 
members of that legitimate state trump the other conflicting duties of fairness and equality. 
This, however, would not be the case if the state of which one was a member was not 
legitimate.
8. - Conclusion.
This chapter has been laying out the basic framework of my conception of global 
justice. This framework consists in: (a) There are duties of minimal wellbeing, which bear 
on all individuals against all other individuals. (b) There are also duties of fairness and 
equality. (b-i) These duties are derived from the form of cooperation at hand. And in our 
contemporary world,  there are three kinds of cooperation:  states,  local  cooperation and 
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trans-state  cooperation.  (b-ii)  Though  states  are  not  the  only  source  from which  these 
duties can be derived, they do play a more significant and important role than the other two 
sources. (b-iii)  These duties bear on individuals who are members of the so concerned 
cooperation against all other individuals who are fellow members of it. (b-iv) In cases of 
conflict,  those that are derived from (the form of cooperation of) one's legitimate state, 
trump the other conflicting duties of fairness and equality that one has.
As I  said at  the  beginning of this  chapter,  this  thesis  assumes that  the primary 
bearers  of these duties are individuals.  And I  briefly defended this  view by criticizing 
Rawls's alternative view that states are the primary bearers of these duties, as opposed to 
individuals, in Chapter 1 - Introduction. Nevertheless, as I have also argued there, holding 
individuals as the primary bearers of these duties, is consistent with holding other entities 
(e.g. states, associations, collectives etc.) as secondary bearers of these duties, for various 
instrumental  reasons  (e.g.  efficiency,  issues  of  collective  action,  informational  issues, 
economies of scale, costs, the legitimacy of coercion etc.). Thus although I have framed the 
above discussion as duties that individuals have, it might be the case that in actual life, it is  
other entities that bear these duties.
As I said in section 3.3 of this chapter, for the rest of the thesis, I shall focus on 
duties of minimal wellbeing. The next chapter argues for an account of duties of minimal 
wellbeing – the human-life account, and against the usual account – the human flourishing 
account. 
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Chapter 3
An Account for Duties of Minimal Wellbeing
1. - Introduction.
This  chapter  discusses  accounts  of  duties  of  minimal  wellbeing,  accounts  from 
which  the  objects  of  such  duties  are  derived.  I  consider  three  accounts:  the  human 
flourishing  account  and  the  needs-based  account,  both  of  which  are  prominent  in  the 
literature; and my account, the human-life account. I argue that my account is superior to 
the human flourishing account, and contrast it with the needs-based account.
In section 2 below, I discuss a couple of structural points that any account of duties 
of minimal wellbeing has to take into consideration. I then consider the human flourishing 
account, and its problems, in section 3. In section 4, I introduce my human-life account, 
and  argue  that  it  is  superior  to  the  human  flourishing  account.  Finally,  I  contrast  my 
account with the needs-based account in section 5.
2. - Duties of Minimal Wellbeing & Sufficientarian Conception of Justice.
Duties of minimal wellbeing are concerned with the quality of life of individuals. 
That  is,  they are concerned with how good or how bad an individual’s  life  is  for that 
individual. However, they are not just concerned with the quality of life of individuals per 
se. More specifically, they are concerned with individuals having a certain level of quality 
of life,  where this  level is in some sense ‘minimal’.  In other words, duties of minimal 
wellbeing are concerned with individuals  having a quality of life  that is at  or above a 
certain threshold. Different accounts conceive this threshold differently. The main aim of 
this  chapter  is  to  discuss  what  account  offers  the  most  appropriate  conception  of  this 
threshold.
Given that duties of minimal wellbeing are concerned with individuals having a 
quality  of  life  that  is  at  or  above  a  certain  threshold,  they  assume  a  sufficientarian 
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conception of justice. Such a conception states that if individuals have a quality of life that 
falls below a certain threshold, then there is priority in benefiting these individuals until 
they reach the threshold; while individuals whose quality of life is at or above the threshold 
should not be prioritised to the same extent. Call this the positive thesis. Sometimes the 
positive  thesis  is  coupled  with  the  negative  thesis  which  states  that  prioritarian  and 
egalitarian concerns are not applicable in any way to individuals whose quality of life is at 
or above that threshold.110 If one believes that prioritarian and egalitarian concerns exhaust 
all the concerns of justice, this negative thesis has the effect of implying that all justice 
demands is that individuals have a quality of life that is at least at the threshold. Once 
everyone’s  quality of life  is  at  or above that  threshold,  justice  demands  nothing more. 
Some advocates of the sufficientarian conception of justice advance both the positive thesis 
and the negative thesis,111 while some only advance the positive thesis.112 Since under my 
account, duties of minimal wellbeing are only one aspect of global justice (the other being 
duties of fairness and equality), I therefore only advance the positive thesis. Indeed, one 
reason why a sufficientarian conception of justice is implausible is because it endorses the 
negative thesis on top of the positive thesis.113 It seems very counter-intuitive that as long 
as everyone is above a certain threshold, then any inequalities (no matter how grave) do 
not matter from the point of view of justice. 
In  my  M.  Litt.  Dissertation,114 I  argue  that  the  most  plausible  sufficientarian 
conception of justice has the following three features:
 First,  it  is a strong sufficiency view. There is absolute  priority in non-trivially 
benefiting those individuals whose quality of life is below the threshold, even if this means 
forgoing greater benefits to a greater number of those whose quality of life is already at or 
above the threshold, or when inequalities are increased as a result. There are two reasons 
110 I have taken from Casal this distinction between the positive thesis and the negative thesis. See Casal 
2007: 297-303.
111 For example Frankfurt 1997 & Crisp 2003.
112 For example Nussbaum 2000, see particularly p. 75.
113 See Casal 2007 & Benbaji 2006.
114 Lee 2007.
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for this: First, the moral commitment of sufficientarian conceptions of justice is that we 
should  benefit  those  whose  quality  of  life  is  below  the  threshold  because  they  are 
absolutely worse off. This commitment is betrayed when benefits to a greater number of 
those whose quality of life is already above the threshold are allowed to outweigh the non-
trivial  benefits  to those whose quality of life is below the threshold.  Second, it  is also 
susceptible  to the criticism that  the lives of those who are already well  off  are further 
improved, when that improvement can benefit certain people who are living a miserable 
life (i.e. those whose quality of life is below the threshold).  
Second,  it  has  only  one  threshold.  This  is  in  response  to  Benbaji’s  Multilevel 
Sufficiency View.  Benbaji  argues  that  the  most  plausible  sufficientarian  conception  of 
justice has three thresholds: the personhood threshold, the pain / poverty threshold and the 
luxury threshold; and the priority to benefit  individuals  diminishes  as we move up the 
thresholds. 115 I argue that if we look in detail at his arguments for each of those thresholds,  
they all collapse into a single threshold. Thus it is not an objection to a sufficientarian 
conception of justice, if it only has one threshold. 
Third,  the  concepts  that  are  used  to  define  the  threshold  should  be  ‘threshold 
concepts’  rather  than  ‘graded  concepts’.   This  is  in  response  to  the  objection  that  a 
sufficientarian conception of justice implies wellbeing dis-continuity,116 which I consider 
as  the  most  serious  objection.  Advocates  of  wellbeing  continuity  argue  that  since 
individuals’  quality  of  life  is  a  continuous  scale,  why is  there  an  absolute  priority  in 
benefiting person X whose quality of life is slightly below the threshold, while there is no 
such priority when person X’s quality of life is slightly above the threshold? They argue 
that it seems arbitrary to attribute such a large moral difference to such a small difference 
in quality of life, when person X’s quality of life moves from slightly below the threshold 
to slightly above it. In response, I argue that it would not be arbitrary if the concepts that 
115 Benbaji 2006: 338 & 343.
116 See Benbaji 2006: 331-333 & Arneson 2000: 56.
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are  used  to  define  the  threshold  are  threshold  concepts  rather  than  graded  concepts. 
Threshold  concepts  are  concepts  that  do  not  admit  degrees  in  their  application,  while 
graded concepts are concepts that admit degrees in their application. I argue, for example, 
that the status of being a human being is a threshold concept. One is either a human being 
or not, there are no degrees in being a human being. If we define the threshold with such 
threshold  concepts  that  carry  great  normative  weight,  then  there  is  a  large  qualitative 
difference  between  the  individual  whose  quality  of  life  is  at  the  threshold  and  the 
individual  whose quality of life is slightly below it,  even though there is  only a small  
quantitative difference between them. This large qualitative difference can then ground the 
absolute priority in benefiting the latter individual over the former individual.
Most contemporary sufficientarian conceptions of justice have at least one of the 
above three features. For example Nussbaum’s position (which is what I call the ‘human 
flourishing account’) has all of the above features.117 Although I need to further elaborate 
or strengthen some of my arguments for the above features, I am not doing so here for the 
following three reasons:
First, recall that duties of minimal wellbeing assume a sufficientarian conception of 
justice because they are concerned with individuals having a quality of life that is at or 
above a certain threshold, and this chapter aims to discuss what account offers the most 
appropriate conception of this threshold. It is therefore not the aim of this chapter to argue 
in detail about what is the most plausible sufficientarian conception of justice. Rather, I 
take for granted a sufficientarian conception of justice that has prima facie plausibility, and 
discuss what account offers the most appropriate conception of the threshold. This is then 
used to explain in chapter 7 what the objects duties of minimal wellbeing are. 
Second, although I believe no account can offer an appropriate conception of the 
117 One thing to note is that it is true that in her definition of the threshold, i.e. a life worthy of human dignity, 
‘human dignity’ is a threshold concept. However, she fleshes that out by saying “… the human being as a 
dignified free being who shapes his or her own life in cooperation and reciprocity with others, rather than 
passively shaped or pushed around by the world in the manner of a “flock” or “herd” animal” (Nussbaum 
2000: 72). This seems to undermine ‘human dignity’ as a threshold concept since shaping one’s own life in 
cooperation and reciprocity with others comes in degrees.
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threshold unless it takes the above three features in consideration,  my criticism against 
human flourishing account does not depend on the above three features.118 In fact as I have 
said earlier, it has already taken them into consideration. The purpose to make explicit the 
above three features, is to illustrate  how my human-life account still  yields  a plausible 
sufficientarian conception of justice for duties of minimal wellbeing, even though it rejects 
the human flourishing account. This is because, like the human flourishing account, it takes 
the above three features into consideration. This is discussed in section 4 of this chapter. 
Third,  the plausibility of some of the above three features depends on how the 
threshold is conceived. For example with the first feature: is the threshold conceived in 
such a way that there is an absolute priority in benefiting those whose quality of life is  
below the threshold? Thus discussing what account offers the most appropriate conception 
of the threshold for a sufficientarian conception of justice, is part of the argument for some 
of the above three features. 
Thus the above three features play different roles with regard to the aim of this 
chapter:  whether the first feature is plausible depends on what account offers the most 
appropriate  conception of the threshold. The second feature implies most  probably that 
only  one  threshold  is  needed.  The  third  feature  is  a  constraint  on  what  is  the  most 
appropriate account. All this is further discussed in relation to my human-life account in 
section 4 of this chapter.
3. - The Human Flourishing Account & Its Problems.
Here I discuss one of the most prominent accounts of duties of minimal wellbeing, 
i.e. the human flourishing account. This account usually starts with a conception of human 
flourishing, and asks what is minimally required for an individual to lead such a life. The 
objects of duties of minimal wellbeing are then those things that are minimally required for 
an individual to lead a flourishing human life. The function of duties of minimal wellbeing 
118 This is in section 3 of this chapter.
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is to secure those objects for individuals.119 
Due  to  their  commitment  to  overlapping  consensus,120 most  contemporary 
advocates of the human flourishing account tend to formulate their conception of human 
flourishing in a general and abstract way. Subsequently their derived lists of things that are 
minimally required for an individual to lead such a life are also general and unspecific. The 
objects  that constitute  their  derived lists  are usually types of things that  are minimally 
required for an individual to lead such a flourishing life.121 However, I have three worries 
with using human flourishing as a starting point.
First,  if  overlapping  consensus  is  achieved  by  reducing  contestability,  then  a 
conception of human flourishing and a derived list that is general, abstract and unspecific 
is unhelpful and does not necessarily achieve that aim. It might reduce the contestability of 
items on the list, but sometimes that is not because they are really incontestable. Rather it 
is because their general, abstract and unspecific nature that makes it harder to reasonably 
and rationally contest  them. Indeed, in so far as one actually began with a substantive 
conception  of  human  flourishing which  would  most  probably  be  highly  contestable,  it 
seems a bit deceptive in trying to achieve overlapping consensus by formulating it and the 
derived list in general, abstract and unspecific terms. This might not be with a fair criticism 
of Nussbaum, but it seems applicable to Pogge: “Facing up to this daunting responsibility 
requires  that  we develop,  within  our  conception  of  the  justice  of  social  institutions,  a 
substantive conception of human flourishing”.  But then he says,  “The sought universal 
criterion of justice ought to work with a thin conception of human flourishing, which might 
be  formulated largely in terms of  unspecific  means,  rather  than components  of, human 
flourishing. Though disagreements about what human flourishing consists in may prove 
119 See Pogge 2002b 27-51. For Nussbaum, the conception of human flourishing is a life that is worthy of 
human dignity. Nussbaum 2006: 74-78. 
120 The general idea behind ‘overlapping consensus’ is that for a conception of justice to be stable (and hence 
a plausible conception), it has to be the case that its principles of justice can be agreed upon by people who 
hold different and incompatible but reasonable comprehensive conceptions of the good. See Rawls 1996: 
144-150.
121 See Pogge 2002b: 36 and Nussbaum 2006: 76-79.
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intractable,  it  may well be possible to bypass them by agreeing that nutrition, clothing, 
shelter, certain basic freedoms, as well as social interaction, education, and participation 
are important means to it…”122
Nevertheless,  one  might  think  that  we can  avoid  this  by taking  seriously  what 
Pogge says in the latter quotation. Rather than starting with a substantive conception of 
human  flourishing,  we  start  with,  as  Pogge  suggests,  a  thin  conception  of  human 
flourishing which is constituted by unspecific means to human flourishing. Then maybe we 
can achieve overlapping consensus by bypassing the contestability, which originates from 
a substantive conception of human flourishing. This, however, leads to my second worry.
I agree that maybe we can achieve overlapping consensus by starting with a thin 
conception  of  human  flourishing,  which  is  constituted  by  unspecific  means  to  human 
flourishing.  However,  the  problem  here  is  that  we  seem  to  be  misconstruing  their 
significance.  As I shall  argue later in chapter 7, means to the satisfaction of biological 
needs,  education,  physical  security,  freedom of  expression,  belief  and  association  and 
freedom  of  non-harmful  conduct  are  all  constitutive  of  securing  a  human  life  for 
individuals. Of course there is the prior problem of what Pogge means by certain basic 
freedoms, social interaction, education and participation. But insofar as they refer to what I 
argue for in chapter 7, they are not just unspecific means to human flourishing. Rather, 
they  are  constitutive  of  securing  a  human  life  for  individuals.  It  is  true  that  what  is 
constitutive  of  securing  a  human  life  for  individuals  is  (part  of)  the  means  to  human 
flourishing, since an individual cannot flourish unless a human life is secured for him. But 
construing  them as  merely  unspecific  means  to  human  flourishing,  fails  to  accurately 
identify the role they play in the life of individuals. Indeed, this role that they play – being 
constitutive to securing a human life for individuals - is arguably more important than just 
122 Pogge 2002b: 36. My italics. Note that these unspecific means are different from (maybe narrower than) 
Rawls's primary goods. The latter are means for pursuing one's ends, whatever they might be. In contrast, 
unspecific means to human flourishing are means for pursuing one kind of ends, namely human flourishing. 
For Rawls's primary goods, see Rawls 1971: 62 & 92.
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being unspecific means to human flourishing. This is because first, being able to lead a 
human life is arguably more important than being able to lead a flourishing human life; and 
second,  being  constitutive  to  securing an  end (which  in  this  case  is  a  human  life  for 
individuals) is arguably more significant than just being unspecific means to an end (which 
in this case is human flourishing).  
Third,  overlapping consensus is  definitely an attractive  ideal  that  we cannot  do 
without. But any conception of human flourishing (indeed anything normative) that we 
endorse  necessarily  comes  from  our  own  comprehensive  doctrines  –  our  religious, 
philosophical or moral doctrines in which we are brought up.123 Their intelligibility and 
meaning  are  tied  to  their  respective  comprehensive  doctrines.  Thus  trying  to  achieve 
overlapping consensus on such issues is not just to offer a general, abstract, unspecific and 
vague list, and ask whether everyone would reasonably agree with it. Agreement between 
reasonable individuals is much more rich and deeper than that. It is about engaging with 
others  in  a  rich  discursive  practice.  It  involves  making  explicit  the  underlying 
comprehensive  doctrines,  elucidating  and justifying  one’s  beliefs,  commitments,  values 
and weaving them all together into a conception of human flourishing. It also involves 
engaging  the  reasonable  comprehensive  doctrines  of  others,  and  understanding  their 
elucidation and justification of their beliefs, values and commitments by relating them to 
one’s  conception  of  human  flourishing.  The  hope  is  that  through  such  a  process,  a 
conception of human flourishing and a derived list will eventually emerge which everyone 
can reasonably agree on. I am not implying that Pogge and Nussbaum have not set out 
something like this, though arguably Nussbaum has done a better  job than Pogge with 
regard to this.124 However, if that is the nature of overlapping consensus, then starting with 
a conception of human flourishing is not an easy way to reach it.
123 I am using ‘comprehensive doctrines’ in the manner Rawls uses it. See Rawls 1996: 59.
124 Pogge only talked about the different components in his conception of human flourishing, and then 
proceeded to assert that everyone would agree with his list of general unspecific means to human flourishing. 
Nussbaum elucidated her conception of human flourishing and her derived list with her rich and detailed 
examples of Vasanti and Jayamma. See Pogge 2002b: 27-36 & Nussbaum 2000: 15-24.
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This  is  because  the  concept  of  human  flourishing is  a  very rich  and pervasive 
concept. As will become clearer in the discussion, a concept is rich in the sense that it 
involves many other concepts, some of which are themselves also rich in this sense. It is 
therefore also pervasive in the sense that its meaning is intricately tied up with the meaning 
of many other concepts. One cannot understand its meaning independently of the meanings 
of its connected concepts; and a shift in the meaning of one will lead to a shift in the many 
others that are connected.
The concept of human flourishing is rich and pervasive in this sense: It involves a 
lot of our commitments, values and beliefs, some of which are themselves very rich and 
deep, like dignity, worth etc. Thus it is tied up with our comprehensive doctrines in such an 
intricate way that it is really hard to engage with others in a rich discursive practice about 
it. This is because it is hard to disentangle the elements that constitute one’s conception of 
flourishing, elucidate them clearly and see how they are inter-woven together. This makes 
justifying them especially hard. This also means that others would have a hard time trying 
to grasp and understand one’s conception of human flourishing, let alone understand it by 
relating it to their own conceptions of flourishing. It is therefore not surprising that the 
conception of human flourishing that Pogge and Nussbaum start  with is a general and 
abstract  one.  This  is  because  it  is  quite  hard  to  elucidate  one’s  conception  of  human 
flourishing clearly and systematically, let alone justify it and compare it with other rival 
conceptions. There are ways to make this easier. Nussbaum argues that the argument for 
each of the items on her list involves imagining how a life without them is not a life worthy 
of human dignity.125 Such arguments might help to clarify and elucidate the elements that 
constitute her conception of human flourishing, and see how they are inter-woven together. 
But I think it only makes it less hard rather than easier. This is evident from the fact that 
Nussbaum tried to do so with only two items on her list: affiliation and practical reason,126 
125 Nussbaum 2006: 78.
126 Nussbaum 1995. 
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and her subsequent discussion of the list is not particularly clearer because of that. 
Furthermore,  even  if  we  can  find  a  way  of  disentangling  the  elements  that 
constitute one’s conception of human flourishing, elucidate them clearly and see how they 
are inter-woven together; given the pervasiveness and richness of the concept of human 
flourishing, it seems reasonable to suppose that not everyone can reasonably agree on one 
conception of human flourishing. First, deep and rich concepts like dignity, worth etc. do 
not lend themselves to further explanation and justification. Sometimes what dignity means 
is just this or that, and what at most support them are intuitions. They are the bedrock, and 
there is  nothing deeper  than that.127 Sometimes  people share them and sometimes  they 
don’t, even after much convincing. However, it might be too quick to presume that they are 
unreasonable just because they do not share them. For example, some might reasonably 
contend that human dignity lies in being able to control one’s life; while others might also 
reasonably contend that human dignity lies in being able to do what is required, even when 
this is daunting or demanding. It seems a bit quick, if they do disagree, for either side to 
dismiss the other as being unreasonable. Second, the same consideration applies to how the 
elements of a conception of human flourishing are tied together, especially with regard to 
its constitutive values. It is not just simply that the ordering of its constitutive values does 
not lend itself to further explanation and justification. Sometimes there is just no fact of the 
matter to prefer one ordering rather than the other. This is because the constitutive values 
might  be  incommensurable  with  each  other.128 Thus  for  example,  being  able  to  form 
affiliations with other individuals and being able to have achievements in life are both 
constitutive of a flourishing human life. A life without either of them is not flourishing. 
However, which one is more important with regard to a flourishing human life? Some 
might contend that being able to form friendships outweighs the importance of being able 
127 Nussbaum herself also admitted that the arguments for her conception for human flourishing and her 
derived list are intuitive and discursive. See Nussbaum 2006: 78.
128 For various discussions on the incommensurability of values, see Wiggins 1997, Raz 1986: 322-366, 
Griffin 1986: 75-92 & Broome 1997. The most comprehensive argument against the incommensurability of 
values is Chang 2002. I have written a paper against Chang’s position (Lee 2008) but unfortunately there is 
no space to  include it in this thesis. 
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to  have  achievements  with  regard  to  a  flourishing  human  life,  while  others  contend 
otherwise.  Both of them seem reasonable enough. I believe this  is so because they are 
incommensurable. Thus there is no fact of the matter as to which is more important in a 
conception  of  human  flourishing.  There  are  a  couple  of  ways  around  this.  Nussbaum 
stipulates that the components in her conception of human flourishing are all of central 
importance and distinct  in quality.129 Pogge leaves  it  open in his  conception  of human 
flourishing how its components relate to each other.130 However, legislators require some 
sort  of  guidance  with  regard  to  the  relative  importance  or  priority  of  the  various 
components in a conception of human flourishing. Leaving it open or stipulating that they 
are all  of central  importance is not particularly helpful,  especially when in many cases 
certain things like life, bodily health, bodily integrity are in my view more important than 
practical reason and affiliation, which are in turn more important than other species and 
play in an account of human flourishing.131   
These are not definitive arguments against the human flourishing account. They are 
just worries. I believe that Nussbaum’s and Pogge’s positions have gone a long way in 
trying to reduce the severity of these worries. However, if there is another starting point 
that does not suffer from the above worries as much as human flourishing does, i.e. it is 
less rich and pervasive, involves less rich and deep concepts and provides an ordering of its 
constitutive elements, and if it does as good a job as a conception of human flourishing, 
then it would be a better starting point for an account of duties of minimal wellbeing.
4. - The Case for the Human-life Account.
In this  section,  I  shall  first  introduce my human-life  account  for conceiving the 
threshold for duties of minimal wellbeing. I shall then argue for it being superior to the 
human  flourishing  account  with  respect  to  the  three  worries  I  have  identified  in  the 
129 Nussbaum 2000: 81.
130 Pogge 2002b: 28.
131 For the various components of Nussbaum’s conception of human flourishing, see Nussbaum 2000: 78-80. 
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previous section. Finally, I shall discuss it in relation to the three features that any account 
for conceiving the threshold has to take into consideration, for them to yield a plausible 
sufficientarian conception of justice for duties of minimal wellbeing. 
4.1 – The Human-life Account.
Despite the above worries with the human flourishing account, it is still instructive 
for our purposes to look at the concept of human flourishing again.
If an individual is living a flourishing human life, then his life is of a certain quality 
for him. It is of a certain quality for him because we are concerned with the flourishing of 
his life, not the flourishing of the human species or the flourishing of the society in which 
he is living. It is also not the quality of his life to him. Since it might be the case that to 
him,  for  whatever  reason,  he  is  not  living  a  flourishing  life,  yet  his  life  is  in  fact 
flourishing.  For  example,  someone  who  has  very  low self-esteem and  self-confidence 
might think that he has achieved nothing in life, even though he has in fact achieved much 
in it. In this thesis, I shall call the quality of an individual’s life for him the wellbeing of 
that individual. Thus what a conception of human flourishing refers to is a certain level of 
wellbeing. Different conceptions of human flourishing differ from each other as to what 
exactly constitutes this level of wellbeing, i.e. the things that he needs to have such that his 
life is at that level of wellbeing. This is the source of the richness and pervasiveness of an 
account of human flourishing, since specifying this involves appealing to rich and deep 
concepts like dignity, worth etc. Given the above worries, a better alternative is to take a 
step back and instead of asking what constitutes the level of wellbeing where one’s life is 
flourishing,  we  ask  what  constitutes  the  wellbeing  of  individuals,  i.e.  what  makes  an 
individual’s life go better and what makes their life go worse. The next two chapters argue 
for  and  defend  what  I  call  a  Razian  conception  of  wellbeing.  According  to  this,  the 
wellbeing of an individual is fundamentally constituted by:
(a) the satisfaction of his biological needs; and,
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(b) his  success  in whole-heartedly pursuing socially  defined and determined goals and 
activities which are in fact valuable.
Accordingly,  the  more  of  an  individual’s  biological  needs  are  satisfied,  and  the  more 
successful and whole-hearted he is in pursuing socially defined and determined goals and 
activities, and the more these goals and activities are in fact valuable, then all other things 
being equal, the higher is his wellbeing; and vice versa.
Based on this account of wellbeing, an account of what constitutes a human life can 
then be derived. According to it, a human life consists in having a level of wellbeing that is 
higher than the satisfaction of biological needs, where this is constituted by the pursuit of 
goals and activities with a sense of what is worth doing.132 Under my human-life account, 
the  function  of  duties  of  minimal  wellbeing  is  therefore  to  secure  a  human  life  for 
individuals. Thus the threshold for duties of minimal wellbeing is constituted by whatever 
is involved in securing a human life for individuals. Determining what this amounts to then 
determines the objects of duties of minimal wellbeing.133
4.2 – The Human-life Account vs. the Human Flourishing Account.
My  human-life  account  is  superior  to  the  human  flourishing  account.  This  is 
because it is less pervasive and less rich than a conception of human flourishing, as it does 
not appeal to rich and deep concepts like dignity,  worth etc. The Razian conception of 
wellbeing does appeal to whole-heartedness and the value of goals and activities, and they 
might involve rich and deep concepts. But as it turns out in chapter 6 and 7, they do not 
play much role in the account of human life and in determining the objects of duties of 
minimal wellbeing. The latter does involve identifying what I call ‘justice-violating goals 
and activities’,  but that  can be done without  appealing to rich and deep concepts.  The 
derived account  of human life  does have a notion of human agency.134 But it  is  much 
132 This is discussed in detail in chapter 6.
133 This is the subject of chapter 7.
134 As captured by the clause ‘…with a sense of what is worth doing’. 
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thinner and less value laden than other notions of human agency, e.g. autonomous agency.
135 All it involves are the abilities to form ideas of what is worth doing, revise them in light 
of  further  reasons  and  coordinate  one’s  actions  according  to  them;  and  they  are  just 
grounded in the thought that individuals pursue certain goals and activities because they 
find them worth doing. Chapter 6 discusses all this in greater detail. 
The Razian conception of wellbeing and the derived account of human life are also 
not  just  disguised  conceptions  of  human  flourishing.  Imagine  a  biologically  healthy 
individual who is an agent in the above sense. He is able to forms ideas of what is worth 
doing, revise them in light of further reasons and coordinate his actions according to them. 
However, his life is devoted to his job as a toilet cleaner, which is definitely a valuable 
activity. He is whole-hearted in his job and is relatively successful in it. According to the 
Razian conception of wellbeing, he has a positive level of wellbeing that is beyond the 
satisfaction of his biological needs. Since this positive level is constituted by his pursuit of 
goals and activities with a sense of what is worth doing, he is also leading a human life 
according to the derived account of human life. However, it is doubtful that he is living a 
flourishing human life. Such a life is usually not the kind of life that people intuitively 
think of when they imagine a flourishing human life. Thus my human-life account is not a 
disguised human flourishing account. 
My account also has an ordering of its constitutive elements. The satisfaction of 
biological needs is usually lexically prior to pursuing goals and activities, since it is one of 
the necessary conditions for pursuing goals and activities. However there are cases where 
this is not true. This is because there are certain goals and activities which are justifiably 
valuable, but involve the non-satisfaction of biological needs. For example fasting for a 
political cause or leading an ascetic life for spiritual reasons. Thus depending on the goals 
and  activities  that  one  pursues,  the  negative  effects  on  wellbeing  caused  by  the  non-
satisfaction  of biological  needs can be outweighed.  All  other  things  being equal,  if  an 
135 Please refer to section 6.3.3 of chapter 7 for this.
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individual successfully pursues a valuable goal or activity which involves non-satisfaction 
of  biological  needs,  then  the  negative  effects  on  his  wellbeing  would  be  outweighed; 
otherwise it  would not.  Chapter  4  also argues  that  whole-heartedness  consists  in  three 
levels:  dis-heartedness,  half-heartedness  and  whole-heartedness.  The  effects  of  dis-
heartedness on wellbeing cannot be outweighed by the effects of success and the value of 
the pursued goal or activity.  While for half-heartedness, whole-heartedness, success and 
the value of the pursued goal or activity, none of them can necessarily outweigh the others. 
Chapter 4 elaborates more on this.
Since compared with the human flourishing account, my human-life account is less 
rich and pervasive, involves less rich and deep concepts and provides an ordering of its 
constitutive elements, it would be easier to achieve overlapping consensus with it than with 
the human flourishing account. Thus it is a better account of duties of minimal wellbeing 
than the human flourishing account.
4.3 – The Human-life Account & Sufficientarian Conception of justice.
So, how does my human-life account fare in relation to the features that I have 
identified in section 2 of this  chapter?136 Recall  that  if  an account  does not  take these 
features into consideration, then it cannot offer an appropriate conception of the threshold 
for a sufficientarian conception of justice. 
The first feature states that there is absolute priority in non-trivially benefiting those 
whose quality of life is below the threshold, even if this means forgoing greater benefits to 
a  greater  number  of  those  whose  quality  of  life  is  already  above  the  threshold,  or 
inequalities are increased as a result. My human-life account supports this feature. Recall 
that the function of duties of minimal wellbeing is to secure a human life for individuals, 
and that the threshold is constituted by what is involved in doing so. The main reason 
behind this is because individuals have a basic entitlement to live a human life, and this 
136 I shall leave out the second feature in the following discussion, according to which there is only one 
threshold. This is because it merely specifies that there do not have to be more than one threshold.
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entitlement is fulfilled when a human life is secured for them. Here lies the significance of 
my threshold for duties of minimal wellbeing: it fulfils individuals’ basic entitlement to 
live  a  human  life,  by  securing  a  human  life  for  them.  If  individuals  have  any  basic 
entitlements in virtue of the fact that they are human beings, they have a basic entitlement 
to live a human life. I really cannot think of anything else that can outweigh this basic 
entitlement.137 Thus there is an absolute priority in non-trivially benefiting those whose 
quality of life is below the threshold,  even if  this means forgoing greater benefits  to a 
greater  number  of  those  whose  quality  of  life  are  already  above  the  threshold,  or 
inequalities  are  increased  as  a  result.  We  are  here  trying  to  secure  a  human  life  for 
individuals. Thus it seems implausible that greater benefits to those with secured human 
lives,  or  decreased  inequalities  among  those  who  can  already  live  a  human  life,  can 
outweigh that. 
This leads to the third feature, according to which the concepts that are used to 
define  the  threshold  should  be  ‘threshold  concepts’  rather  than  ‘graded concepts’.  My 
account also conforms to this. Although it seems that ‘living a human life’ is a graded 
concept, there are considerations to suggest otherwise. First; although it makes sense to say 
that the life of a gorilla is closer to a human life than a life of a snake, it does not quite 
make sense to say that a gorilla lives a more human life than a snake. Second; even when 
an individual’s life is better than another’s, insofar as both of them are living a human life 
we  do  not  say  that  the  former  individual  is  living  a  more  human  life  than  the  latter  
individual.  The difference between their  lives  does not lie  in the fact that one is  more 
human than the other, rather it lies in how they respectively live out their human lives. 
These two considerations suggest that living a human life is an ‘all-or-nothing states of 
affairs”.138 Either you are living a human life or you are not. One is not living a human life 
when the life that one is living is partly a human life. If one is already living a human life, 
137 For possible exceptions to this, see section 3.2 of chapter 6 and section 6.4 of chapter 7.
138 According to Benbaji, this is a mark of a threshold concept. See Benbaji 2006: 399. 
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one cannot live a more human life, one can only make more out of the human life that one 
is living. But even if one makes more out of it, one is still living a human life.
5. - Needs-based account and duties of minimal wellbeing.
Besides  the  human  flourishing account,  another  prominent  account  of  duties  of 
minimal wellbeing is the needs-based account. According to it, individuals have certain 
needs, such that they would be harmed if those needs are not fulfilled.139 Of course, not all 
needs have such a normative status. Needs that are predicated on individuals' contingent 
goals, aims, ends etc. - instrumental needs – do not have such a normative status. 140 It is 
only  those  that  are  in  some  sense  fundamental,141 intrinsic,142 basic,143 categorical  or 
absolute,144 that have such a normative status. The function of duties of minimal wellbeing 
is to secure the fulfilment of these needs for individuals. The objects of these duties are 
therefore constituted by these needs. What exactly constitute these needs, depends on the 
account  of harm that  one holds.  This account  specifies  a  standard,  according to which 
individuals are harmed if they are unable to reach it. These needs are then constituted by 
what exactly is required for individuals to reach that standard.
In principle, this standard can be a conception of human flourishing.145 But it can 
also be something else. If it is a conception of human flourishing, then the corresponding 
needs-based account would be basically a human flourishing account. Thus my worries 
with the human flourishing account would then extend to such a needs-based account. In 
any  case,  most  advocates  of  the  needs-based  account  endorse  a  different  standard,  to 
distinguish their account from the human flourishing account; and this standard is usually 
lower than the standard of human flourishing.146 In the following, I would like to discuss 
139 A good discussion on the nature of needs, and their relation to harm, is Thomson 1987.
140 Thomson 1987: 7-9.
141 Thomson 1987: 8.
142 Miller 2007: 179. 
143 Brock 2009: 63-69.
144 Wiggins 1991a: 6-11.
145 See for example Wiggins 1991a: 11-14.
146 This is not surprising, since if the standard is higher than human flourishing, then it would seem 
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two such accounts – Miller's and Brock's – and how they relate to my human-life account. I 
shall argue that my human-life account is very similar to both of them.
5.1 – Miller.
Miller argues for basic needs, which are the conditions that must be met for an 
individual  to  have  a  decent  human  life  in  any society.147 These  needs  are  intrinsic,  as 
opposed to  instrumental;148 and they are basic,  in  contrast  to  (intrinsic)  societal  needs, 
which are the more expansive conditions that must  be met  for an individual to have a 
decent human life in the particular society which he belongs.149 These basic needs include, 
but are not exhausted by: food and water, clothing and shelter, physical security, health 
care, education, work and leisure, freedoms of movement, conscience and expression.150 
Although Miller uses these basic needs to ground universal basic human rights,151 I 
do not see a necessity in doing so, if we are only trying to establish duties of minimal 
wellbeing.152 If the non-fulfilment of these basic needs constitute harm on individuals, then 
it seems that fact alone, is sufficient enough to ground duties on others to fulfil these basic 
needs. Thus it is possible to argue that there are duties of minimal wellbeing, which are 
grounded  on  these  basic  needs,  without  committing  to  Miller's  claim  that  there  are 
universal basic human rights, which are also grounded on these basic needs. In any case, 
even if we accept Miller's claim here, there still are duties of minimal wellbeing that are 
grounded - in some sense - on these basic needs. This is because the universal basic human 
rights  (that  are  grounded  on  these  basic  needs)  have  correlative  duties;  and  these 
correlative duties would then be duties of minimal wellbeing. 
However, it is not at all clear what constitutes a decent human life in any society. 
implausible to hold that individuals are harmed when they are unable to reach it. 
147 Miller 2007: 182.
148 Miller 2007: 179.
149 Miller 2007: 182.
150 Miller 2007: 184.
151 Miller 2007: 178-197.
152 For the relationship between duties of minimal wellbeing and universal basic human rights, see section 2.2 
of chapter 8.
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Miller  talks  about  it  being  constituted  by  core  human  activities,  but  he  never  exactly 
explained what are core human activities, besides giving a couple of examples.153 I shall 
therefore  suggest  that  my account  of  what  constitutes  a  human  life  (having a  level  of 
wellbeing that is higher than the satisfaction of biological needs, which is constituted by 
the pursuit of goals and activities with a sense of what is worth doing, see section 2 of 
chapter  6),  can in  some sense supplement  his  position,  by giving content  to  what  one 
means by 'a decent human life in any society'. Allow me to motivate this a bit more in the 
following.
Let me start with what Miller says about living a decent human life in the society to  
which one belongs. One way that Miller fleshes this out, is that each society has a shared 
conception of a range of activities that make up a normal human life.154 Accordingly, if an 
individual engages in the range of activities, that his society takes as making up a normal 
human life, then he is living a decent human life in the society to which he belongs. In that 
case, my account of what a human life consists in, captures the idea that a decent human 
life in any society involves engaging in certain activities, without making references to the 
particular range of activities, that particular societies take as making up a normal human 
life. This is because my account basically says that a human life consists in, besides the 
satisfaction of biological needs, the pursuit of goals and activities. But it does not specify 
exactly what these goals and activities are, since under my account (like a decent human 
life in the society to which one belongs), that depends on the society in which one lives.155
My account is also not just a life that is merely living - recall that my account is a 
life  that  is  more than  the  satisfaction  of  biological  needs  -  but  more  importantly,  it 
incorporates a sense of human decency; and that captures the sense in which a life is a 
decent human life.  For example, my account includes a respect that we owe to others, in 
virtue of the fact that they are human beings, not to coerce or manipulate them (I have 
153 Miller 2007: 184.
154 Miller 1999: 210.
155 More specifically, they are the ones that are latent in the social form of the society in which one lives.
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called this the requirement to respect individuals as someone who leads a human life, see 
section 6.3.4 of chapter 7). Thus someone who pursues goals and activities, besides the 
satisfaction of biological needs, is (in some sense) living a human life. But as long as he is  
subject to coercion or manipulation, then he is not leading a decent human life. Note that 
this requirement is not grounded in any particular societal norm. Rather, it is grounded in 
the fact that individuals are human beings, and what a human life consists in.  Both of 
which are not tied to any particular societal norm. Thus it captures the sense in which a life 
is a decent human life in any society.
Furthermore, if ones compares Miller's list of basic needs, and the objects of my 
duties  of  minimal  wellbeing,  they are  strikingly  similar:  food and water,  clothing  and 
shelter, health care, mirror my means for the satisfaction of biological needs. Freedom of 
movement mirrors my freedom to non-harmful conduct. The more obscure one is work and 
leisure, which I take as goals and activities that are latent in the social form of the society 
in which one lives, from which no one in that society should be prevented from pursuing.156 
The rest of the basic needs exactly mirror my other objects of duties of minimal wellbeing.  
Since Miller's list of basic needs are derived from what he takes as a decent human life in 
any society, while my objects of duties of minimal wellbeing are derived from my account 
of human life, this suggests that what I take to be a human life is very similar to what  
Miller takes as a decent human life in any society.
Given  all  these  considerations,  it  therefore  seems  plausible  to  suggest  that  my 
human-life account can, in some sense, supplement Miller's position, in the way I have 
described above.
5.2 – Brock.
As a component of her theory of global justice, Brock argues for a needs-based 
minimum floor principle.157 For Brock, the (basic) needs that constitute this principle are - 
156 This excludes what I call justice-violating goals and activities. See section 6.1 of chapter 7.
157 Brock 2009: 46-58.
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following Len Doyal and Ian Gough - universalizable conditions that enable non-impaired 
participation in any form of life.158 According to her, to be able to participate in a form of 
life, one has to be capable of performing acts. Thus needs are basically the conditions for 
human agency;159 and they are: (a) a certain amount of physical and psychological health; 
(b) sufficient security to be able to act; (c) a sufficient level of understanding of the options 
one is choosing between; (d) a certain amount of autonomy; and (e) decent social relations 
with at least some others.160 
I  basically  share  the  same  starting  point  as  Brock,  when  I  argue  that  what  is 
relevant to an individual's wellbeing are his actions (section 3.1 of chapter 4). However, 
unlike me, who goes beyond that, and further characterizes in what sense an individual's 
actions are relevant to his wellbeing (this leads me to the Razian conception of wellbeing, 
see section 3.2 and onwards in chapter 4), Brock stops there, and proceed to discuss what 
is  needed for individuals  to be agents,  i.e.  be capable of performing acts.  Since Brock 
never further characterizes and substantiates the end from which needs are derived, her list 
of needs – (a) to (e) above - are therefore more vague and less determinate, than my objects 
of duties of minimal wellbeing. This is evidenced by phrases like 'a certain amount',  'a 
sufficient level', 'decent' etc. in her list of needs.
I have no idea, had Brocke further characterized and substantiated the end from 
which her list of needs are derived, whether my account would still be in line with her 
account. But it is possible to see elements within my account, that correspond to her list of 
needs: Means for the satisfaction of biological needs and whole-heartedness correspond to 
(a); physical security corresponds to (b); pursuing goals and activities with a sense of what 
is worth doing correspond to (c); freedom of non-harmful conduct corresponds to (d); and 
freedom of association corresponds to (e). If that is the case, then this suggests that, had 
158 Brock 2009: 64-65.
159 Brock 2009: 65.
160 Brock 2009: 66.
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Brocke further characterized and substantiated her account, my account would still be in 
line with hers.
5.3 - Needs-based account and the human-life account.
All that said, there is still a crucial difference between my account and a needs-
based  account.  For  a  needs-based  account,  the  normative  force  of  duties  of  minimal 
wellbeing (whose objects are just those needs) are grounded in the fact that an individual is 
harmed, when those needs of his are not fulfilled. In contrast, in my account, the normative 
force of these duties are grounded in the fact that an individual's entitlement (to lead a 
human life) is not fulfilled, when the objects of these duties are deprived from them. Thus 
there is a difference between my account, and the needs-based account, on what grounds 
the normative force of duties of minimal wellbeing. Nevertheless, one must not exaggerate 
the difference here. This is because as long as one does not understand 'harm' narrowly as 
only referring to perceivable or tangible harm, then there is a sense in which one is harmed, 
when one's entitlement is not fulfilled. Thus even under my account, it is still possible to 
ground the normative force of these duties on the notion of 'harm'. It is just that this notion 
of 'harm' can then be further analysed in terms of the non-fulfilment of certain entitlements.
Given the similarity between my account and the needs-based account, why did I 
opt  for  a  language  of  entitlements,  rather  than  needs?  The  reason  is  basically  a 
methodological one. As I said before, to identify what are the relevant needs that ground 
duties of minimal wellbeing, we need an account of harm. An account that tells use what 
constitutes harm and what does not. The worry that I have here is that once we go beyond 
tangible,  physical,  biological  or  perceivable  harms,  our  intuitions  on  what  exactly 
constitutes harm (and what does not) become rather vague, unclear and controversial.161 
One might  hold,  following Brock, that  one is  harmed if  one is  unable to be an agent. 
Alternatively, one might hold, in line with Miller, that one is harmed if one is unable to 
161 Of course, we can restrict to only those harms that are tangible, physical, biological or perceivable. But 
then most probably, this would only yield too narrow a set of duties of minimal wellbeing.
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lead to a decent human life (whether or not it is in any society, or in the society to which 
one belongs). It seems very hard to adjudicate between them. And even if we can do so – 
say a decent  human life  is  the correct  account  – it  still  seems very hard to adjudicate 
between different understandings of it. And since duties of minimal wellbeing are derived 
from it, different understandings of it would lead to different duties. It then becomes hard 
to decide what exactly are our duties of minimal wellbeing.
Contrast this with my human-life account. According to it, the normative force of 
these duties is grounded in the entitlement that all individuals, in virtue of the fact that they 
are human beings, are entitled to lead a human life. This entitlement,  I take, should be 
rather uncontroversial. What exactly constitutes our duties of minimal wellbeing, are then 
derived from an account of what constitutes a human life, which in turn are derived from 
an  account  of  wellbeing  (the  Razian  conception  of  wellbeing);  and  I  have  offered 
arguments for this account of wellbeing (in chapter 4), and against alternative accounts of 
wellbeing (in chapter 5). If the end from which these duties are derived is in dispute, there 
seem to be more resources here (compared with a needs-based account), to adjudicate the 
dispute. Thus if one disputes what exactly constitutes a human life, we can appeal to the 
Razian conception of wellbeing from which it is derived. If one then disputes that, we can 
appeal to the arguments for it, and the arguments against alternative accounts of wellbeing. 
Thus  it  seems  here,  there  are  more  resources  (and  therefore  less  hard)  to  adjudicate 
disputes over the end from which these duties are derived, than a needs-based account. It is 
because of this that I opted for a language of entitlements, rather than needs.
Indeed, in this respect, there is an advantage in opting a language of entitlements. 
As I said earlier, it is open for my position to argue that one is (in some sense) harmed,  
when one's entitlement is not fulfilled. If that is the case, then the language of entitlements 
can even inform our vague, unclear and controversial intuitions on what does, or does not, 
constitute harm.
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6. - Conclusion.
In this chapter, I have argued that my human-life account is more appropriate than 
the human flourishing account for duties of minimal wellbeing. I have also discussed in 
what respect it is different from, and similar to, the needs-based account. Central to the 
human-life  account  is  the claim that  all  individuals  have  a  basic  entitlement  to  lead  a 
human life, and the function of duties of minimal wellbeing is to fulfil this entitlement by 
securing a human life for individuals. What is involved in doing so therefore constitutes 
the objects of duties of minimal wellbeing. Chapter 7 discusses what these objects exactly 
are. But before we do so, we need to know what constitutes a human life, which is derived 
from the Razian conception of wellbeing. The next two chapters argue for and defend the 
Razian conception of wellbeing. 
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Chapter 4
The Razian Conception of Wellbeing
1. - Introduction.
The last chapter argued for my human-life account of duties of minimal wellbeing. 
Central to it is my Razian conception of wellbeing. This is the subject of this chapter.
As I argued in section 4.1 of the last chapter, the ‘wellbeing’ of an individual refers 
to the quality of his life for him.162 This contrasts with two related notions: the quality of 
his life per se and the quality of his life to him. The former includes an evaluation of the 
quality of an individual’s life from various perspectives which are not his perspective - for 
example, how his life contributes to the collective, or to the society etc. By contrast, the 
latter refers to the quality of his life solely according to his assessment, i.e. the quality of 
his life as he himself sees it. In this case, the assessment is on the individual’s own terms; 
we do not evaluate how the individual thinks or assesses how good or bad his life is. In 
contrast to these two notions, the quality of an individual’s life for him refers to this: it is 
an objective  evaluation  of  how good or how bad the life  of  an individual  is  from the 
perspective of the individual whose life it is.163
The Razian conception of wellbeing states that the wellbeing of an individual is 
fundamentally constituted by:164
(a) the satisfaction of his biological needs, and;
(b)  his  success  in whole-heartedly pursuing socially  defined and determined goals  and 
activities which are in fact valuable. 
Besides a few points that section 2 discusses, (a) is rather uncontroversial as an essential 
component of wellbeing. This chapter shall focus on (b).
The argument proceeds in stages. Section 3 discusses the central idea that it is an 
162 Crisp 2005: n. pag., Crisp 2006: 100 & Arneson 1999: 113.
163 Raz 1986: 289-290.
164 It is a ‘Razian’ conception because it is basically the one endorsed and argued by Raz, albeit very slightly 
and in a very sketchy manner. See Raz 1994: 3-8 & Raz 2004: 269-281.
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individual’s goals and activities that are of relevance to his wellbeing. This brings in the 
other  elements  in  my  account:  ‘pursue’,  ‘value’,  ‘success’  and  ‘whole-heartedness’. 
Section 4 discusses the nature of goals and activities as possible objects  of pursuit  for 
individuals. Central to this is an idea of ‘social embeddedness’. Section 5 elucidates the 
various elements in my account: ‘pursue’, ‘success’, ‘value’; their relationships with each 
other and how they are related to goals and activities. Section 6 argues for a conception of 
whole-heartedness, and discusses its relationship with ‘pursuing goals and activities’.
2. - Wellbeing and the Satisfaction of Biological Needs.
By ‘an  individual’s  biological  needs’,  I  refer  to  the  needs  that  are  required  to 
sustain  the  healthy  biological  life  of  a  human  being,  as  given  by our  best  biological 
theories. Although it is true that “[o]ther things being equal, a person is better off when 
well fed, in moderate temperature, with sufficient sensory stimulation, in good health, etc., 
whether he adopts these as his goals or not”,165 the satisfaction of the biological needs of an 
individual is not necessarily conducive to the wellbeing of that individual. This is because 
some valuable goals and activities consist in the non-satisfaction of one’s biological needs, 
for example fasting for a just political cause. Thus for an individual who whole-heartedly 
pursues these valuable goals and activities, satisfying his biological needs would not only 
frustrate his whole-hearted pursuit  of them. It would also effectively prevent him from 
pursuing them. This would be highly detrimental to his wellbeing. Thus as Raz says, “… 
their  [the satisfaction  of biological  needs] contribution  to  the well-being of the person 
concerned  may  depend  on  their  satisfaction  being  consonant  with  his  comprehensive 
goals”.166 This will be brought up again when I discuss what constitutes a human life in 
chapter  6,  and  the  objects  of  duties  of  minimal  wellbeing  in  chapter  7.  Nevertheless, 
although (a) is normally a necessary condition for (b), the satisfaction of biological needs 
165Raz 1986: 290.
166 Raz 1986: 290.
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does not only have an instrumental value to the wellbeing of individuals. Insofar as human 
beings  are  biological  beings,  the  satisfaction  of  biological  needs  also  contributes  non-
instrumentally  to  their  wellbeing.  Thus  the  wellbeing  of  individuals  is  not  just 
fundamentally constituted by (b), but also (a). Otherwise we are not giving proper attention 
to their biological nature
3. - Wellbeing and Actions.
‘Wellbeing’  is  not  an  empty  concept.  It  is  already used by us  in  our  everyday 
language, and thus we already have a rough and vague understanding of what it means. An 
account of wellbeing therefore does not start from scratch. Rather it starts from our rough 
and  vague  understanding  of  what  ‘wellbeing’  means.  From  there,  it  elucidates, 
substantiates, clarifies and, one would hope, justifies our rough and vague pre-theoretical 
understanding of it. I believe that it is instructive to start with Nozick’s diagnosis of the 
problems raised by the Experience Machine Objection against the Quality-of-experience 
View. 
The Quality-of-experience View states that the wellbeing of an individual is the 
quality of his experiences in life. I shall discuss the Quality-of-experience View in chapter 
5. The Experience Machine Objection argues for the following: The Quality-of-experience 
View entails that as long as an individual who is hooked onto the experience machine has 
the same quality of experiences as another individual who lives his life as we all normally 
do, then they have the same level of wellbeing.  However, intuitions suggest otherwise. 
Indeed, it might even seem that the former individual has a lower wellbeing than the latter 
individual. Thus the Quality-of-experience View is not a plausible account of wellbeing.167
I  do  not  claim that  the  Experience  Machine  Objection  successfully  refutes  the 
Quality-of-experience  View.  I  do  believe  that  the  Quality-of-experience  View  is 
implausible, but for reasons other than those raised by the Experience Machine Objection. 
167 Nozick 1974: 42-45.
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Chapter 5 discusses that. But irrespective of whether the Experience Machine Objection 
does raise genuine problems for the Quality-of-experience View, and whether Nozick’s 
diagnosis captures these problems, his diagnosis captures something significant about what 
it means to live a human life.
3.1 – The Centrality of Actions.
Nozick says the following in his diagnosis of the problems raised by the Experience 
Machine Objection against the Quality-of-experience View:
“What does matter to us in addition to our experiences? First, we want to do certain 
things… A second reason for not plugging in is that we want to be a certain way, to 
be a certain sort of person… Thirdly, plugging into an experience machine limits us 
to a man-made reality,  to a world no deeper or more important than that which 
people can construct. There is no actual contact with any deeper reality, though the 
experience of it can be simulated. Many persons desire to leave themselves open to 
such contact and to a plumbing of deeper significance”.168
Rather than focusing on the notions of ‘want’ or ‘desire’ in the above,169 let us focus on the 
objects that Nozick says we desire or want: to do, to be and to engage with reality.
It seems that they can all be captured by the notion of ‘actions’.  First,  it  seems 
obvious that actions are doings. Thus acting in a certain way is basically doing a certain 
thing - acting an act X is basically doing X. Second, it is through our actions that we 
engage with reality. This involves two elements: On the one hand, the reality within which 
we find ourselves not only shapes, but also, to a certain degree, constrains our actions. On 
the other hand, our actions also, to a certain degree, shape the reality within which we find 
ourselves. Finally, our actions are to a certain degree a reflection of who we are.  We act in 
such and such a way because of who we are. But it also seems true that we are who we are 
168 Nozick 1974: 43. My italics.
169 Focusing on them leads one to an alternative account of wellbeing - Desire Fulfilment Theory. I shall 
discuss Desire Fulfilment Theory in chapter 5.  
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because  of  our  actions.170 If  I  never  act  courageously,  kindly,  intelligently,  wittily  or 
lovingly, I cannot be said to be courageous, kind, intelligent, witty or loving,171 even if I 
sincerely believe myself to be so. If that is the case, then one way of reading Nozick’s 
diagnosis  is  this:  the reason why the person connected to  the Experience Machine has 
lower wellbeing than another person who is not and lives his life as we all normally do 
everyday is because the life  of the latter  person involves actions,  while the life  of the 
former  person does  not  involve  actions  on his  part.  Although he has  some qualitative 
feelings in response to the experiences that are fed to him by the Experience Machine (and 
he might well think that he is performing actions), they are not ‘actions’ in any sense of the 
word. 
Thus  the  kind  of  difference  in  wellbeing  between  the  person  connected  to  the 
Experience Machine and the one who is not, is not the kind of difference in wellbeing 
between the person who earns a small but sufficient salary and another person who earns a 
huge salary. The difference is more distinctive and significant than that. Since the life of 
the person connected to the Experience Machine does not involve actions on his part, it is 
hard to see how he is actually living a life at all. This is because the idea of ‘living a life’ is 
closely connected to the idea of ‘being active’, such that it is hard to see how one is living 
a life  when one is not  active in some substantive sense.  As Raz explains, “While being 
alive does not literally imply activity, we recognize non-active life as vegetative. ‘X is very 
much alive’ cannot be said of the comatose; it implies being ‘alive and kicking’. So the 
concentration on activity is meant to flow from the very notion of a life”.172 This does not 
mean that a person whose life involves no actions on his part is not living at all. But what 
is so distinctive and significant about the individual who is connected to the Experience 
Machine, is that it is hard to see how he is living a life at all, since his life involves no 
actions. There is a sense in which it is not just that he has a lower level of wellbeing. 
170 This echoes Sartre’s argument that who we are is defined by our actions. See Sartre 1974.
171 These are actually the examples used by Nozick to illustrate his point here. 
172 Raz 1994: 3.
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Rather, he does not have wellbeing.  Since if he is not living a life, then nothing can be said 
concerning the quality of his life for him.
However, one must not overemphasize the role that ‘action’ plays in the wellbeing 
of individuals. In my view, it is the central constituent of wellbeing. But it is not the only 
constituent. I am not denying that other things, e.g. the quality of one’s experiences, also 
play a part in constituting one’s wellbeing. It is just that they cannot outweigh or replace 
the role that ‘action’ plays in the wellbeing of individuals.  This is why (a) and (b) are 
fundamental constituents of an individual’s wellbeing, rather than the only constituents.  
3.2 – One's Actions and One's Wellbeing.
Since the wellbeing of an individual is the quality of his life  for him, if ‘actions’ 
play a central role in an account of wellbeing, then the kind of ‘actions’ relevant here are 
the kind where there is  some connection  with the individual  whose wellbeing  it  is.  A 
trivially true way to forge such a connection is that the kind of ‘actions’ relevant to an 
individual’s wellbeing are at least his actions. We therefore need a characterization of what 
actions count as an individual’s actions.
It might seem for an action to be one’s own, all that is required is that it is one’s 
physical body which performs the action in question. Thus it is me who is hammering the 
nail into this board, if it is my arms that are yanking up and down with the hammer that is 
held in my hand, in such a way that the head of the hammer hits the nail appropriately 
which drives the nail into the board. However, that cannot be all that is required. Take for 
example  the  case  where  my brain,  without  my  knowledge,  is  wired  up  by a  brilliant 
neurologist. He wires it up in such a way that it is he who, through controlling my brain, 
instructs my arm to pick up the hammer and yank it up and down, in such a way that the 
head  of  the  hammer  hits  the  nail  appropriately  which  drives  the  nail  into  the  board. 
Arguably in this case, although it is my physical body which nailed this nail into the board, 
it is not my action. 
Page 93 of 222
I do not intend to engage in the ambitious project of formulating the criteria for 
one’s actions.  I  am rather offering a more modest  proposal.  I  believe  that  one way to 
characterize when an action that an individual performs counts as his action is to say that 
one can understand how, simply given his beliefs and desires, he performed the action in 
question. I do not have strict arguments for this. But I believe it captures the intuitive idea 
that  generally  speaking,  actions  that  an individual  performs are his  actions,  if  they are 
connected in some way to him, i.e. his self so to speak. If the ‘self’ of an individual is 
constituted at least by all his beliefs, desires and commitments etc; then the above modest 
proposal  characterizes  and fleshes  out this  connection,  by saying that  an action is  that 
individual’s  when  one  can  understand  how,  simply  given  his  desires  and  beliefs,  he 
performed those actions.
Thus  the  problem  with  the  above  case  of  my  brain  being  wired  up  by  the 
neurologist is this: Since I do not know my brain is so wired up, one cannot understand 
how,  by  simply  appealing  to  all  my  beliefs  and  desires,  I  performed  that  action. 
Accordingly, it is not my action. Indeed, that case is no more different than another case in 
which the brilliant neurologist, rather than wiring up my brain, wires up the brain of a 
zombie to make him hammer the nail. This is because I, in some substantive sense of the 
word, am not involved in the action of hammering the nail in the original case. And I 
believe that one of these substantive senses can be characterized in terms of the modest 
proposal. Thus the kinds of actions relevant to an individual’s wellbeing are the kinds for 
which it is true to say that one can understand, simply given his beliefs and desires, how he 
performed those actions.
 However,  for  one to  be able  to  understand how, simply  given his  beliefs  and 
desires,  an  individual  performed  the  action  in  question,  the  action  and his  beliefs  and 
desires must be connected in the right sort of way. I believe that the right connection is 
basically this: the action that an individual performs is, or at least is believed by him to be, 
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means  towards  achieving a  goal  or  part  of  the activities  that  he intends  to  achieve  or 
engage in. This is evidenced by looking at the following example: After reading a website 
on self-help written by a prankster, I come to believe that my destiny, and the key to my 
happiness lies in counting the grains of sand in any given beach. (Suppose I feel lost in life 
and am pretty depressed.) A strong desire grows in me to count the grains of sand in the 
beach in front of my house. In this example, one can understand how, given my beliefs and 
desires, I have a goal which is to fulfil my destiny and achieve happiness; and a desire to 
engage in the activities that are part of my destiny and will lead me to happiness. However, 
one cannot understand how, just  by appealing to  these beliefs  and desires,  I  count  the 
grains of sand in the beach in front of my house. One can do so only by also appealing to  
my (erroneous) belief that it is a means to achieve that goal and is part of those activities.  
Of course, it  is doubtful that counting the grains of sand in a beach contributes  to my 
wellbeing, since it does not seem to be an activity that has objective value, and certainly in 
this  case, it  is based on an erroneous belief.  However, the issue here is not whether it  
contributes to one's wellbeing, but whether it is one's action. It is only when we know that 
it is one's action, that we can ask the further question of whether it contributes to one's 
wellbeing or not.
Thus we have seen that the actions that are relevant to an individual’s wellbeing are 
his actions; and those actions are his if one can understand how, simply given his desires 
and beliefs, he performs those actions. But one can do so only by appealing to his belief 
that the action in question is a means towards achieving a goal or part of the activities that 
he intends to achieve or engage in. Thus in effect, to say that it is an individual’s actions 
that are relevant to his wellbeing,  is to say that it  is the goals and activities  that he is 
working towards and engaging in that are relevant to his wellbeing.
Goals and activities are structured in a way that some actions are means of working 
towards a certain goal or are part of a certain activity, while other actions are not. For an 
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individual who is working towards a certain goal or engaging in a certain activity, he is not 
performing actions just randomly. Rather, he pursues them in the sense that the actions he 
performs are either means of working towards that goal or are part of that activity (I shall 
call this the ‘structures’ of goals and activities). The notion of ‘pursue’ here captures the 
idea that since goals and activities have structures, it is not the case that when an individual 
is  working  towards  goals  or  engaging  in  activities,  he  is  merely  acting  without  any 
guidance or direction.  Rather,  he is in some sense guided or directed by the particular 
structures  of  those  goals  or  activities.  Furthermore,  since  goals  and  activities  have 
structures, and the actions that an individual performs in pursuit of them may or may not 
conform to their particular structure, we can therefore evaluate an individual’s pursuit of 
goals and activities, by appealing to how much his actions in pursuit of them conform to 
their particular structures. This evaluation constitutes the success of an individual’s pursuit 
of goals and activities. Finally,  since individuals do not just pursue goals and activities 
randomly - rather they pursue these or those goals and activities because they find them 
worth doing,173 the value of the goals and activities that he pursues are also relevant to his 
wellbeing.  Thus  one  can  see  that  by  putting  all  these  together,  the  wellbeing  of  an 
individual  is fundamentally constituted by his successful pursuit  of goals and activities 
which are in fact valuable.174 
4. - The Nature of Goals and Activities.
I would now like to address the following questions regarding the nature of goals 
and activities that is central to my account of wellbeing. 
First, how do goals and activities come to have the particular structures that they 
have? In other words, what determines the particular structures of goals and activities? 
Recall that the particular structures have at least the following significance: they in some 
173 This will be discussed in more detail in section 2.2 of chapter 6, when I discuss the kind of agency that is 
involved in a human life. 
174 Note that this is only a preliminary definition. It will be further qualified in the subsequent discussions.
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sense guide or direct the actions that an individual performs when he pursues the respective 
goal or activity;  through them, we can see how the goal or activities that an individual 
pursues are relevant to his wellbeing; and they determine what counts as success in an 
individual’s pursuit of the respective goal or activity. Presumably, they are not determined 
solely by the individual  who is  pursuing that  goal  or activity.  They do not  have their 
particular structure just because the individual who is pursuing them thinks they do. The 
second  question  follows  from  this:  How  do  individuals  come  to  pursue  the  goals  or 
activities  that  they  are  pursuing?  Answers  to  these  questions  further  substantiate  my 
account  of wellbeing.  Central  to this is  the idea of ‘social  embeddedness’.  I  shall  first 
explain what that is, and further characterize it in relation to ‘goals and activities’, ‘pursue’ 
and ‘success’. This should give an answer to the above two questions.
4.1 - Social Embeddedness.
The basic idea behind ‘social embeddedness’ is this:175 Each society has its own 
social  form which consists in, according to Raz, “shared beliefs, folklore,  high culture, 
collectively  shared  metaphors  and  imagination,  and  so  on”176.  Given  that  all  these 
presuppose sets of values, the social form of a society expresses or embodies the values of 
its respective society. I refer to ‘values’ descriptively here. They in general are values that 
(partially) constitute the conceptions of good or the conceptions of bad of the people who 
live in that society.  The goals and activities  that  we find in a given society which are 
possible objects of pursuit, are based on the social forms of that society in the following 
five ways: 
First, certain goals and activities are possible objects of pursuit only if the society 
in which we find them has the appropriate social forms. As Raz says, “One cannot pursue a 
legal career except in a society governed by law, one cannot practice medicine except in a 
175 My idea of social embeddedness echoes the communitarian thought that individuals are, in some sense, 
shaped by the society or community in which they live. A good discussion on this aspect of the 
communitarian position, see Mulhall & Swift 1996: 13-18 & 40-126. 
176 Raz 1986: 311. Note that the institutional structures of a society also incorporate the social form of that 
society.
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society in which such a practice is recognized… A doctor participates in a complex social 
form, involving general recognition of a medical practice, its social organization, its status 
in society, its conventions about which matters are addressed to doctors and which not…, 
and its conventions about the suitable relations between doctors and their patients”.177 
Second,  most  of  the  goals  and activities  that  are  found in  a  society which  are 
possible objects of pursuit, involve appropriate interactions with other people. However, 
people can only interact appropriately if there is some kind of implicit shared background 
between them.  This implicit  shared background is  provided by the social  forms of the 
society in which they all live. Thus people can pursue these goals and activities only if they 
are based on the social forms of the society in which they all live. This is best explained by 
Raz,  “… often when the goal  concerns interaction between people,  its  very possibility 
depends on the partners having the correct expectations concerning the meaning of other 
people’s behaviour. The significance of a thousand tiny clues of what is known as body 
language  contribute,  indeed  are  often  essential,  to  the  success  of  the  developing 
relationship.  All  these  are  derived  from  the  common  culture,  from  the  shared  social 
forms…  our  continued  awareness  of  the  common  culture  continuously  nourishes  and 
directs our behaviour in pursuit of our goals”.178 
Third, the significance and meaning of the goals and activities that are found in a 
certain society are given by the social forms of a society. 179 Raz illustrates this with the 
following example, “Bird watching seems to be what any sighted person in the vicinity of 
birds can do. And so he can, except that that would not make him into a bird watcher. He 
can be that only in a society where this, or at least some other animal tracking activities, 
are  recognized  as  leisure  activities,  and  which  furthermore  shares  certain  attitudes  to 
natural life generally. The point is that engaging in the same activities will play a different 
177 Raz 1986: 310-311.
178 Raz 1986: 312.
179 By ‘the significance and meaning of goals and activities’, I am referring to what their significance and 
meaning is to individuals. E.g. what roles do the goals or activities play in the lives of those who pursue 
them, are they leisure or serious activities? Are they something that everyone should have in some sense 
pursued before, like for example football in our societies? Etc.
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role, have a different significance in the life of the individual depending on social practices 
and attitudes to such activities.  Much of the interest  that people have in goals of these 
kinds is available to them because of the existence of suitable social forms”.180 I believe 
this illustrates two points: (a) the significance and meaning of the goals and activities that 
are found in a society are given by the social forms of that society. If we move them from 
one society with particular social forms to another one with very different social forms, 
their significance and meaning would be altered; and they would thereby become different 
goals and activities. (b) If we divorce a goal or activity from all the social forms from 
which its significance and meanings are given, it ceases to be a possible object of pursuit;  
and as such it ceases to be a goal or activity. Thus for people who are living in a society, it  
is only in relation to the social forms of that society that a goal or activity is a possible 
object of pursuit, and therefore is a goal or activity.
Of course, this does not mean that people in a given society cannot or would not 
pursue goals and activities that are not based on the social forms of the society in which 
they are living. However, in such cases, the significances and meanings of such goals and 
activities are constituted by how they react against  or develop from the existing social 
forms of that society.181
Take for example the development of art movements. Most painting styles that are 
radical during the time when they were painted, were understood as rejecting or further 
developing the central ideas that were embodied in the painting styles widely practised or 
dominant  at  that  time.  One  can  see  this  from  the  early  stages  of  Modernism,  i.e. 
Expressionism and Impressionism. Before Modernism, one of the central ideas that was 
embodied in the painting styles  of that period was that paintings have to represent the 
world more or less accurately, irrespective of how we experience it. One way to understand 
the development of Modernism is as rejecting this idea and insisting that painting can also 
180 Raz 1986: 311.
181 Raz 1986: 312-313.
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be about how we experience the world. This can be seen in the early stages of Modernism 
–  Impressionism.  This  was  further  developed  in  early  20th Century  by  Expressionist 
painters. Their paintings still represent the world, but in a way that is highly tainted by our  
qualitative experience of it,  rather than being an impartial  and accurate depiction.  This 
rejection is so entrenched in the art styles by the time of Abstract Expressionist painters, 
that their  radical styles were seen as further developing the idea that a painting can be 
about our qualitative experience of the world, but to the extent that it is not representing 
the world at all. The same can be seen in the development of political ideas. For example, 
at  least  for  Mill,  one  of  the  meanings  and  significances  in  arguing  for  the  value  of 
individual  liberties  is  to  protect  them  from ‘the  tyranny  of  the  majority’,  which  was 
practised in the democratic republics of his time.182 Thus in so far as people can, would or 
do pursue goals  and activities  that  are  not  based  on the existing  social  forms  of  their  
society; the significance and meaning of their pursuit are understood in terms of how they 
react against, or develop from the social forms of their society at that time. In the case of 
Impressionist painters, it was rejecting the idea that paintings had to represent the world 
more or less accurately. While in the case of Mill, it was the limitation that has to be placed 
for the protection of individuals, in democratic republics that were widely practised and 
accepted in his time.  
Fourth, since the significance and meaning of goals and activities are given by the 
social forms of the society in question, the social forms of the society also define the nature 
of  the  goals  and activities  that  are  found in  that  society.  They define  what  counts  as 
pursuing or not pursuing the goal or activity in question (which includes not only that 
actions that an individual may perform, but also the attitudes, reasons or motivations etc. 
that he might have), and thus they determine how it is to be pursued. For example, it is 
because we have a certain attitude towards natural life and our understanding that it is a 
182 ‘Tyranny of the majority’ is a term used by Mill to refer to the effects of Democratic Republics on 
individuals that individuals need to be protected from. See Mill 1974: 61-63.
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kind of leisure activity,  that bird watching involves, among other things, going into the 
wild away from the normal routines and chores of daily life, and quietly observing and 
appreciating the activities of birds in their natural habitat undisturbed by the activities of 
our modern world. But if someone captures a bird and observes its activities in a cage, then 
he is not bird-watching. 
 Fifth and finally, since the particular structures of goals or activities are constituted 
by their respective significances and meanings, how they are to be respectively pursued 
and  what  respectively  counts  as  pursuing  or  not  pursuing  them,  it  follows  that  the 
particular structures of goals and activities are also based on the social forms of the society 
in which we find them. Thus how successful one is in pursuing them is also based on the  
social forms in which one is living.183 
It  is  in the above five ways that the goals and activities,  as possible objects  of 
pursuit that we find in a given society, are based on the social forms of that society. Since 
the social form of a society expresses or embodies the values of its respective society, the 
goals and activities that we find in a society also embody, exhibit, express or instantiate the 
values of that society.
4.2 – Qualifications to Social Embeddedness.
There are two qualifications to the above discussion. First, one must note that the 
three elements  - the values of a society,  the goals and activities  that are found in that 
society  and  the  social  forms  of  that  society  -  affect  each  other  dynamically  and 
reciprocally. Sometimes it is the social forms that affect the values of a society, and the 
goals and activities that are found in that society. An example of this might be the social  
forms  of  medieval  feudal  societies.  They not only give rise  to  the distinction  between 
aristocratic values and peasantry values. They also give rise to goals and activities that are 
183 Note that I am not saying that the success of one’s pursuit is based on social forms. In so far as we assume 
that the particular structure of a goal or activity is given, the success of one’s actual pursuit of that goal or 
activity is constituted by how far one’s actual pursuit of it conforms to that particular structure; and that has 
nothing to do with social forms. Rather I am saying that it is those given particular structures that are based 
on social forms.
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only possible objects of pursuit for the peasants, and those that are for the aristocrats. 
Sometimes it is the values of a society which give rise to the social forms or the 
goals and activities that are found in that society. One example of this might be the civil 
rights movement between 1960-1980. The change in social forms in say, America, after 
that movement, and the change in goals and activities that are found in America after that 
movement (e.g. access to public establishments cannot be denied based on skin colour or 
race, and African Americans are allowed to hold public offices etc.), seems to originate 
from the value of equality that was implicit in the values of the American society before 
the movement.
Sometimes it is the goals and activities that are found in the society that affect the 
social forms of that society and the values of that society. This is possible, because some 
people can and would pursue goals and activities that are not based on the existing social  
forms of the society they are living in, as I have discussed earlier. But if those goals and 
activities become widely recognized as possible objects of pursuit, it would affect existing 
social forms and the values of that society. This is evident from the previous example of art 
movements. As more paintings that were painted after Impressionism were about how we 
experience the world rather than about representing the world correctly and accurately, by 
the  time  of  Abstract  Expressionism  it  was  widely  accepted  that  a  painting  does  not 
necessarily have to be representative, but can still be valuable and aesthetically pleasing. 
Another example is the social movements in communist China and Russia. They usually 
started off with isolated incidents of proletarian movements against capitalists, which then 
spread to become nation-wide communist revolutions. Through such revolutions, the social 
forms of those societies were significantly changed, and the original values of the society 
were replaced with communist values. Since the goals and activities that are found in a 
society,  the social forms of that society and the values of that society, affect each other 
reciprocally,  dynamically and continuously,  the existing social forms of any society are 
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therefore not static. They are evolving together with the changes in values of that society,  
and the goals and activities that are possible objects of pursuit.
A second qualification to my discussion in 4.1 is as follows: the discussion only 
applies to most of the goals and activities that are found in a society and most of its values. 
This  is  because  a  society  is  not  a  homogenous  entity.  In  any  society,  some  people’s 
conceptions of good or bad would contain values that are not embodied in the social forms 
of the society in which they live. Some people would also pursue goals and activities that 
are not based on the social forms of the society in which they live. This qualification must 
not be exaggerated though. To the extent that a certain goal or activity that an individual 
pursues is not directly based on existing social forms of the society he lives in, it must still 
be indirectly based on them. Its significance and meaning as a possible object of pursuit is 
understood in terms of how it reacts against or develops from the existing social forms of 
the society, as discussed earlier. And the same goes for the values that individuals have. 
Even if they are not directly embodied or expressed in the social forms of the society, they 
are still understood in relation to those values that are, in terms of how they react against or 
develop from them. Take the example of the civil  rights movement again.  The idea of 
equality between blacks and whites definitely embodies the value of equality, which was 
implicit in the social forms of America at that time; and it is in relation to this value of 
equality that this idea is understood. Thus if there are any instances in which a person 
holds values that are not, in any sense, expressed or embodied in the existing social forms 
of the society in which he lives; or he pursues a certain goal or activity that is not in any 
sense based on them; then these instances would be of the same kind as when a person 
holds the value of competitiveness in a society where there are no meritocratic values, or 
when he tries to be an amateur race driver in a society where there is no conception of 
competitive leisure activities. As one can see, such instances, if there are any, would be 
very few.184
184 Note that this is not to say that their relevance to individuals’ wellbeing is unclear. Insofar as they are 
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5. – Goals, Activities and the Other Elements of Wellbeing.
This section further characterizes these notions in light of the above discussion: 
goals and activities, the pursuit of them, the success in pursuing them and their value.
5.1 - 'Pursuing' Goals and Activities.
Some people pursue some goals and activities because they have chosen them as a 
result of deliberation. For example, I am doing a PhD in philosophy because I realized that 
I love doing philosophy, and would like to work as a professional philosopher. Given that 
the best way to do so is to get a PhD in philosophy, I therefore decided to do a PhD in 
philosophy when I finished my masters. However, not all the goals or activities that people 
pursue are like that.  Sometimes  people pursue some goals or activities  out of habit  or 
entrenched  daily  routines,  as  for  example  when  one  goes  to  brush  one’s  teeth  every 
morning when one wakes up. At other times people pursue some other goals or activities 
because of the environment in which they are brought up. For example people in Asian 
countries  tend  to  work  immediately  after  graduation  from school  or  university,  while 
people do not tend to do so in western countries like USA or UK. Indeed, some goals or 
activities cannot be pursued by deliberation.  Rather they can only be pursued by being 
immersed in  an environment,  or  more  specifically  the  social  forms,  in  which they are 
pursued and practiced by others. This is because either they are too dense or complicated 
for deliberation, or deliberation is incompatible with the nature of pursuing that goal or 
activity. This is especially true of most inter-personal relationships, as Raz says, 
“…  an  individual  cannot  acquire  the  goal  by  explicit  deliberation.  It  can  be 
acquired  only  by habituation.  Consider  again  the  relations  between  spouses,  or 
parental behaviour. Such relations are dense, in the sense that they involve more 
than individuals. They involve for example ways of treating a tired and distressed 
goals or activities, then they are relevant to the wellbeing of the individual who pursues them. What is 
unclear is how the individual comes to acquire such goals or activities as possible objects of pursuit. 
However, I do not believe this poses a problem for my account of wellbeing since my account is not 
concerned with how individuals contingently come to acquire this or that goal or activity as a possible object 
of pursuit. 
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friend. Each one of us reacts somewhat differently to different friends in the same 
situation. This is in part a response to the personality of the friends. But it is in part 
a reflection of conventions of appropriate behaviour… They include clues by which 
one judges the intensity or intimacy the relationship has reached, and these in turn 
determine  what  reaction  will  be appropriate… But they are  too  dense to  allow 
explicit  description or learning, they can be learnt only by experience,  direct  or 
derived (e.g. from fiction)”.185 
Thus the notion of pursuing a goal or activity not only includes cases where individuals  
pursue a goal or activity because they have deliberated to do so. It also includes cases 
where  individuals  do  so  out  of  habit  or  entrenched  daily  routines,  or  because  in  the 
environment in which they are brought up, such goals or activities are usually or expected 
to be pursued.
5.2 - The 'Value' of Goals and Activities.
According to my account, the value of a given goal or activity is given by all its 
features and properties;186 and it may be one of the following:187
a) Valuable – (it has a positive value).
b) Dis-valuable – (it has a negative value).
c) Value-less – (it does not possess any features or properties that can give it value at all).
d) Neutral value – (the features or properties of that goal or activity that give it a positive 
value and the features or properties of that goal or activity that give it a 
negative value balance each other out).
e) Indeterminate  Value  –  (the  value  of  that  goal  or  activity  is  indeterminate  (for 
epistemological or semantic reasons)). 
The above is an axiological account of value which leaves the following issues open: First, 
185 Raz 1986: 311-312.
186 This is discussed in more detail in my paper titled “The Incommensurability of Valuable Goals and 
Activities” (August 2008).
187 This is discussed in more detail in section 5 of chapter 7.
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what are the relevant features or properties that give (either positive or negative) value to a 
goal or activity? Second, are the values of goals or activities constituted by a plurality of 
irreducible contributory values (value pluralism), or by only one kind of contributory value 
(value  monism)?  Third,  how do the  differing  values  which  are  given  by the  different 
features or properties of a goal or activity constitute the value of that goal or activity? 
Given that my account of wellbeing leaves the above issues open, it should be compatible 
with different substantive theories of value. The only exception to this is the kind which 
says that a goal or activity is valuable if it increases the wellbeing of the individual who 
pursues it, or vice versa. Let us call this theory of value the ‘agent-directed theory’. 
The reason for this exception is because the agent-directed theory would render my 
account of wellbeing circular.  Recall  my account argues that one’s wellbeing increases 
when one pursues valuable goals and activities.188 But if they are valuable because they 
increase  the wellbeing  of  the  individual  who pursues  them,  then it  seems my account 
implies  that  one’s  wellbeing  increases  when one pursues  valuable  goals  and activities, 
because they increase one’s wellbeing. This is circular.
 Just as I must eschew the agent-directed theory of the value of goals and activities 
in order to avoid circularity in my account of wellbeing, so that theory must eschew mine 
for the same reason. The agent-directed theory must  therefore assume some alternative 
account of wellbeing.189 But what might that account be? One candidate is the Quality-of-
experience View, which states that the wellbeing of individuals depends on the quality of 
their  experiences.  Another  candidate  is  the  Desire-based  Account,  which  states  that  it 
depends on the satisfaction  of certain kinds of desires.  But both of these accounts are 
rejected  in  the  next  chapter.  Assuming  that  those  arguments  are  sound,  and given the 
arguments  in this  chapter  for my account  of wellbeing,  the onus therefore falls  on the 
188 We can put aside success and whole-heartedness for the purposes of the discussion here.
189 Let me briefly illustrate why it would be circular if it does not do so: If a goal or activity is valuable when 
it increases the wellbeing of the individual who pursues it, and if the wellbeing of the individual who pursues 
it increases because it is valuable, then it seems that it is valuable when it increases the wellbeing of the 
individual who pursues it, because it is valuable – a circularity.
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agent-directed theory to offer an alternative account  of wellbeing,  or argue against my 
account of wellbeing. In the absence of that, we should accept my account of wellbeing; 
and conclude that the agent-directed theory is implausible because it assumes a contrary 
account of wellbeing. 
5.3 - The 'Structure' of Goals and Activities & Their 'Value'.
Some goals and activities are independent from each other. But there are also some 
other goals and activities that are means towards the pursuit of other goals and activities, 
and these goals and activities themselves are also means towards the pursuit of further 
goals  and  activities.  Thus  the  value  of  some  goals  and  activities  consists  in  two 
components:  their  instrumental value (as means towards other goals and activities)  and 
their non-instrumental value. It is not obvious why the value of a goal or activity has to be 
either instrumental or non-instrumental but not both. It is therefore possible for a goal or 
activity to be not only instrumentally valuable but also non-instrumentally valuable. For 
example,  education  is  instrumentally  valuable  for  finding  work,  but  it  is  also  non-
instrumentally valuable because one gains knowledge through it. Let us call the goals and 
activities for which other goals and activities are means ‘over-arching goals and activities’, 
and the goals and activities that are means for these over-arching ones ‘nested goals and 
activities’. When an individual pursues an over-arching goal or activity, but fails to pursue 
it successfully,  the instrumental value of the nested goals and activities that he pursues 
contributes nothing to his wellbeing. However, insofar as these nested goals and activities 
have non-instrumental values, his success in pursuing them while he was trying to pursue 
his  over-arching  goal  or  activity  contributes  (all  things  being  equal)  positively  to  his 
wellbeing.
The same goes for the actions that individuals perform when they are pursuing a 
certain goal or activity. Take for example my unsuccessful pursuit of the goal of alleviating 
everyone in the world from poverty. I gave some money to the beggar sitting on the street.  
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My act  here has value,  which is  independent  from the fact that  it  is  a means towards 
alleviating everyone in the world from poverty or part of the activity of doing so. Thus it 
contributes  (all  things  being  equal)  positively  to  my  wellbeing,  even  when  I  am 
unsuccessful in my pursuit of alleviating everyone in the world from poverty. Thus even if 
an individual is unsuccessful in his pursuit of a goal or activity, it is not the case that there 
is nothing in his (failed) pursuit that contributes to his wellbeing.
Over-arching goals and activities usually encompass or permeate many aspects of a 
person’s  life  for  long  stretches  of  time.  But  they  are  not  the  only  kind  of  goals  and 
activities that are relevant to an individual’s wellbeing. As Raz says, “A good life need not 
be integrated through one or a small number of dominating goals. It can be episodic and 
varied”.190 Thus my account does not discriminate between goals and activities that are 
over-arching, nested or independent. This has two implications: (a) To the extent that the 
success of one’s over-arching goal or activity counts more towards one’s wellbeing, it does 
not follow that one’s success in pursuing other kinds of goals or activities counts nothing 
towards  it;  and  (b)  an  individual  who is  successful  in  pursuing  over-arching  goals  or 
activities, does not necessarily have a higher wellbeing than another individual, who never 
pursues over-arching goals or activities but is successful in pursuing quite a few valuable 
non-over-arching goals or activities. 
6. - The Subjective Component of Wellbeing.
The previous sections discussed how an individual’s  wellbeing is fundamentally 
constituted by, among other things, his success in pursuing socially defined and determined 
goals and activities that are in fact valuable. But there is a further subjective component to 
this,  and it  is  related to the idea of an individual  pursuing a  goal or activity.  For any 
individual who is pursuing a given goal or activity, he may be said to be doing so whole-
heartedly, half-heartedly or dis-heartedly. I shall now characterize what this is and how it 
190 Raz 1994: 4.
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relates to the wellbeing of an individual.191
6.1 – Dis-heartedness. 
Whole-heartedness does not refer to an individual’s actions. Rather it refers to the 
individual’s subjective mentality with regard to the goals or activities that he is pursuing 
(hence it is a subjective component), i.e. his feelings, his motivations, his attitudes towards 
them etc.
Let  me  first  focus  on  dis-heartedness.  Raz  characterizes  ‘whole-heartedness’  as 
follows,  “In  the  main,  the  notions  involved  are  negative;  they  exclude  resentment, 
pathological self-doubt, lack of self-esteem, self-hate etc. One is acting whole-heartedly if 
one  is  not  prey  to  one  of  these  attitudes.  Nothing  else  is  required:  no  reflective 
endorsement of one’s activity, no second-order desire to continue with it, etc”.192 It seems 
more plausible to understand these as the necessary conditions for whole-heartedness (I 
shall argue later why this is so). Thus if an individual feels resentment, has pathological 
self-doubt, lack of self-esteem or self hate when he is pursuing goals or activities; then he 
is  pursuing  them  dis-heartedly.  The  following  discusses  these  negative  attitudes 
respectively.
To  have  pathological  self-doubt  is  to  be  doubtful  about  oneself,  when  one  is 
unjustified  in  doing  so  -  for  example  with  regard  to  one’s  ability  to  do  things,  how 
successful one is in doing those things, the choices that one makes, their significance, their 
value or worth etc. To have a lack of self-esteem means that one fails to appreciate one’s 
own worth. It can be manifested through being unable to recognize that one has the ability 
to do things, can be successful in doing them, can make the right choices etc. But when one 
doubts or fails to recognize one’s ability to do things and the choices that one makes, then 
one would be reluctant to pursue goals and activities which are in fact valuable, and that 
191 This component has also been argued for by Raz, although he does not develop it as fully as I do. See Raz 
1994: 3-8 & Raz 2004: 269-281.
192 Raz 1994: 6.
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one in fact can be successful in. Indeed, an individual who pathologically doubts himself or 
lacks self-esteem would be reluctant to take on goals or activities and pursue them, let 
alone those that he can be successful in and are in fact valuable.
To  have  self-hate  is  to  hate  oneself;  or  more  specifically,  to  hate  the  things 
regarding or about oneself. Thus if one hates oneself, then most probably one also hates the 
goals or activities that one is pursuing. But if one hates them, then one is, all others things 
being equal,  not  motivated  to  pursue them,  even if  it  is  the case  that  they are  indeed 
valuable and one can be successful in pursuing them.193 However, the effect of self-hate is 
more pervasive than that. Since self-hate is directed towards the things regarding oneself, 
and any goals or activities that one pursues, tries to pursue or wants to pursue are things 
regarding oneself, it  therefore seems very likely that an individual who has self-hate is 
inter alia all things being equal, not motivated to pursue any goal or activity.194
When  an  individual  feels  resentment  towards  the  goals  or  activities  that  he  is 
pursuing, he does not identify himself with those goals or activity. He does not see them as 
his goals or activities. But there is a more pervasive kind of resentment. This is when an 
individual  feels  resentful  in  general.  He does  not  identify  with  the  state  he  is  in,  and 
therefore does not identify with anything he does, tries to do or wants to do. This is more 
pervasive than the former case of resentment. This is because it negatively affects not just 
his ability to pursue the goals or activities that he feels resentment towards, but any goals 
or activities that he so happens to pursue, tries to pursue or wants to pursue.  
Imagine an everyday standard case where an individual pursues a goal or activity 
which contributes to his wellbeing. In such a case, all external conditions are favourable. 
He  has  effective  and  secure  access  to  goals  and  activities,  absence  of  coercion  etc. 
Although he might not be pursuing the goal or activity with the best of reasons, and may 
193 All other things being equal because he can still be externally motivated to pursue it, for example when he 
is coerced etc.  
194 It is only 'very likely' or 'most probably' because it is possible for someone to hate oneself, but not hate 
one's goals or activities. For example, one might hate oneself for being weak-willed and therefore unable to 
follow through with one's commitments. In such a case, one might not hate one's goals or activities at all, one 
only hates one's lack of will to pursue them. However, I do not think that such cases are common.  
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not have a positive attitude towards it, he at least identifies, in some minimal sense, with 
the goal or activity that he is pursuing, is motivated (not because of coercion) and is not 
reluctant  to  pursue  it.  The  above  negative  attitudes  therefore  negatively  affect  the 
wellbeing of the individual who has them, because they undermine those three conditions. 
As a result, an individual who has either of the above negative attitudes, is not pursuing 
goals or activity in the relevant sense that contributes to his wellbeing.  
6.2 – Half-heartedness.
However,  the  absence  of  the  above  negative  attitudes  is  not  sufficient  for  an 
individual to be pursuing goals and activities whole-heartedly.  Consider the case where 
Tom becomes a friend of John who has a high social standing. Tom did so because by 
becoming friends with him, he can be introduced into the world of the rich and famous. 
Tom does not hate himself  in doing so. Neither does he have a lack of self-esteem or 
pathological self-doubt. He knows that John is a bit naive and therefore would never find 
out  his  true  intentions.  He  might  even  enjoy every  moment  he  spend  with  John,  and 
therefore  does  not  feel  any  resentment  towards  anything.  Indeed,  Tom  might  be 
enthusiastic towards his friendship with John. This might be because John is his ticket to 
the kind of life he has always longed for. Although Tom has none of the above negative 
attitudes, and thus he is not friends with Tom dis-heartedly,  even if he is successful in 
being good friends with Tom, there is something amiss in saying that he is friends with 
Tom whole-heartedly. 
What  seems amiss  is  that  the  individual  lacks  the  right  positive  attitudes,  right 
feelings or right motivating reasons with respect to the goal or activity he is pursuing. 
Consider Tom again. What it means for two people to be friends and what is significant 
about friendships is, at the minimum, that they do not see each other as means towards 
some ends. Furthermore, they do not take advantage of each other. This, however, is not 
the case with regard to Tom. He not only sees John as his ticket to living in a world of the 
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rich and famous, he also thinks of John as being naïve and takes advantage of it. Since 
goals or activities have meanings and significance, even if an individual coordinates his 
actions in such a way that they are means towards achieving the goals, or are part of the 
activities  that  he  is  pursuing,  insofar  as  his  feelings,  motivating  reasons  or  positive 
attitudes are incompatible, or not in line with, the particular meanings and significance of 
those goals and activities, there is something amiss in his pursuit of them. It is in this sense 
that an individual is pursuing goals or activities half-heartedly. Thus:
An individual is pursuing a certain goal or activity half-heartedly if, (a) he does not 
have the above negative attitudes which characterize dis-heartedness; but (b) his 
feelings, motivating reasons, attitudes etc. while he is doing so are incompatible or 
not in line with the goal or activity's particular meanings or significance. 
In light of this, whole-heartedness is as follows: 
An individual is pursuing a certain goal or activity whole-heartedly if, (a) he does 
not have the above negative attitudes which characterize dis-heartedness; and (b) 
his feelings, motivating reasons, attitudes etc. while he is doing so are compatible 
or in line with the goal or activity’s particular meanings or significance.
6.3 Dis-heartedness vs. Half-heartedness.
Dis-heartedness affects wellbeing more fundamentally than half-heartedness. When 
an individual pursues goals or activities half-heartedly, he is pursuing goals or activities in 
the relevant sense that contributes to his wellbeing. If he is successful in doing so and it is 
highly valuable, then it would significantly affect his wellbeing in a positive way. But to 
the extent that he is half-hearted, the quality of his pursuing is negatively affected. And this 
contributes negatively to his wellbeing, independent from his success in pursuing that goal 
or activity and its value. This captures the following intuitions: 
 First, it is intuitively worse for someone to pursue something for or with the wrong 
reasons, than it is for him to do so for or with the right reasons. When someone does 
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something with the wrong reasons, then most probably he would not be as successful as 
someone who does it with the right reasons. Thus sometimes the worseness in someone 
who pursues something with the wrong reasons is just because he is not as successful as if 
he had done so with the right reasons. However, that is not necessarily the case. Even if he 
is as successful as if he had done so with the right reasons, intuitively sometimes it would 
have been better for him had he done so with the right reasons. My account captures this 
intuition. Since the individual pursues the goal or activity with the wrong reasons, i.e. they 
are  incompatible  or  not  in  line  with  its  meaning  and  significance,  the  quality  of  his  
pursuing is  negatively  affected.  This  therefore  contributes  negatively  to  his  wellbeing, 
independent from his success in pursuing it and its value. All other things being equal, it 
would have been better for him had he pursued the goal or activity with the right reasons.
Second, sometimes because the individual is so successful in pursuing a goal or 
activity and because it  is so valuable,  his  pursuit  of it  all  things considered intuitively 
contributes positively to his wellbeing even if he pursues it half-heartedly.  My account 
captures this intuition as well. Since half-heartedness affects the quality of his pursuing 
independently from his success, and the value of his pursuit, there is the possibility that his 
success and the value of his pursuit are so great, that they outweigh the negative effects his 
quality of pursuit has on his wellbeing.
On the other hand, such outweighing cannot happen in cases of dis-heartedness. 
This is because for an individual’s success in pursuing a goal or activity and its value to 
outweigh anything, he must at least be pursuing it in the relevant sense that contributes to 
his wellbeing. But that is what dis-heartedness negates. Thus the negative effects that dis-
heartedness has on wellbeing cannot be outweighed by an individual’s success in pursuing 
a goal or activity and its value. This not only captures the intuition that generally speaking, 
it is bad for people to do something for the wrong reasons. It is particularly worse for them 
if they suffer from resentment, pathological self-doubt, self-hate or a lack of self-esteem 
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etc. It is particularly worse for them because even if they are very successful in doing what 
they do, and what they do is of great value, their lives are still, other things being equal,  
bad. It is in this sense that dis-heartedness affects wellbeing more fundamentally than half-
heartedness.
7. - Conclusion.
Raz claims  that  the wellbeing  of an individual  is  fundamentally  constituted  by, 
among other things, his whole-hearted and successful pursuit of socially determined and 
defined goals and activities which are in fact valuable. But he only argued for it briefly. On 
the  other  hand,  Nozick’s  diagnosis  of  the  problems raised  by his  Experience  Machine 
Objection  against  the Quality-of-experience  View seems – irrespective  of  whether  that 
objection is sound – to capture something significant about what it means to live a human 
life. But Nozick never develops it into an account of wellbeing. What this chapter has done 
is to connect these two together, by starting with Nozick’s undeveloped ideas to argue for 
the  Razian  conception  of  wellbeing.  Doing  so  clarified,  developed  and  elucidated  the 
following issues:  the concepts  that  constitute  the Razian  conception  of  wellbeing  (e.g. 
‘pursue’ ‘goals and activities’, ‘socially defined and determined’ etc.), their relationship 
with each other, and how they relate to the wellbeing of an individual etc. The next chapter 
will further defend this by arguing against two rival conceptions of wellbeing: the Quality-
of-experience View and the Desire Fulfilment Theory.
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Chapter 5
Alternative Accounts of Wellbeing
1. - Introduction.
The last chapter argued for my Razian conception of wellbeing. It also clarified and 
elaborated  what  exactly  it  means  to  say  that  the  wellbeing  of  an  individual  is 
fundamentally  constituted  by:  (a)  the  satisfaction  of  his  biological  needs,  and  (b)  his 
success in whole-heartedly pursuing socially defined and determined goals and activities 
which are in fact valuable. 
However, to defend a conception of wellbeing, it is necessary to argue against rival 
conceptions.  This  chapter  therefore  critically  discusses  two  alternative  accounts  of 
wellbeing: the Quality-of-experience View in section 2, and the Desire Fulfilment Theory 
in section 3.
2. - The Quality-of-experience View.
It  seems  natural  to  suggest  that  the  quality  of  an  individual’s  life  for him,  is 
connected  to  the  quality  of  his  experiences  in  his  life  -  the  quality  of  his  conscious 
awareness of aspects of his life as it unfolds moment by moment.195 As Crisp says, “Well-
being, what is good for me, might be thought to be naturally linked to what seems good to 
me…”,196 and the quality of my experiences in life is what seems good or bad to me. This 
might  lead  to  what  Griffin  calls  the  “Experience  Requirement”,197 which  states  that  if 
something does not affect the quality of an individual’s experience, then it also does not 
affect the quality of his life for him.198 One family of accounts of wellbeing builds on this, 
and argues that the quality of one’s life for one is the quality of one’s experiences in life. 
Following Arneson, I shall call such views “Quality-of-experience Views”.199 A Quality-
195 Arneson 1999: 121.
196 Crisp 2005: n. pag.
197 Griffin 1986: 13.
198 See Scanlon 1993: 186 & Sumner 1996: 112.
199 Arneson 1999: 121.
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of-experience View by itself is incomplete as an account of wellbeing, since it does not 
specify how the quality of one’s experiences is to be judged with regard to the quality of 
one’s  life.200 Specifying  this  leads  to  different  strands  of  Quality-of-experience  Views. 
Most of these strands are hedonistic. They assert that the quality of one’s experiences is 
judged with regard to the quality of one’s life in terms of pleasure and pain. The more 
pleasurable the experiences one has in life, the higher the quality of one’s life, while the 
more painful the experiences one has in life, the lower the quality of one’s life. The quality 
of one’s life is therefore the net balance of all of one’s pleasurable and painful experiences 
in life.201 Some of these hedonistic strands express themselves in terms of happiness.202 Yet 
they understand happiness as both pleasure and the absence of pain. This was the case with 
Mill’s and Bentham’s position,203 though they each had different conceptions of pleasure.204 
However,  according to  Parfit  and Crisp,  all  these hedonistic  strands  of the  Quality-of-
experience  View  seem to  assume  that  pleasure  and  pain  are  two  distinctive  kinds  of 
experience. There is some distinctive quality shared by all our pleasurable experiences, that 
contrasts with some other distinctive quality that is shared by all our painful experiences. 
This assumption seems false.205 In response, Parfit argues for “Preference-Hedonism”.206 
According to this,207 the more experiences one has that one prefers, the higher the quality 
of one’s life; while the more experiences one has that one prefers to avoid, the lower the 
quality of one’s life. The quality of one’s life is thus the net balance of experiences that one 
prefers,  and  those  that  one  prefers  to  avoid.208 Preference-Hedonism is  still  a  kind  of 
Quality-of-experience View, as it asserts that the quality of one’s life for one is the quality 
200 Scanlon 1993: 187.
201 Crisp 2005: n. pag. I believe Parfit was referring to these strands when he was talking about ‘Narrow 
Hedonists’. See Parfit 1994: 235.
202 Parfit call these ‘Hedonistic Theories’. See Parfit 1994: 235.
203 Arneson 1999: 121.
204 See Crisp 2005 n. pag.
205 Crisp 2005: n. pag. & Parfit 1994: 235.
206 Parfit 1994: 235.
207 Of course, 'prefer' is a three place comparative relation. However, to keep the following discussion as 
simple and clear as possible, I have used it as a two place non-comparative relation. This should not alter 
whatever is intended to be conveyed in the discussion.
208 Scanlon 1993: 186.
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of one’s experiences in life. It is just that for Preference-Hedonism, the quality of one’s 
experiences is judged, with regard to the quality of one’s life, in terms of whether one 
prefers  or  prefers  to  avoid the  experiences  in  question.  Other  strands  of  Quality-of-
experience View (e.g. Crisp’s position) differ from the hedonistic strands by arguing that 
the  quality  of  one’s  life  should,  in  light  of  difficulties  with  the  hedonistic  strands,  be 
understood solely in terms of the  enjoyments  and  sufferings of one’s experiences in life 
rather than the pleasures and pains.209 Thus the quality of one’s life is the net balance of all 
of one’s enjoyable and suffering experiences in life.210
2.1 – The Experience Machine Objection.
I  shall  not  assess  the  relative  merits  or  demerits  of  the  various  strands  of  the 
Quality-of-experience  View.  This  is  because  according  to  many,211 any  Quality-of-
experience View suffers from Nozick’s “Experience Machine” Objection, to which I have 
already referred in the previous chapter:212
“Suppose there were an experience machine that would give you any experience 
you desired. Superduper neuropsychologists could stimulate your brain so that you 
would think and feel you were writing a great novel, or making a friend, or reading 
an interesting book. All the time you would be floating in a tank, with electrodes 
attached to your brain… Would you plug in? What else can matter to us, other than  
how our lives feel from the inside?”213
The problem is  this:214 According to the Quality-of-experience View, the quality of an 
individual’s life for him is the quality of his experiences. Thus if the quality of experiences 
of two people is exactly the same, then according to the Quality-of-experience View, they 
209 See Crisp 2006: 100-103. Notice that Crisp still understands his position as a kind of hedonism. 
210 Crisp 2006: 102.
211 For example Griffin 1986: 9-10; Arneson 1999: 121. 
212 Arneson 1999: 121. For discussions on the objection against various strands of Quality-of-experience 
View, see Griffin 1986: 9-10 & Crisp 2006: 117-119. For Nozick’s “Experience Machine” Objection, see 
Nozick 1974: 42-45.
213 Nozick 1974: 42-43.
214 The following discussion of the Experience Machine Objection is based on Crisp’s discussion. See Crisp 
2006: 117-118.
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have the same level of wellbeing. This holds even when one of them is hooked onto the 
experience machine, while the other is not and is living his life as we all normally do. 
However,  this  seems  counter-intuitive.  This  is  because  intuitively  the  person  who  is 
hooked onto the experience machine has a lower level of wellbeing than the person who 
isn’t,  even when both of  them have the same quality  of  experiences.  This  intuition  is 
particularly  strong  when  the  quality  of  experience  in  question  is  a  positive  quality  - 
happiness,  enjoyment  or  pleasure.  If  we  consider  a  person  who  is  hooked  onto  the 
experience machine all his life, even if his life is as happy, enjoyable or pleasurable as 
another person who is not hooked onto the experience machine, and lives his life as we all 
normally do, it is very hard not to consider that his level of wellbeing is lower than that of 
the other person. Accordingly, the wellbeing of an individual - the quality of his life for 
him - is not the quality of his experiences in life.215
This objection can be elaborated to argue against all the hedonistic strands of the 
Quality-of-experience View and also Crisp’s position. By making the experience machine 
responsive to the preferences of the person who is connected to it, the objection is also 
applicable to Preference-Hedonism.216
Furthermore,  the  objection  also  rejects  the  Experience  Requirement.  This  is 
because if one believes that the person who is connected to the experience machine has a 
lower level of wellbeing than the person who is not connected to it and is living his life as 
we all normally do, even when the quality of both of their experiences is the same, then it  
is not the case that if something does not affect the quality of an individual’s experience, it  
215 Note that an advocate of the Quality-of-experience View might be able to argue that the experiences 
replicated in the experience machine are necessarily different from the experiences in the real world, by 
tweaking on how experiences are to be individuated. This might very well be true. However, the crux of the 
objection is that the quality of the experiences replicated in the experience machine are exactly the same as 
the quality of experiences in the real world, and it is in virtue of this that the above two people have the same 
level of wellbeing. Thus even if we admit that the experiences replicated in the experience machine are 
necessarily different from the experiences in the real world, it does not follow necessarily that their qualities 
are different from each other. This is because it is very possible for different experiences to have the same 
quality. Thus the objection still stands. For a discussion of this possible response to the objection, see Crisp 
2006: 118-119.
216 See Nozick 1974: 42-43 on how this can be done.
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also does not affect the quality of his life for him. This is because the objection shows that 
something - the fact that one is connected to the experience machine while the other is not 
- affects the quality of a person’s life for them, even when it does not affect the quality of 
their experiences.
Although I  believe  that  the  Experience  Machine  Objection  is  a  good argument 
against the Quality-of-experience View, I shall not rely on it to argue against the Quality-
of-experience View in this thesis. This is because it seems that the debate on whether the 
objection genuinely refutes the Quality-of-experience View,217 has reached a stalemate. Yet 
it does not seem like the stalemate can be resolved by further engagement in the debate. 
Thus I now attempt to offer several problems for the Quality-of-experience View that do 
not depend on the Experience Machine Objection.   
2.2 – Further Problems with the Quality-of-experience View.
All  the various strands of the Quality-of-experience View seem to construe the 
quality of experiences as a feeling.  For example,  for Crisp, “Enjoyments are just those 
experiences that are good, for the people who have those experiences, because of how they 
feel”.218 Similarly for Sidgwick,  “Pleasure… as a  feeling which… is at  least  implicitly 
apprehended as desirable”;  219 and for Bentham on Sumner's reading, “What they have in 
common, in virtue of which they all count as pleasures, is their positive  feeling tone: an 
intrinsic, unanalysable quality of pleasantness which is present to a greater or lesser degree 
in all of them”.220
However, individuals can be manipulated to feel one way rather than the other. It 
might be true that feelings are not as malleable as desires and preferences.221 And some of 
them,  like  pain,  might  not  be malleable  at  all.  Nevertheless,  it  still  seems plausible  to 
suggest that for quite a lot of feelings like happiness, pleasure, enjoyment etc., individuals 
217 For rejoinders to the Experience Machines Objection, see Crisp 2006: 117-125 & Rivera-López 1998.
218 Crisp 2006: 108. My Italics.
219 Sidgwick 1907: 127. My italics.
220 Sumner 1996: 88. My Italics. This is Sumner's exposition of Bentham's position.
221 See Nussbaum 2000: 136-142 for the adaptiveness of desires and preferences.
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can be manipulated to have them, i.e. the feelings that one has when one is manipulated, 
one  would  not  have  (or  would  have  entirely  different  ones)  if  one  had  not  been 
manipulated.  As  an  example,  one  only  needs  to  think  of  Alex,  the  protagonist  of  A 
Clockwork  Orange.222 His  feelings  towards,  say  Beethoven’s  Ninth  Symphony,  were 
manipulated  through classical  conditioning.  Or  consider  another  example  closer  to  the 
subject of this thesis: a person who is brought up as a slave might be manipulated in such a 
way that not only does he not feel unhappy about serving his master as a slave, he might 
even find it satisfying and therefore pleasurable. Given all this, I have the following three 
worries.
The first worry is that what we are interested in, when we are interested in the 
quality of peoples’ experiences in connection to their wellbeing, is how they genuinely feel 
about their experiences - not how they feel about them as a result of manipulations. Thus in 
cases of manipulation, the Quality-of-experience View might be tracking the wrong things 
(i.e. what he feels about his experiences as a result of manipulations, rather than what he 
genuinely  feels  about  his  experiences).  This  raises  doubts  about  the  accuracy  of  the 
Quality-of-experience View, as an evaluation of the quality of an individual’s life for him.
The  second  worry  builds  on  the  first.  It  seems  very  intuitive  that  it  is  bad  to 
manipulate  an individual  to  feel  better  towards  his  life,  when his  life  is  in  fact  going 
poorly. Indeed, it is not just bad per se when we do so, but bad for him – it makes his life 
worse. But it does not seem that the Quality-of-experience View can take that into account. 
This is because according to it, the wellbeing of an individual is constituted by the quality 
of  his  experiences.  Thus  if  manipulating  an  individual  improves  the  quality  of  his 
experiences, then it also improves his wellbeing - makes his life better. The Quality-of-
experience View therefore allows for the possibility that it is good for an individual to be 
manipulated into feeling better towards his life, in circumstances where we should rather 
conclude that such manipulation makes his life worse.
222 Burgess 1962.
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The third worry relates to the role of an account of wellbeing in the aim of this 
thesis.  The aim of this thesis  is to develop a conception of justice (more specifically - 
duties of minimal wellbeing) based on an account of wellbeing. Let us now consider the 
possibility that one’s feelings towards injustices are manipulated. We can imagine that one 
can be manipulated in such a way that not only does one not feel unhappy, spiteful, angry, 
suffering, or displeasure when one is subject to certain injustices, one might even have a 
positive feeling towards them. In cases like these, under the Quality-of-experience View, 
the negative effects of injustices on the concerned individuals' wellbeing would be negated. 
This  means  that  any  subsequent  conception  of  justice  based  on  such  an  account  of 
wellbeing  would  be  unable  to  recognize  such  injustices.  This  then  undermines  the 
plausibility of such a conception of justice. Thus the Quality-of-experience View is not a 
plausible  account  of  wellbeing,  at  least  for  the  purposes  of  this  thesis  -  to  develop  a 
conception of justice based on an account of wellbeing.
2.3 – Possible Rejoinder: Revised Quality-of-experience View.
There is a way for the Quality-of-experience View to answer the above worries. 
Rather than arguing that the wellbeing of an individual is constituted by the quality of his 
experiences, one can argue that it is constituted by the quality of his experiences that he 
would  have  if  certain  conditions  were  satisfied  –  e.g.  when  he  is  not  subject  to  any 
manipulation.  Call  this  the  “revised  Quality-of-experience  View”.  Assuming  that  it  is 
possible to draw a distinction between the quality of experiences that one actually has, and 
the quality of experiences that one would have if certain conditions were satisfied, then the 
revised Quality-of-experience View should be able to answer the above worries. Allow me 
to explain.
First,  insofar  as  the  conditions  that  are  specified  in  the  revised  Quality-of-
experience View are robust enough, so that the quality of an individual’s experiences that 
he  would  have  if  those  conditions  were  satisfied  can  plausibly be  said  to  be  what  he 
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genuinely feels about his experiences, then the revised Quality-of-experience View would 
not be tracking the wrong things as constituents of an individual’s wellbeing.
Second,  insofar  as  the  conditions  include  not  manipulating  the  feelings  of 
individuals, the revised Quality-of-experience View would not allow for the possibility that 
it is good for an individual to be manipulated into feeling better towards his life, when 
being so manipulated  makes  his  life  go worse.  This is  because if  the wellbeing  of an 
individual  is  constituted  by what  he would feel  towards his  life  when he is  not  being 
manipulated,  then from the fact  that  manipulating  him improves  how he actually  feels 
towards his life, it does not follow that his wellbeing is improved by such manipulation. 
Furthermore,  insofar as  under  those conditions,  one would feel  negatively about  being 
manipulated into feeling better about one’s life, in cases where one’s life is in fact worse, 
the revised Quality-of-experience View can even explain why we intuitively think that 
such manipulations are bad for individuals – it makes their lives worse. 
Third,  since  the  quality  of  an  individual’s  experiences  that  results  from 
manipulating him does not constitute his wellbeing, the negative effects of injustices on the 
wellbeing of individuals cannot be negated, by manipulating them to feel positively (or not 
negatively)  towards  those  injustices.  Accordingly,  these  injustices  would  not  go 
unrecognised  under  a  conception  of  justice  that  is  based  on  the  revised  Quality-of-
experience  View.  Thus  the  revised  Quality-of-experience  View  is  not  an  implausible 
account of wellbeing for the purposes of this thesis.
Although it seems that the revised Quality-of-experience View has advantages over 
the Quality-of-experience View, as far as I know, nothing similar to the revised Quality-of-
experience View has been proposed in the literature.223 I speculate that the reason behind 
this is because the revised Quality-of-experience View - in arguing that the wellbeing of an 
223 Note however, that similarly revised Desire Fulfilment Theories (i.e. Informed-desire account) are rather 
common. I shall discuss Griffin's version of it in section 3.2 of this chapter. Thus what is uncommon in the 
literature is applying such a kind of revision to the Quality-of-experience View, not the kind of revision in 
question.
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individual is constituted by the quality of his experiences that he would have if certain 
conditions  were  satisfied  -  departs  too  radically  from the  Quality-of-experience  View. 
Recall that the starting idea for the Quality-of-experience View is the thought that “Well-
being, what is good for me, might be thought to be naturally linked to what seems good to 
me…”.224 However, under the revised Quality-of-experience View, what seems good to me 
has nothing to do with what is good for me. Rather, what is good for me is what seems 
good to me when certain conditions are satisfied. Indeed, insofar as the plausibility of the 
Quality-of-experience  View  is  based  on  this  starting  idea,  the  revised  Quality-of-
experience View lacks an independent argument for its plausibility, besides the fact that it 
is immune from certain worries that the Quality-of-experience View has. Furthermore, the 
revised Quality-of-experience View also needs to offer a justification for the conditions 
that need to be satisfied, for the quality of an individual’s experiences to constitute his 
wellbeing.  But  it  does  not  seem  plausible  that  these  conditions  can  be  justified  by 
appealing to the quality of experiences again. As a result, the revised Quality-of-experience 
View is at most an incomplete account of wellbeing, and much work is needed for it to be 
a plausible account of wellbeing. I shall therefore set this aside in this thesis for future 
consideration.
3. - The Desire Fulfilment Theory.
An alternative account to the Quality-of-experience View is the Desire Fulfilment 
Theory  of  wellbeing.  This  theory  can  be  motivated  by  appealing  to  the  Experience 
Machine Objection. On the one hand, Nozick says this in his diagnosis of the problem 
raised by the Experience Machine Objection:
“What does matter to us in addition to our experiences? First, we want to do certain 
things… A second reason for not plugging in is that we want to be a certain way… 
Thirdly, plugging into an experience machine limits us to a man-made reality, to a 
224 Crisp 2005: n. pag.
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world no deeper or more important than that which people can construct. There is 
no  actual  contact  with  any  deeper  reality,  though  the  experience  of  it  can  be 
simulated. Many persons desire to leave themselves open to such contact and to a 
plumbing of deeper significance”.225
One reading  of  the  above passage  focuses  on  the  notions  of  ‘want’  and ‘desire’,  and 
ignores what Nozick says about their objects. In this reading, the reason why the person 
connected to the Experience Machine has lower wellbeing than another person who is not, 
is because the former person’s desires are not satisfied while, other things equal, the latter 
person’s desires are satisfied. Furthemore, a natural response to Nozick’s diagnosis is this: 
if a person happens to not desire any of the three things that Nozick identified in the above 
passage, but strongly desires to be connected to the Experience Machine, it is hard to see 
how his level of wellbeing would suffer if he connects to the Experience Machine. Thus a 
possible diagnosis of the problems raised by the Experience Machine Objection suggests a 
connection between desire fulfilment and the wellbeing of the individual. 
3.1 – Unrestricted Actual Desire Theory & Its Problems.
One form of Desire Fulfilment Theory is called the “Unrestricted Actual Desire 
Theory”,226 which states that “… the quality of a person’s life at a given time is measured 
by the degree to which the preferences which he or she has at that time are fulfilled”. 227 
Thus the more of one’s desires are fulfilled, the higher one’s level of wellbeing - with 
desires that are ranked as more important in a person’s preference set contributing more to 
his wellbeing when they are fulfilled.228
However,  Unrestricted  Actual  Desire  Theory  suffers  from two  main  problems. 
First, as Scanlon observes, “…a person can in principle have preferences about anything 
whatever – about the number of moons the planet Uranus has, about the colour of Frank 
225 Nozick 1974: 43. My italics.
226 Scanlon 1993: 186. Griffin also refers to it as “The Actual Desire Account”, see Griffin 1986: 10-11. 
227 Scanlon 1993: 186.
228 Arneson 1999: 123.
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Sinatra’s eyes, or about the sexual mores of people who they will never see – this theory 
makes the determinants of the quality of a person’s life very wide indeed”.229 Arguably, it 
is hard to see how the satisfaction of these desires can contribute to the wellbeing of the 
individual who happens to have them, even when they are very strong ones. As Arneson 
neatly sums up, “… not all of an agent’s desires plausibly bear on her well-being”.230 Thus 
the Unrestricted Actual Desire Theory by itself is not a plausible account of wellbeing. The 
second problem is best outlined by Arneson: “…some desires that are felt to be of great 
importance by the individual, and desired for their own sake… are only desired because 
the  individual  is  confused,  ignorant,  or  making  reasoning errors… Why suppose  their 
satisfaction is good for the desirers at all?”231 We all are fallible beings. Thus some of our 
desires are based on our ignorance, confusions, mistakes or flawed reasoning etc. It is hard 
to see how the satisfaction of such error-based desires constitutes  the wellbeing of the 
individual who has those desires. For example, after reading a website on self-help written 
by a prankster, I come to believe falsely that my destiny, and the key to my happiness lies 
in counting the grains of sand in any given beach. Since I feel lost in life and am pretty 
depressed, a strong desire grows in me to count the grains of sand in the beach in front of 
my house.  However,  it  seems counter-intuitive  to suggest that  my life  is  in  some way 
better, if such desires of mine are fulfilled. That is precisely what the Unrestricted Actual 
Desire Theory would say.
The two problems are distinct from, and irreducible to, each other. Take again the 
example  of my desire  to count  the grains of sand on the beach in front of my house, 
because I come to falsely believe that doing so is my destiny and the key to my happiness. 
Although it is an error-based desire, and thus is an example of the second problem, it is not 
an example of the first problem. This is because it is hard to deny that my beliefs about my 
destiny, and the key to my happiness, are related to the quality of my life. Thus that desire 
229 Scanlon 1993: 186.
230 Arneson 1999: 124.
231 Arneson 1999: 124.
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of mine, though error-based, bears on my wellbeing. 
In response to the first problem, some have placed restrictions in the theory, such 
that only the satisfaction of certain kinds of actual desires constitutes the wellbeing of the 
person  who  has  them.  Call  these  ‘Restricted  Actual  Desire  Theory’.  One  example  is 
Parfit’s  “Success Theory”,  which restricts  the desires which when satisfied constitute  a 
person’s wellbeing to those actual desires that are intuitively about that person’s own life.
232
Arneson argues that the first problem is more intractable than the second one.233 
This is because he thinks that most, if not all, responses to the first problem are in some 
way viciously circular.234 For a response to be able to solve the problem, it must be able to 
exclude those actual desires of an individual, that are either by themselves or the fulfilment 
of which are not relevant or related to his wellbeing, from the set of his fulfilled actual  
desires that is used to calculate his level of wellbeing. However, to be able to do so, one 
must  already have at  least  a  rough conception  of  wellbeing.  It  is  by appealing  to  this 
conception of wellbeing that one can differentiate between those actual desires which when 
fulfilled  would constitute  the wellbeing  of the person who has them,  and those which 
would not. Take for example Parfit’s Success Theory. It restricts the set of actual desires, 
which are used to calculate the wellbeing of the person who has them, to those which are  
intuitively  about  that  person’s  own  life.  This  already  assumes  a  rough  conception  of 
wellbeing - the wellbeing of a person is constituted by things which are about that person’s 
life.  The problem with these responses, it  seems,  is that  we are trying to argue for an 
account of wellbeing. If we do so by assuming a certain conception of wellbeing, then our 
argument seems viciously circular. The responses therefore fail to address the problem.
I disagree with Arneson here. As Griffin rightly says in defending his account from 
232 Parfit 1994: 236-238. See also Scanlon 1993: 187. 
233 Arneson 1999: 125.
234 Arneson 1999: 19 & 124-126.
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such a criticism:235 
“In a way the account is now circular. I appeal to our rough notion of well-being in 
deciding which informed desires to exclude from this account of well-being. But 
that, I think, does not matter. If what we were doing were taking a totally empty 
term, ‘well-being’ and stipulating a sense of it, then we could not, in the middle of 
the job, appeal to ‘well-being’. But our job is not that. The notion of ‘well-being’ 
we want to account for is not empty to start  with; utilitarians use our everyday 
notion, and our job is to make it clearer. So we are free to move back and forth 
between  our  judgements  about  which  cases  fall  inside  the  boundary  and  our 
descriptions of the boundary. Every account of this type will do the same.”236 
We are here not trying to argue for an account of wellbeing from scratch. Rather, we are 
trying to argue for an account of wellbeing which best captures and reflects our everyday 
understanding of what wellbeing is;  and one would hope,  in the process,  we will  also 
clarify our conception of it. This task cannot be done without appealing to and reflecting 
on our rough pre-theoretical everyday conception of wellbeing. Thus given what we are 
trying to do, it is legitimate to argue for a certain account of wellbeing, by assuming a 
certain rough conception of wellbeing. Such arguments might be circular, but they are not 
viciously circular.237
Furthermore, if Arneson’s charge of vicious circularity is valid against responses to 
the first problem, it is also valid against the argument for the problem. Recall the argument 
for the first problem against the Unrestricted Actual Desire Theory: In its calculation of the 
wellbeing of an individual, it includes certain actual desires the fulfilment of which does 
not seem to constitute that person’s wellbeing. This arguably also appeals to some rough 
conception of wellbeing, i.e. there are certain actual desires of an individual that are either 
by themselves, or the fulfilment of which, are not related to his wellbeing. If it is viciously 
235 I shall be discussing Griffin’s account in detail in the later sections of the paper.
236 Griffin 1986: 22.
237 An interesting paper concerning when circularities are not vicious is Keefe 2002. 
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circular for responses to the problem to appeal to some rough conception wellbeing, it is 
also viciously circular for the argument for the problem to do the same. Thus Arneson’s 
criticism against  the  responses  to  the  first  problem is  also a  criticism against  the  first 
problem itself.
I think the second problem is a more serious problem for the Unrestricted Actual 
Desire Theory. To start with, even if there are viable responses to the first problem, they do 
not necessarily solve the second problem. Recall the second problem: Unrestricted Actual 
Desire Theory includes error-based desires of an individual in the calculation of his level 
of wellbeing, but it is hard to see how the fulfilment of error-based desires constitutes an 
individual’s  wellbeing.  Insofar  as  the  responses  to  the  first  problem contend that  it  is 
actual desires that constitute an individual’s wellbeing when satisfied, even if they restrict 
them to a set that is smaller than all or any of the actual desires that an individual has, it is  
still possible for these actual desires to be error-based; and they are therefore susceptible to 
the second problem of the Unrestricted Actual Desire Theory. Let me illustrate this with 
Parfit’s Success Theory. Assuming that it is a viable response to the first problem, it still 
cannot rule out the satisfaction of, in my earlier example, my error-based desire to count 
the grains of sand in the beach in front of my house, from constituting my wellbeing. This 
is because although the desire is error-based, it is arguably about my own life, since it 
concerns my destiny and my happiness. Thus even if there are viable responses to the first 
problem of the Unrestricted Actual Desire Theory, they do not necessarily solve the second 
problem.
The crux of the second problem is not merely that it is counter-intuitive to suggest 
that the fulfilment of one’s actual error-based desires constitutes one’s level of wellbeing. I 
think it  is deeper than this.  This is  because at  least  one of the aims in arguing for an 
account of wellbeing is to preserve what Scanlon calls “the direct ethical significance of 
well-being”,238 which states that “any improvement in a person’s wellbeing has positive 
238 Scanlon 1993: 187.
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ethical  value”.239 According  to  our  everyday  pre-theoretical  rough  understanding  of 
wellbeing, it is prima facie good that the wellbeing of an individual increases; while it is 
prima facie bad that it decreases. Although they might be overridden by other normative 
considerations (and become either all-things-considered bad or all-things-considered good 
respectively), it still seems true that despite the fact that they can be overridden, it is in 
some  sense  a  good  thing  that  a  person’s  wellbeing  increases  and  a  bad  thing  that  it 
decreases. This seems evident from the fact that it  is generally considered by default  a 
good  thing  when  people’s  wellbeing  increases,  unless  there  are  other  countervailing 
reasons; while it is generally considered by default a bad thing when people’s wellbeing 
decreases, and strong reasons must be offered for it not to be considered so. The problem is 
that it is hard to see how something which is based on ignorance, confusions, mistakes or 
flawed reasoning etc.  -  error-based actual  desires  -  has  any normative  weight  that  can 
override or be overridden by other normative considerations. Indeed, it is hard to see how 
they can be objects of normative considerations. Take my previous example of my error-
based desire to count the grains of sand on the beach in front of my house again. Imagine 
now that  the  community  in  which  I  am living  is  thinking  of  obliterating  a  couple  of 
beaches for property development, and my beach is one of those selected. When everyone 
(including myself) in the community gathers around to discuss whether to go ahead with 
the property development, and I present my reason against it - it would make it impossible 
for me to fulfil my (error-based) desire to count the grains of sand on the beach in front of 
my house (and therefore my wellbeing will suffer) - it is not simply that this reason will  
most certainly be outweighed by the reasons for the property development. Rather it is not 
a reason at all in considering whether to go ahead with the property development. That 
reason  would  have  been  dismissed  not  just  as  a  bad  reason  against  the  property 
development,  but as a non-reason (it  is  not a reason either  for or against  the property 
development). Since the Unrestricted Actual Desire Theory does not preserve the direct 
239 Scanlon 1993: 187.
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ethical  significance  of  wellbeing  -  in  cases  concerning  the  satisfaction  of  error-based 
desires, it is therefore not a plausible account of wellbeing. 
3.2 – Griffin's Informed-desire Account & Its Problems.
Griffin’s “Informed-desire Account” is an alternative account of wellbeing, which 
directly  responds  to  the  second  problem  of  the  Unrestricted  Actual  Desire  Theory.240 
Rather than contending that it is the fulfilment of actual desires that constitutes wellbeing, 
Griffin’s Informed-desire Account contends that it is the fulfilment of informed desires that 
constitutes wellbeing,  where “informed desires” refer to desires “… that persons would 
have if they appreciated the true nature of their objects”.241 According to Griffin, there are 
two  necessary  conditions  for  an  individual  to  have  appreciated  the  true  nature  of  the 
objects of those (informed) desires: first,  there is an absence of logical mistakes in the 
appreciation process;242 and second, the individual  concerned has adequate information, 
which  includes  not  only  adequate  factual  information,  but  also  “insight  and  subtle, 
perspicuous concepts”.243 Griffin  characterizes such an individual  as having a complete 
understanding of what makes life go well.244 In general according to the Informed-desire 
Account, one’s level of wellbeing is higher, the more one’s informed desires are fulfilled, 
and the stronger are those fulfilled informed desires (and vice versa), where the strength of 
an informed desire is its place in an ordering of them that reflects appreciation of the nature 
of their objects.245 
One might wonder why it is the case that one’s level of wellbeing is higher, the 
more one’s informed desires are fulfilled, and the stronger those fulfilled informed desires 
are (and vice versa). The explanation would presumably be something like the following:
240 See Griffin 1986: 7-40.
241 Griffin 1986: 11. Griffin never seems to have clearly explained what he means here by “their objects”. 
Nevertheless, I do not think this ambiguity compromises the rest of the discussion. 
242 Griffin 1986: 12.
243 Griffin 1986: 12-13.
244 As Griffin says, “So there is only one way to avoid all the faults that matter to 'utility': namely, by 
understanding completely what makes life go well (1986: 13).
245 Griffin 1986: 14-16.
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IDA#1 - If an individual would desire something had he appreciated the true nature of that 
thing (in the sense that the above necessary conditions are satisfied), then that 
thing is good for him.
IDA#2 - If an individual  would desire to avoid something had he appreciated the true 
nature  of  that  thing  (in  the  sense  that  the  above  necessary  conditions  are 
satisfied), then that thing is bad for him.
Given IDA#1 and IDA#2,  the  more  an individual’s  informed desires  are  satisfied,  the 
higher his level of wellbeing is. This is because either more of the things that are good for 
him are actualized, or more of the things that are bad for him are not actualized. On the 
contrary,  the less an individual’s  informed desires  are  satisfied,  the worse his  level  of 
wellbeing is. This is because either less of the things that are good for him are actualized, 
or more of the things that are bad for him are actualized.
Since  informed  desires  are  informed  in  the  above  sense,  the  Informed-desire 
account excludes error-based desires from the calculation of an individual’s wellbeing. It is 
therefore not susceptible to the second problem of the Unrestricted Actual Desire Theory.
But there is one thing to note with Griffin’s Informed-desire Account. In principle, 
it  seems that  according to it,  a person’s wellbeing may be constituted by none of that 
individual’s actual desires, as in cases where he actually failed to appreciate the true nature 
of all his objects. Griffin seems to be against understanding his Informed-desire Account in 
such a way. As he highlights but fails to explain very clearly:
“Although ‘utility’  cannot  be equated with actual  desires,  it  will  not  do,  either, 
simply to equate it with informed desires… Utility must, it seems, be tied at least to 
desires that are actual when satisfied… It is hard to get the balance between the 
actual and the informed desires quite right. But, to be at all plausible, the informed-
desire account has to be taken to hold them in a balance something like the one I 
have just sketched”.246 
246 Griffin 1986: 11-12. My Italics.
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The ‘something’ he sketched is the following: 
“It is doubtless true that if I fully appreciated the nature of all possible objects of 
desire, I should change much of what I wanted. But if I do not go through that 
daunting improvement, yet the objects of my potentially perfected desires are given 
to me, I might well not be glad to have them…”247
In light of this, there are two ways to understand Griffin’s Informed-desire Account:
Strong version:  The satisfaction  of informed desire does not  make an individual’s  life 
better unless he actually desires the object of that informed desire.
Weak version: When an individual  does not actually desire the object of his informed 
desire, then this reduces the positive contribution which the satisfaction of 
that informed desire has on the wellbeing of that individual.
The strong version contends that the objects of satisfied informed desires cannot constitute 
an  individual’s  wellbeing  unless  he  actually  desires  those  objects.  Under  the  strong 
version, having actual desires towards the objects of satisfied informed desires is therefore 
a necessary condition for those objects to constitute the wellbeing of an individual. This is 
basically a version of the Desire Constraint, and I shall critically discuss it in section 3.4 of 
this chapter. The weak version is basically a principled Informed-desire Account,248 which 
contends that the satisfaction of informed desires (all  things being equal)  increases  the 
wellbeing of an individual.  But it  further contends that  the wellbeing of the individual 
would  increase  more,  if  that  individual  actually  desires  the  objects  of  those  satisfied 
informed  desires.  Insofar  as  the  weak  version  of  Griffin’s  Informed-desire  Account 
contends that the satisfaction of informed desires (all  things being equal)  increases  the 
wellbeing of an individual (even if the increase would be to a lesser degree than if he 
actually desires them), then it is susceptible to my argument below, as with a principled 
247 Griffin 1986: 11.
248 By a 'principled Informed-desire Account', I refer to an account that only accepts this basic claim: the 
satisfaction of informed desires (all things being equal) increases the wellbeing of an individual. It therefore 
does not accept the further contention in the weak version of Griffin's Informed-desire Account:  the 
wellbeing of the individual would increase more, if that individual actually desires the objects of those 
satisfied informed desires
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Informed-desire  Account.  To  avoid  over-complicating  the  discussion  with  qualifying 
phrases, I treat Griffin’s Informed-desire Account as a principled Informed-desire Account 
in my subsequent discussion.
The problem I have with the Informed-desire Account concerns how to interpret the 
idea of ‘appreciating the true nature of the objects of (informed) desires’ (I shall refer to 
the idea as ‘X’ in the remainder of the discussion). The problem is basically this: suppose 
that X is construed thinly; for example suppose that all that is required for an individual to 
have  appreciated  the  true  nature  of  the  objects  of  his  (informed)  desires  is  just  the 
satisfaction of certain procedures: his mind is of a sound state and he is not under duress.249 
Under this construal of X, it is possible that an individual would desire something had he 
appreciated the true nature of that thing even though that thing is intuitively not good, or 
maybe even bad for him - e.g. being a slave. He might think that as long as he obeys his 
owner,  then  it  is  a  good  way  to  secure  his  livelihood.  So  under  this  construal  of  X, 
according to IDA#1 being a slave is good for him. This seems very counter-intuitive. (An 
argument of the same structure can be advanced with regard to IDA#2, by using something 
which is intuitively good for him - e.g. intimate relationships) 
However, if X is construed substantively, then it can deal with the above problem 
raised  when  construing  X  thinly.  For  example,  Griffin  might  argue  that  the  above 
individual had not really appreciated the true nature of being a slave, since he did not have 
a complete understanding of what makes life go well. If he had a complete understanding 
of what makes life go well, then he would not have desired (or maybe even would have 
desired to avoid) being a slave, had he appreciated its true nature. The reason why Griffin’s 
response can deal with the above problem is presumably this: a complete understanding of 
what makes life go well would inform him that given its  nature, slavery does not makes 
one’s life go well. Thus if he had a complete understanding of what makes life go well, he 
249 This might not be Griffin’s position, since he requires that the individual has a complete understanding of 
what makes life go well. That is not a matter of procedure.
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would not desire to be (or would desire the avoidance of being) a slave had he appreciated 
its true nature. Thus according to IDA#1, it is not the case that being a slave is good for 
him (or according to IDA#2, being a slave is  bad for him).  An argument of the same 
structure can also be applied to intimate relationships - thus resulting in the conclusion that 
if he had a complete understanding of what makes life go well, he would desire (or would 
not desire the avoidance of) intimate relationships, had he appreciated their true nature. 
Thus according to IDA#1, intimate relationships are good for him (or according to IDA#2, 
it is not the case that they are bad for him). 
However, although by construing X substantively the Informed-desire Account can 
deal with the problem raised when construing X thinly, yet if X is construed substantively, 
then the reason why something is bad or not good for one (or good or not bad for one), is  
not the fact that one would desire its avoidance or would not desire it (or would desire it or  
would  not  desire  its  avoidance),  had  one  appreciated  the  true  nature  of  that  thing  in 
question; rather it is the  nature of the thing in question. Let me explain this here with a 
purported thing that is good for an individual - intimate relationships. An argument with 
the same structure can be offered for purported things that are bad for an individual.
According to the Informed-desire account, intimate relationships are good for an 
individual, because one would desire them had one appreciated their true nature. But why 
would that be the case? Presumably because they have a certain nature, such that if one 
appreciated it, then one would desire them. Had intimate relationships not had this nature, 
then one would not desire them if one appreciated their true nature. Thus it is because of 
the nature of intimate relationships, that one would desire them if one appreciated their true 
nature. As one can see, although it  seems that the reason why intimate relationships are 
good for  an  individual  is  because he would  desire  them had he appreciated  their  true 
nature, yet given that the reason for this desire is because of such relationships’ nature, it 
seems that the real reason why intimate relationships are good for an individual is because 
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of their nature. If that is the case, then the reason why intimate relationships are good for 
an individual is, despite appearances, not because he would desire them had he appreciated 
their true nature. 
The problem with the Informed-desire Account is basically this: It is a dilemma. In 
the first horn of the dilemma, if the idea of ‘appreciating the true nature of the objects of 
(informed) desires’ is construed thinly,  then the Informed-desire Account would lead to 
results that are counter-intuitive. In the second horn of the dilemma, if the idea is construed 
substantively,  then it seems that the Informed-desire Account is not a Desire Fulfilment 
Theory anymore. This is because what is distinctive about a Desire Fulfilment Theory, is 
its contention that the reason why something is good or bad for an individual is because he 
(in some sense) respectively desires or desires to avoid that thing. As Scanlon says, “As I 
see  it,  according  to  a  desire  theory,  when  something  makes  life  better  this  is  always 
because that thing satisfies some desire”.250 It is true that advocates of Desire Fulfilment 
Theories are never explicit about this contention of theirs. But it seems that the contention 
is nevertheless implied or assumed in their  theories.  Take for instance the Unrestricted 
Actual Desire Theory. It contends that one’s wellbeing is constituted by the fulfilment of 
one’s actual desires. The most straightforward answer that the Unrestricted Actual Desire 
Theory would give, as to why giving something (e.g. y) to two people results in an increase 
in the level of wellbeing in one but not in the other, is this: the former person desires y 
while  the latter  person does  not  desire  y.  Thus the Unrestricted  Actual  Desire  Theory 
contends that something is good for one because one desires it. Since under the Informed-
desire Account, unlike the Unrestricted Actual Desire Theory, the reason why something is 
good or bad for an individual is not because he (in some sense) respectively desires it or 
desires its avoidance, it is therefore not a Desire Fulfilment Theory anymore.
There is a qualification to all this: note that in the case of Griffin (the focus of the 
above discussion), the reason why something is good or bad for one is the nature of the 
250 Scanlon 1993: 190.
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thing  in  question.  In  other  cases,  it  might  be something  else,  depending on how X is 
substantially construed. In any case, there are two points to this: First, in so far as the idea 
is not substantially construed in terms of desires (in some sense or another), then it is that 
which is used to substantially construe the idea, which is the reason why something is good 
or bad for one. Thus it would still be susceptible to my argument. Second, for an Informed-
desire Account to be extensionally adequate (thus not susceptible to the first horn of the 
dilemma), it must at least appeal to the nature of the things in question when construing the 
idea  substantially.  This  is  because  at  least  for  certain  things  that  we  strongly  find 
intuitively bad for one - e.g. slavery,251 we find them to be so in virtue of the fact that they 
have certain properties, which in the case of slavery, would most properly be the fact that 
one’s will is subjugated to the will of others. This suggests that at least part of the reason, if 
not  one  of  the  reasons,  why  slavery  is  bad  for  one,  is  because  one’s  will  would  be 
subjugated  under  the  will  of  others  if  one  is  a  slave.  Thus  if  the  idea  is  construed 
substantially without appealing to the nature of the things in question, then the Informed-
desire Account might not be going deep enough to accurately track what we intuitively 
find as bad for one. For example, it might fail to identify other things, which also involve 
subjugating one’s will to the will of others, as bad for one - certain forms of manipulation 
and coercion. 
Can Griffin just embrace the second horn of the dilemma? If he does so, then there 
are  two  worries  concerning  his  version  of  the  Informed-desire  Account:  First,  if  he 
embraces  the second horn of the dilemma,  then his account  is  not a Desire Fulfilment 
Theory anymore. This is because under his account, the reason why something is good or 
bad  for  one,  is  not  because  one  (in  some  sense)  respectively  desires  or  desires  the 
avoidance of it, rather it is the nature of that thing in question.252 Second, if that is the case, 
251 I shall frame the discussion here in terms of things that are bad for one. This is because we have much 
stronger intuitions on things that are bad for one, then things that are good for one.
252 As I have discussed in the first point of the above qualification to my dilemma argument, other non-
Griffin accounts of the Informed-desire Account are also susceptible to such an argument of the same 
structure.
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then in his account of wellbeing, desires (and their fulfilment) would play as much a role in 
constituting an individual’s wellbeing, as any other things which are good or bad for him 
because of the respective natures of those other things.253 Furthermore, since it does not 
specify what exactly are the things, that are either good or bad for an individual because of  
their respective natures, it is compatible with other accounts of wellbeing, which argue for 
certain specific things as constituting an individual’s wellbeing because of their particular 
natures.254 As a  result,  it  not  only loses  its  distinctiveness  as  an alternative  competing 
account of wellbeing. It is also trivially true from the point of view of all other accounts of 
wellbeing, which argue for certain specific things as constituting an individual’s wellbeing 
because of their particular natures.
3.3 – Possible Rejoinder: The Indispensable Role of Desires.
One might object to my above criticism by arguing that it is based on at least two 
implausible premises. On the one hand, it might be true that what is distinctive about a 
Desire Fulfilment Theory is its contention that the reason why something is good (or bad) 
for an individual is because he (in some sense) desires (or desires to avoid) that thing. But 
why think that that contention is plausible to start with? Surely, it cannot be the case that 
something is good or bad for one, just merely because one respectively (in some sense) 
desires or desires to avoid it. It must also have a certain nature – it has certain desirable or 
undesirable features. Similarly, on the other hand, it might be true that, on the face of it, 
something is good or bad for one because of its nature – it has certain features that make it 
good or bad for one. Yet a full explanation of why that is true must explain why it is those 
certain features, as opposed to other features that it has, that make it good or bad for one. 
And one might think that what marks those features out is, at least partly,  that they are 
desirable or undesirable features. If we take these two points together, then the reason why 
253 This would be the case, only if one argues that the satisfaction of desires is good for a person, because of 
the particular nature of desire satisfaction.
254 For example, a Quality-of-experience View might argue that certain qualities of experience, say pleasure, 
are good for a person because of the nature of pleasure; while other qualities of experiences, say pain and 
suffering, are bad for a person because of the nature of pains and sufferings. 
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something is good or bad for one is neither: (a) merely because one (in some sense) desires 
it or desires to avoid it, nor (b) merely because it has certain features. Rather it is - (c) 
because it has certain desirable or undesirable features. If one thinks that (c) necessarily 
makes  references  to  the  nature of  the  thing  in  question  (i.e.  its  features)  and peoples’ 
desires, then the real reason why something is good or bad for one must involve both its 
nature (that it has certain features) and in some sense one’s desires. My criticism therefore 
assumes overly simplistic views about why something is good or bad for one. As Wiggins 
says, “Surely an adequate account of these matters will have to treat psychological states 
and  their  objects  as  equal  and  reciprocal  partners,  and  is  likely  to  need  to  see  the 
identifications  of the states  and of the properties under  which the states subsume their 
objects as interdependent”.255
If this alternative view on why something is good or bad for one is plausible, then it 
might rescue Griffin’s Informed-desire Account from my criticisms. It is true that under 
the alternative view, the Informed-desire Account would not grant desire (in some sense), 
the foundational  role in the reasons why something is  good or bad for one,  unlike the 
Desire  Fulfilment  Theory.  Nevertheless,  by granting  desires  a  foundational  role  in  the 
reasons why something is good or bad for one, this alternative view renders the Informed-
desire Account distinctive enough as an alternative competing account of wellbeing. Or so 
it seems. 
My initial  worry with the alternative view is that it  is hard to spell  out what it 
amounts to, in saying that the reason why something is good or bad for one, must involve 
both the features of that thing and (in some sense) one’s desires; and why that is true. 
Griffin  seems to have something like the  alternative  view in mind,  when he says  that 
“[d]esire is not blind. Understanding is not bloodless. Neither is the slave of the other.  
There is no priority”.256 But it is not clear why he thinks that is true.
255 Wiggins 1991b: 106.
256 Griffin 1986: 30. See also his discussion of this in Ibid: 26-31.
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Griffin seems to have offered two arguments for why he thinks that something like 
the alternative view is plausible. His first argument appeals to three examples: A recluse 
comes to see that good company is good for him; Freud, in his last days, comes to see that 
thinking clearly is better for him than drugged comfort, and; a person who has wasted most 
of his life doing nothing comes to see why it is good for him to accomplish something in 
his life.257 However, on the face of it, these three examples are more concerned with how 
someone comes to realize (or recognize that) something is indeed good for one, rather than 
with the reason why it is indeed good for one. It might be true that when it comes to the 
former, it must involve not only the fact that those things have certain features, but also (in 
some sense) the desires of an individual. But this is a different issue. It thus tells us nothing 
about the reason why something is good or bad for one, let alone supports the contention 
that it must involve both of those things. This first argument therefore seems to fail to 
support why something like the alternative view is plausible. One might think that I am 
being too quick here,  and that there is  something deeper with Griffin’s first  argument, 
especially if one looks at his discussion of the last example.258 I agree that there is a deeper 
argument  in  that  discussion.  But  I  think  it  is  an  altogether  different  argument  that  is 
independent from the examples. This brings me to his second argument for something like 
the alternative view, which is much more promising.
Recall  that  in  the  objection  against  my  criticism  of  Griffin’s  Informed-desire 
Account, I talked about (c) - the reason why something is good or bad for one is because it 
respectively has certain desirable or undesirable features; and that one might think that (c) 
necessarily makes references to not only the features of the thing in question, but also 
people’s desires. Griffin’s second argument focuses on these two claims and why they are 
true. Here is what he says:
257 Griffin 1986: 28-30. His first example concerning his preference of pears over apples does not seem to be 
relevant to the alternative view on why something is good or bad for one. It seems the function of that 
example is to set the stage for his remaining three examples (the ones I have illustrated here) to support 
something like the alternative view, rather then directly supporting it.  
258 Griffin 1986: 29-31.
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“The way in which we talk about the objects we value is far from neutral… The 
language we use in reporting our perceptions already organizes our experience and 
selects what we see as important; it is designed to show how we view certain things 
in a favourable light…  We also have to explain what goes on in our perceiving  
things favourably. And here desire comes back at a deeper level, as part of this  
explanation… Hume  was  wrong  to  see  desire  and  understanding  (appetite  and 
cognition) as distinct existences. He was wrong to make desire blind. But it is a 
variety of the same mistake to think that one can explain our fixing on desirability 
features purely in terms of understanding…  Some understanding – the sort that  
involves fixing on certain features and seeing them in a favourable light – is also a  
kind of movement. It requires a will to go for what has those features. There is no  
adequate explanation of their being desirability features without appeal to this kind  
of movement”.259
Griffin seems to be saying this: what marks out the features of a thing that makes it good 
for us, as opposed to its other features, is the fact that we find those features favourable. It  
is  in  this  sense that  they are desirable  features.  But to say that  we find those features 
favourable, or that they are desirable features, is to say that there is a movement within us - 
a movement that (according to Griffin) is characterized as a will to go for the thing that has 
those features. And somehow, explaining this movement - this will - necessarily involves 
making references  to  our  desires.  This  argument,  if  sound,  not  only explains  what  (c) 
amounts to; it also explains why (c) necessarily makes references to not only the features 
of the thing in question, but also people’s desires.
The problem that I have with this argument is with the last claim – that explaining 
this movement (this will to go for the thing that has those features) necessarily involves 
making  references  to  our  desires.  Griffin  does  not  offer  support  for  this,  besides 
mentioning in a footnote that  the phrase ‘seeing in a favourable light’  originated from 
259 Griffin 1986: 29-30. My italics.
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McDowell; and that McDowell still makes understanding prior to desires. Doing so makes 
desire and understanding too independent from each other, to the degree that makes it hard 
to explain what it means to see something in a favourable light.260 However, in my view 
Griffin  does  not  make  clear  exactly  why  that  is  the  case.  In  fact,  in  the  passages  of 
McDowell  that  Griffin refers to,  McDowell  argues that desires are only ascribed to an 
individual in recognition of the fact that he sees in a favourable light the objects of those 
desires.  But  what  explains  him  seeing  those  objects  in  a  favourable  light  is  his 
understanding of those objects. This understanding is not a neutral  conception of those 
objects, but how he conceives those objects. This seems to be what McDowell is saying 
when he considers the case of two individuals, where one is incapable of seeing how a fact  
about the likely effect of an action on his own future could (on its own) constitute a reason 
for action, while the other is capable of doing so, even though both of their circumstances 
are exactly the same:261
“It is not that the two people share a certain neutral conception of the facts, but 
differ  in  that  one,  but  not  the  other,  has  an  independent  desire  as  well,  which 
combines with that neutral conception of the facts to cast a favourable light on his 
acting in a certain way. The desire is  ascribable to the prudent person simply in 
recognition of the fact that his conception of the likely effects of his action on his  
own future  by  itself  casts  a  favourable  light  on  his  acting  as  he  does.  So  the 
admitted difference in respect of desire should be explicable, like the difference in 
respect of action, in terms of a more fundamental difference in respect of how they  
conceive  the  facts…  What  is  special  about  a  prudent  person  is  a  different 
understanding of what it is for a fact to concern his own future. He sees things 
otherwise  in  the  relevant  area;  and  we  comprehend  his  prudent  behaviour  by 
260 Griffin 1986: 29 fn. 19.
261 McDowell 1998: 80-81. Note that for McDowell, “A full specification of a reason… must contain enough 
to reveal the favourable light in which the agent saw his projected action” (Ibid: 79).
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comprehending the relevant fragment of his world view,  not by appealing to the  
desire that is admittedly ascribable to him”.262 
It seems plausible to assume that Griffin intended to use his argument against McDowell to 
support the last claim in his argument: explaining the movement - the will to go for the 
thing that has those features (i.e.  see those features in a favourable light)  - necessarily 
involves making references to our desires. However, McDowell has already argued that 
one’s conception of those features can fully explain that movement, and that desires are 
only ascribable in recognition of that movement, but do not explain that movement. Thus 
for Griffin to adequately support his last claim, not only does he need to argue that (contra 
McDowell) one’s conception of those features cannot fully explain that movement, he also 
needs  to  argue  that  desires  (in  some  sense)  explain  that  movement  rather  than  being 
ascribed  to  that  movement.  None  of  this  is  achieved  by  (re)iterating  the  claim  that 
understanding without desire makes it hard to explain what it means to see something in a 
favourable light. As a result, in effect, Griffin gives us no reason to accept the last claim of 
his argument. And to the extent that what McDowell argues for is plausible, that claim 
might very well be false.
Indeed,  there  is  a  huge  debate,  that  has  spawned  up  a  huge  literature,263 in 
metaethics concerning the role that desires play in the reasons why something is good or 
bad (for one)  - whether they are at least some of the reasons why something is good or bad 
(for one). I have no intention to resolve this debate in a meagre few paragraphs. But I have 
shown  the  difficulty  in  arguing  for  desires  being  at  least  some  of  the  reasons  why 
something is good or bad (for one), and thus granting them at least a foundational role in 
that respect. The difficulty is basically this: In arguing for desires being at least some of the 
reasons why something is good or bad (for one), one would need to justify why they have 
this normative force, or demarcate those that have such a normative force from those that 
262 McDowell 1998: 81. My Italics.
263 Griffin lists a number of the relevant works in 1986: 27 fn. 15.
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do not. But if one does so, then the normative force of desires would then be reduced to the 
normative  force of  whatever  is  used to  justify  desires’  normative  force or identify the 
relevant desires. And it is that which occupies the place of desires in being at least some of 
the reasons why something is good or bad (for one). Thus the foundational role that they 
would have played in why something is good or bad (for one) is dislodged. The challenge 
is therefore to offer an account of desires being at least some of the reasons why something 
is good or bad (for one), that resists or is immune to such a reduction. This is a challenging 
task  indeed,  as  one  would  have  noticed  in  the  above  discussion.  My response  to  the 
objection  (mentioned  in  the  beginning  of  this  section)  to  my  criticism  of  Griffin’s 
Informed-desire Account is this: the objection is predicated on an alternative view of why 
something  is  good  or  bad  for  one.  But  much  work  is  still  needed  for  the  account  to 
substantiate the claim - desires are at least some of the reasons why something is good or 
bad for one - in a way that could maintain desires as playing at least a foundational role in 
those  reasons.  Insofar  as  this  work  has  yet  to  be  done,  it  can  hardly  save  Griffin’s 
Informed-desire Account from my criticisms in section 3.2. 
3.4 – The Desire Constraint.
Even in light of the above objections against the Unrestricted Actual Desire Theory 
and the Informed-desire  Account,  one might  still  argue that  although the  reasons why 
something is good for an individual are because of its nature, and maybe also because of 
the individual’s interests etc., it still cannot be good for him unless he actually desires it.  
Under  this  position,  actual  desires  towards  things  are  necessary  but  not  sufficient 
conditions for them being good for a person. I shall refer to this position as “the Desire 
Constraint”.  As  mentioned  in  section  3.2,  there  is  a  way  of  understanding  Griffin’s 
Informed-desire Account - the strong version - which endorses such a position. I shall now 
argue that the Desire Constraint is implausible. 
Let me add a qualification. It should be apparent, from my discussion against the 
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Unrestricted  Actual  Desire  Theory in  section  3.1,  that  the  desire  formation  process  of 
individuals is subject to confusion, ignorance and errors. Thus although I do not desire 
something that is good for me right now, if my confusion, ignorance or errors are brought 
to my attention, I shall desire them in the future. Furthermore, our desires are not static. 
They change over time. Thus the fact that I do not have certain desires right now does not 
mean that I shall never have those desires in the future. Thus it seems rather uncharitable to 
understand the Desire Constraint as restricted to an individual’s present desires. Rather it 
should include not only one’s present desires, but also one’s future desires. Accordingly 
we should understand the Desire Constraint as: if an individual does not desire something 
now, nor will desire it in the future, then that thing cannot be good for him. Thus when I 
talk about the desires of an individual in the following, I refer not only to his present but 
also his future desires.
As a general claim about the wellbeing of individuals, there are considerations that 
count  against  the  plausibility  of  the  Desire  Constraint.  Most  of  the  things  that  are 
concerned with one’s  biological  life,  when satisfied,  are  (all  other  things  being equal) 
better for one’s life, even when one does not desire those things or their satisfaction. For 
example, having enough food to avoid starvation is good for one, even when one does not 
desire it. Or getting one’s disease cured is good for one, even when one does not desire it 
be cured. One might argue that in cases like these, if one had desired those things, they 
would make one’s life even better than had one not desired them. But that just means either 
desires intensify the contribution those things already have on one's wellbeing, or desires 
are  a  separate  constituent  in the wellbeing  of individuals,  that  weigh with the positive 
contribution that those things have on the wellbeing of individuals. In either case, it is not 
the case that desires towards those things (i.e. having one’s disease cured, say) are the 
necessary conditions for their being good for one. In the former case, those things are still 
good for one even when one does not desire them, albeit not as good for one as if one 
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desired them. In the latter case, those things are good for one. It is just that their positive 
contribution to one’s wellbeing is reduced by one’s lack of desires towards them.    
However,  there  also  seem  to  be  other  considerations  that  count  towards  the 
plausibility of the Desire Constraint. For example, it seems good for me to take up model  
building as a hobby.  This  is  because this  would help to  improve my patience  and my 
attention to detail. Yet, if I do not desire to build models at all, it is hard to see how taking 
it up as a hobby could be good for me, even if it would indeed help improve my patience 
and my attention to detail. The idea is that we are not passive recipients of all the things 
that are supposedly good for us. Some things that are supposedly good for us (unlike those 
concerned with our biological life) require our engagement in them, for them to be truly 
good for us; and one might think that desiring them is the required sort of engagement.
But why do certain things require one’s engagement in them for them to be truly 
good for one, while other things (e.g. concerned with one’s biological life) do not require 
this? One natural explanation is that for the former things (e.g. model building as a hobby), 
their nature is such that there is this requirement of engagement for them to be truly good 
for one, while that is not the case for the latter things (e.g. concerned with one’s biological 
life). Thus it is because of the nature of model building as a hobby, that me taking it up as a 
hobby would not be good for me, unless I desire building models. Indeed, if I do not desire 
to build models, most probably I will find building models rather frustrating, and jump 
around angrily when it does not go as smoothly as I expected. It is then hard to see how it 
is helping to improve my patience or my attention to detail.
I do agree that if there are things that require one’s engagement for them to be good 
for one, it is because of their nature that there is such a requirement. However, given the 
wide variety of natures that things have, why assume that the requirement for engagement, 
that stems from their nature, necessarily has to be in terms of one’s desires towards them? 
If it is their nature that determines their having this requirement of engagement, then it 
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seems plausible to suggest that their nature also determines the sort of engagement that is 
required. It also seems plausible to suggest that different natures would result in different 
sorts of engagement being required here. Thus for some things, like model building as a 
hobby, the required sort of engagement involves desire. But for other things, because they 
have  a  different  nature,  the  required  sort  of  engagement  is  not  desire,  but  something 
weaker.264 For example, most of us think that having the friends that we have is good for 
us. But it does not seem plausible to suggest that if we did not desire or want to have our  
friends, then it would not be good for us that we have them. Rather it seems more plausible 
to suggest that we need to have some kinds of pro-attitude towards having our friends (e.g. 
to enjoy their company, to like them etc.), for it to be good for us to have our friendships. 
My  proposed  explanation  for  this  is  that  the  nature  of  friendship  is  such  that  the 
engagement that is required for it to be truly good for one is not as strong as the Desire 
Constraint.  Certainly if one has no pro-attitudes towards one’s friend at all,  then he is 
hardly one’s friend.  Part of what it means for someone to be friends with one is that one at 
least  has  some kind of  pro-attitude  towards  him.  In the absence of  such pro-attitudes, 
having him as a friend cannot be good for one, as he is not one’s friend at all.  But this  
does not take us all the way to a Desire Constraint on one’s friendships’ contribution to 
one’s well-being.
We started out with the Desire Constraint as a general claim about the wellbeing of 
individuals  - things cannot be good for one unless one actually desires (or will  desire) 
them. But then we need to exclude from its scope things that are good for one but are 
concerned only with one’s biological needs. After that, we also need to exclude from its 
scope things whose nature is such that the engagement that is required for them to be truly 
good for one need not take the form of desire. The remaining things that are good for one 
(which are still within the scope of the Desire Constraint) are just those whose nature is 
such that the engagement that is required for them to be truly good for one, is in terms of 
264 Or maybe even just the lack of negative attitudes. But I shall put this stronger claim aside in this thesis. 
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one desiring them. If that is the case, it  seems plausible to suggest that not most (and 
definitely not all) of the things that are supposedly good for one, are within the scope of the 
Desire Constraint. Accordingly, the Desire Constraint is not as general a claim about the 
wellbeing of individuals as it is originally taken to be.
4. - Objective List Theories & Conclusion.
I believe that the Quality-of-experience View and the Desire Fulfilment Theory are 
the  main  alternatives  to  my  Razian  conception  of  wellbeing.  This  chapter  has  raised 
various worries concerning different  plausible versions of them. However,  there is  one 
final account that is generally taken to be a further alternative. This is what Parfit calls 
“Objective List Theories”,265 or what Scanlon calls “Substantive Good Theories”.266  This 
chapter  concludes  by  discussing  this  account  of  wellbeing  in  relation  to  my  Razian 
conception of wellbeing. This should also help to situate my account among the different 
accounts of wellbeing that are discussed in the literature.
Usually Objective List  Theories (or Substantive Good Theories)  refer to  all  the 
accounts of wellbeing that are opposed to the Quality-of-experience View and the Desire 
Fulfilment  Theory.  As  Crisp  says,  “Objective  list  theories  are  usually  understood  as 
theories which list items constituting well-being that consist neither merely in pleasurable 
experiences  nor  in  desire-satisfaction”.267 To  that  extent,  my  Razian  conception  of 
wellbeing is an Objective List Theory. However, characterizing Objective List Theories in 
such a  broad way is  not particularly helpful  or useful.  Depending on how one further 
characterizes Objective List Theories, my Razian conception of wellbeing might be one 
such theory or not.
According to Scanlon, “What is essential [to the Objective List Theories] is that 
these are theories according to which an assessment of a person’s well-being involves a 
265 Parfit 1994: 235.
266 Scanlon 1993: 188-189.
267 Crisp 2005: n. pag.
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substantive judgement about what things make life better, a judgement which may conflict 
with  that  of  the person whose  wellbeing  is  in  question”.268 In  this  respect,  my Razian 
conception of wellbeing is a kind of Objective List Theory. This is because according to it, 
the wellbeing of an individual is fundamentally constituted by (among other things), the 
satisfaction of his biological needs, and his success in pursuing goals and activities that are 
in fact valuable. There is no guarantee under this account, that an individual’s judgement 
about  the  satisfaction  of  his  biological  needs,  his  success  in  pursuing  his  goals  and 
activities and the value of his goals and activities, necessarily corresponds with what is 
indeed the case. Subsequently, under my account, the judgement involved in assessing a 
person’s wellbeing may conflict with that of the person whose wellbeing is in question.
On the other hand, according to Arneson, “The idea of the objective list is simply 
that what is intrinsically good for a person is fixed independently of that person’s attitudes 
or  opinions…”.269 This  depends  on  how strongly  one  reads  “that  person’s  attitudes  or 
opinions”. 
If one reads it strongly, as Parfit does when he says that according to Objective List 
Theories, “certain things are good or bad for people, whether or not these people would 
want to have the good things, or to avoid the bad things”,270 then my Razian conception of 
wellbeing is a kind of Objective List Theory. This is because firstly, under it, the reason 
why the satisfaction of one’s biological needs and one’s success in pursuing valuable goals 
and activities  contribute  positively to  one’s wellbeing is  not  because one desires  these 
things  or  avoids  their  opposites.  Rather,  they  contribute  positively  to  one’s  wellbeing 
because this is what a human life is - it is a kind of life whose quality is fundamentally  
constituted by these things. Secondly, as my rejection of the Desire Constraint showed, it is 
also  not  the  case  that  the  satisfaction  of  one’s  biological  needs  and  one’s  success  in 
268 Scanlon 1993: 188. Note that such a characterization does not exclude the Informed-desire Account from 
the Objective List Theories. However, that is exactly one of the things that I was arguing before, that the 
Informed-desire Account is not really a genuine Desire Fulfillment Theory. 
269 Arneson 1999: 118-119.
270 Parfit 1994: 239.
Page 148 of 222
pursuing valuable goals and activities, contribute positively to one’s wellbeing only if one 
desires them – nor indeed that their opposites contribute negatively to one’s wellbeing only 
if one avoids them (for instance, consider someone who pursues dis-valuable goals and 
desires to do so; it seems plausible to suggest that his pursuit contributes negatively to his 
wellbeing). 
Furthermore,  it  does seem true that most  of the time for most  of the goals and 
activities that we pursue, we pursue them because we desire pursuing them or desire to be 
successful in them. This seems to be especially the case with goals and activities that are 
pursued because they were chosen as a result of deliberation. However as I discussed in 
section 5.1 of chapter 4, not all the goals and activities that people pursue are like that.  
Sometimes  people  pursue  some  goals  and  activities  out  of  habit  or  entrenched  daily 
routines.  At  other  times,  people  pursue  some  other  goals  or  activities  because  of  the 
environment in which they are brought up, such goals or activities are usually or expected 
to be pursued by people. In cases like these, it seems plausible to suggest that people do 
not necessarily desire to pursue those goals or activities, or desire to be successful in them. 
However, that is not to say that one can be indifferent towards the goals and activities that 
one  pursues.  This  is  because  part  of  what  it  means  to  pursue  something  is  that  the 
individual who is pursuing it, has at least some kind of pro-attitude towards it, even if it is 
nothing as strong as desires. This leads to the thin reading of Arneson's above claim about 
Objective List Theories.
 If one reads the phrase “that person’s attitudes or opinions” in Arneson's above 
claim thinly to include only some kind of pro-attitude and what I call the attitudes of dis-
heartedness - resentment, pathological self-doubt, lack of self-esteem and self hate - then 
my Razian  conception  of  wellbeing  would  not  be an Objective  List  Theory.271 This  is 
because first, in the absence of any pro-attitudes towards the goals and activities that one is 
pursuing, one is not properly speaking pursuing them. Accordingly, one’s success and the 
271 See section 6.1 and 6.3 in chapter 4 for my discussion on dis-heartedness.
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value of those goals and activities would not contribute to one’s wellbeing - though they 
would have if one had had some pro-attitude towards them, even if  those pro-attitudes 
were  not  as  strong  as  desires.  Second,  in  cases  of  dis-heartedness,  one’s  success  in 
pursuing valuable goals and activities  would not have contributed to one’s wellbeing - 
though it would have if one was not dis-hearted. It is in these two thin senses that under my 
Razian conception of wellbeing, what is good for a person is not fixed independently of 
that person’s attitudes.    
Since my Razian conception of wellbeing is not necessarily a kind of Objective List 
Theory, does that count against its plausibility? I do not think so. As many have argued 
before,272 to avoid excessive rigidity and inflexibility,  the most plausible version of the 
Objective  List  Theory  must  recognize  the  importance  of  peoples’  attitudes  (pleasure, 
enjoyment  etc.)  towards  the  things  that  are  supposedly claimed,  by the  Objective  List 
Theories, to be good for individuals. My account recognizes this importance.
The rest of this thesis takes for granted the plausibility of my Razian conception of 
wellbeing.  The  next  chapter  returns  to  my  human-life  account  of  duties  of  minimal 
wellbeing.  It   argues  for  what  a  human  life  consists  in,  by  appealing  to  my  Razian 
conception of wellbeing. It also discusses how the objects of duties of minimal wellbeing 
are to be determined.
272 For example: Parfit 1994: 241-242, Scanlon 1993: 189-190 & Crisp 2005: n. pag.
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Chapter 6
A Human Life & What Is Involved in Securing It
1. - Introduction.
The last two chapters argued for and defended the Razian conception of wellbeing. 
Recall  that  the  function  of  duties  of  minimal  wellbeing  is  to  secure  a  human  life  for 
individuals, and so in determining what that involves, we will specify the objects of these 
duties accordingly. This chapter first discusses what constitutes a human life, by appealing 
to the Razian conception of wellbeing. It then discusses how to determine what is involved 
in securing a human life for individuals.  
2. - What is a Human Life?
Recall that according to the Razian conception, the wellbeing of an individual is 
fundamentally constituted by (a) the satisfaction of his biological needs, and (b) his success 
in whole-heartedly pursuing socially defined and determined goals and activities which are 
in fact valuable. If that is the case, then what is a human life? 
Note  that  this  question  is  not  about  the  kind  of  biological  life-form that  is 
characteristic of human beings, as opposed to the kind that is characteristic of bacteria. 
Rather, it is about the kind of things that one does or has, which makes the life that one is 
leading  a  human  life,  as  opposed  to  a  non-human  life.  Thus  I  am not  looking  for  a 
biochemical answer to the above question, neither am I looking for an answer that refers to 
the human genome or to evolution. 
2.1 – Satisfaction of Biological Needs & Pursuit of Goals and Activities.
Given (a) and (b) in the Razian conception of wellbeing, it seems that a human life 
consists in not just the satisfaction of biological needs, but also the pursuit of goals and 
activities. Accordingly, since beyond the satisfaction of biological needs, the wellbeing of 
an individual  is  constituted by his pursuit  of goals and activities  (more specifically,  as 
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explained in chapter 4, it is a function of his success in pursuing them, their value and 
whether he is wholehearted or half-hearted in pursuing them), a human life therefore refers 
to a level of wellbeing that is higher than the level where biological needs are satisfied.
The claim that a human life consists in not just the satisfaction of biological needs, 
but also the pursuit of goals and activities, seems to correspond with our intuitions. Non-
human animal lives seem to consist in the satisfaction of biological needs: they eat, they 
sleep, they seek shelter, they propagate, they avoid pain etc.; and as long as a non-human 
animal  does  those things,  we think  it  is  leading a  non-human  animal  life.  Although a 
human life consists in those things, we intuitively think that a human life consists in more 
than just that. Imagine an individual who lives his life doing nothing besides satisfying his 
biological  needs;  or  an  individual  who  has  a  life  where  he  can  do  nothing besides 
satisfying his biological needs. We intuitively think that there is something amiss in both 
of their lives. What immediately strikes us when we are confronted with them seems to be 
this:  For  the  first  individual,  he  must  have  something  beyond  the  satisfaction  of  his 
biological needs that he wants to do. While for the second individual, he cannot do the 
things which he wants that are beyond the satisfaction of his biological needs. No doubt a 
lot of the things that people do in their lives can be reduced to, or are motivated by, the 
satisfaction of their biological needs. But there are two points to note concerning this: First, 
it  does  not  seem plausible  that  all  the  things  people  do  can  be  so  reduced,  or  are  so 
motivated. Engaging in a religious practice seems to be an example of this. Second, even 
for the things that people do, which can be so reduced, or are so motivated, it does not 
seem to be the case that the satisfaction of biological needs can fully explain them. For 
example: if engaging in a leisure activity is merely for the satisfaction of biological needs, 
why football rather than basketball? Or if dining is merely for the satisfaction of biological 
needs, why do we eat so much more than we need biologically, and with so much variety,  
and in such elaborate fashion? If we look at how people in the world live their lives, they 
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do not just do things for the mere satisfaction of their biological needs. They also do things 
that  they  want,  desire,  wish  for,  find  worthy,  find  valuable  etc.,  which  are  not  solely 
concerned with the satisfaction of their biological needs. If we understand these things that 
they do as goals and activities (broadly construed), then this lends plausibility to the claim 
suggested by the Razian conception of wellbeing: a human life consists in not just  the 
satisfaction of biological needs, but also the pursuit of goals and activities. 
Nevertheless, I believe the claim is more accurately stated as: A human life consists 
in pursuing goals and activities, and the satisfaction of biological needs,  insofar as their  
non-satisfaction is not required by the specific goal or activity that one is pursuing. This is 
because, as I have noted in chapter 4, some goals and activities require a temporary or 
continued non-satisfaction of some biological needs. E.g. fasting for a political cause or 
being a Buddhist monk. It would be very counter-intuitive to suggest that political activists 
and Buddhist monks are not leading human lives,  because they are not satisfying their 
biological needs.
However, one should not underestimate, or diminish, the role that satisfaction of 
biological needs plays in a human life. Insofar as human beings are biological beings, a 
human life is a kind of biological life. If a biological life consists in satisfying its biological 
needs, then a human life also consists in satisfying its biological needs. In highlighting that 
a human life normally consists in at least the satisfaction of biological needs, we are giving 
proper attention to the biological nature of human beings.
2.2 – Agency.
However,  all  this  does  not  yet  capture  what  is  distinctive  about  a  human  life. 
Consider a robot that satisfies all its needs, its needs for fuel and maintenance which are 
analogous  to  our  biological  needs.  But  it  also  pursues  goals  and  activities,  like  the 
terminators  in  the Terminator  movies.  Is  it  thereby leading a  human life? Or consider 
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zombies, which also pursue goals and activities, namely devouring living being.273 In both 
cases, it is doubtful that they are leading human lives. Something seems amiss in their lives 
for  them to  be  leading  human  lives.  One  way of  explaining  this  is  that  they  are  not 
biological beings, and therefore they cannot be leading biological lives. Since a human life 
is a kind of biological life, they are therefore not leading human lives. But I believe a more 
telling explanation of this is that when we say that a human life consists in pursuing goals 
and activities,274 we do not just mean that  per se.  Rather,  we mean pursuing goals and 
activities in a way that involves a kind of agency. And the problem with the above two 
examples is that they do not involve this kind of agency.
Central to this kind of agency is the idea that an agent is an individual who acts 
with – what I call -  a sense of what is worth doing. The starting idea behind it is that 
individuals  do  not  randomly  pursue  goals  and  activities  in  their  everyday  lives.  They 
pursue these or those goals or activities because they find them worth doing; and they are 
more reluctant to pursue other goals or activities, if they do not find them worth doing. 
Accordingly, an individual is pursuing goals and activities in a way that involves this kind 
of agency, when he pursues goals and activities with a sense of what is worth doing. Let 
me explain what this means.
First, he is able to form ideas of what is worth doing. How do individuals come to 
find something worth doing? It seems natural and obvious to suggest that it is because, at 
least, they believe there are reasons to find that thing worth doing. However, that does not 
tell us how they come to have those reasons, i.e. the source of those reasons. I believe that 
this  lies  in  the  social  interaction  between  individuals.  Through  interacting  with  other 
individuals  who also pursue goals and activities,  we get acquainted to those goals and 
activities. We get a glimpse of what those goals and activities mean to them, and why they 
find them worth doing. This is similar to what Waldron says about norms:
273 According to some versions, zombies have no needs that are analogous to anything like our biological 
needs.
274 I believe we can set aside the part on satisfying one's biological needs for now.
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“They exist in a context of reasons and reasoning. There is always a story to be 
told, a story internal to the norm – part, as I said, of its internal aspect -  as to why 
doing things  this  way is  better  or  appropriate  or  obligatory  or  required.  If,  for 
example, I ask an elder of the group to which I belong why we have and follow a 
norm of monogamy,  he may tell  me a story about  the need for reciprocity and 
equality  between  lovers  and  explain  why  this  is  difficult  or  impossible  in 
polygamous relationships, or he may tell me a story about the sun and the moon 
and about there being only one of each”.275
The same goes for goals and activities. There is a story to be told, among those who pursue 
those goals and activities, about the meaning of those goals and activities and why they 
find them worth doing. If these stories are internalized (or at least some of their elements 
are internalized), then they constitute one’s reasons for finding those goals and activities 
worth  doing.  It  is  in  this  sense  that  ideas  of  what  is  worth  doing  are  formed.  Since 
individuals pursue goals and activities because they find them worth doing, if they are to 
be able to do so, they have to be able to form ideas of what is worth doing.
Two notes regarding this: First, I am not saying that whenever an individual finds a 
goal or activity worth doing, then it  is  indeed worth doing. All  that is required for an 
individual to find a goal or activity worth doing, is that he believes there are reasons why it 
is worth doing - reasons that he believes (all things considered) count in favour of finding 
it worth doing.276 However, it might be the case that those reasons of his in fact do not 
count in favour of finding it  worth doing. Or it  might  be the case that there are other 
reasons that outweigh or defeat those reasons of his, and which count against finding that 
goal or activity worth doing; but he is not aware of them. Thus what I argued for above 
does not entail that whenever an individual finds a goal or activity worth doing, then it is 
indeed worth doing or he is justified in finding it worth doing.
275 Waldron 2000: 234.
276 The idea that a reason for X is a consideration that counts in favour of X comes from Scanlon. See 
Scanlon 1998: 17-19.
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Second,  I  am also  not  saying  that  individuals  pursue  goals  and  activities  only 
because they have chosen them as a result of deliberation. Sometimes they do, but this is 
not necessarily the case.  As I have argued in section 5.1 of chapter 4, sometimes they 
pursue certain goals or activities out of habit or entrenched daily routines, or because in the 
environment in which they are brought up, such goals or activities are usually or expected 
to be pursued. All I mean above is just that, if individuals were to reflect on the goals and 
activities that they are pursuing, they would offer what they believe are reasons that count 
in favour of finding them worth doing.277 Thus I am not arguing that individuals pursue 
goals or activities only because they have chosen them as a result of deliberation.
This leads to the second characteristic of being an agent – he is able to revise his 
ideas of what  is  worth doing. Since an individual’s  ideas of what are worth doing are 
constituted by what he believes are reasons for finding certain things worth doing, when 
other reasons are brought to his attention (i.e. reasons that are against his original reasons 
in favour of finding that thing worth doing, or reasons that outweigh or defeat his original  
reasons, or reasons that not only outweigh or defeat his original reasons, but also favour 
finding that thing not worth doing), then the reasons that he originally has are now not 
reasons for him to find those things worth doing. Thus he would now not find those things 
worth doing. His ideas of what are worth doing are also revised as a result. Underlying all 
this is the general idea that if someone believes in X because of Y, then all other things 
being equal, he would not believe in X when he ceases to believe in Y. If individuals can 
form ideas of what is worth doing as described above, then they can also revise them in 
light of further reasons that are brought to their attention.
The third and final characteristic of being an agent is that he is able to coordinate 
his actions according to his ideas of what is worth doing. When we say that individuals 
277 As the discussion in section 4 of chapter 4 and section 5 of chapter 7 shows, this does not mean that any 
routine is a goal or activity. Routines that have no meanings or significances are not goals and activities. For 
example, consider an individual who mindlessly walks on the right hand side of the road, as opposed to the 
left hand side, whenever he walks on roads. 
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pursue goals and activities because they find them worth doing, we do not mean that there 
is just a correlation between the former and the latter. That is, we mean to exclude any case 
where - on the one hand - individuals pursue this goal or activity, and – on the other hand -  
they find it worth doing, but where there is no relationship or connection between the two. 
Rather, agents pursue goals or activities as a result of finding them worth doing; or the fact 
that they find them worth doing is what leads them to pursue these goals or activities. It is 
in this sense that an agent is someone who is able to coordinate his actions according to his 
ideas of what is worth doing. 
2.3 – Agency and Wellbeing.
This  account  of  agency  also  helps  to  explain  certain  elements  in  the  Razian 
conception of wellbeing. One such element is the value of the goals or activities that an 
individual pursues, which (together with other things) constitute his wellbeing.278 Since an 
individual who leads a human life must pursue goals and activities through forming and 
revising his ideas of what is worth doing, it  matters whether  he gets it  right  – that  is, 
whether the goals and activities that he pursues are indeed worth doing. This is reflected in 
his level of wellbeing. If an individual got it right, then his wellbeing would be higher than 
if he got it wrong, since he would then be pursuing a goal or activity that is in fact not 
worth doing. Similarly, if he got it wrong, then his wellbeing would be lower than if he got 
it right, since he would then be pursuing a goal or activity that is in fact worth doing. 
This  account  of  agency  also  helps  to  explain  another  element  in  the  Razian 
conception of wellbeing - the notion of dis-heartedness. As I argued in section 6 of chapter 
4,  dis-heartedness consists in pathological  self-doubt,  lack of self-esteem, self-hate and 
resentment. They negatively affect the wellbeing of an individual more fundamentally than 
half-heartedness. I also explained how when one pursues goals and activities dis-heartedly, 
one is not pursuing them in the relevant sense that contributes to one's wellbeing.  The 
278 Please refer to section 3.2 in chapter 4 for this.
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above account of agency helps to further explain this. The negative attitudes that constitute 
dis-heartedness prevent the individual  who has them from being an agent in the above 
sense. Thus a dis-hearted individual is not pursuing goals and activities, in the way that 
involves the kind of agency that a human life consists in. Let me briefly explain this with 
each of the negative attitudes.
As I  argued in section  6 of  chapter  4,  to  have pathological  self-doubt  is  to  be 
doubtful about oneself, when one is unjustified in doing so - for example with regard to 
one’s ability to do things, how successful one is in doing those things, the choices that one 
makes, their significance, their value or worth etc. To have a lack of self-esteem means that 
one fails to appreciate one’s own worth. This can be manifested through being unable to 
recognize that one has the ability to do things, can be successful in doing them, can make 
the right choices etc. All these not only undermine one's ability to form ideas of what is 
worth doing. They also undermine one's ability to coordinate one's actions, according to 
one's ideas of what is worth doing. 
Similarly, to have self-hate is to hate oneself, which includes the things regarding 
or about oneself. It seems plausible to suggest that an individual’s ideas of what is worth 
doing are quite a fundamental part of himself, as those ideas constitute  his conception of 
what he is to do in his life. Thus if he has self-hate then most probably he also hates his 
ideas of what is worth doing. But if that is the case, then he would be reluctant to form 
them in the first place, revise them subsequently, and coordinate his actions according to 
them. Self-hate therefore undermines all three characteristics of being an agent.
Finally, similar things can be said with regard to resentment. When an individual 
feels resentful in general (i.e. he does not identify with the state he is in), he does not  
identify with anything he does,  tries  to do or wants to do.  He therefore also does not 
identify himself with his ideas of what is worth doing, i.e. see them as his. This not only 
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undermines his ability to revise his ideas of what is worth doing, but also his ability to 
coordinate his actions according to them.
2.4 – Summary: What is a Human Life?
I therefore submit that according to the Razian conception of wellbeing: A human 
life consists in having a level of wellbeing that is higher than the satisfaction of biological 
needs, where this is constituted by the pursuit of goals and activities with a sense of what is 
worth doing; and this in turn consists in the three characteristics that I have outlined above 
in section 2.2.
3. - How to Determine the Objects of Duties of Minimal Wellbeing.
We now know what constitutes a human life. To determine the objects of duties of 
minimal wellbeing, we need to determine what is involved in securing such a human life 
for individuals.279 But how do we do so?
3.1 – The Conditions to Lead a Human Life.
We can begin with the conditions that need to be fulfilled for an individual to lead a 
human life - since if these conditions are not fulfilled, then an individual cannot lead a 
human life.  Thus central to what is involved in securing a human life is securing these 
conditions.  But that does not mean that the objects of duties of minimal  wellbeing are 
merely  the  best  way of  securing  these  conditions.  In  chapter  7,  I  shall  argue  for  two 
requirements,  both  of  which  are  grounded  in  elements  that  are  within  the  human-life 
account  of  duties  of  minimal  wellbeing.  These  requirements  shape  and limit  how the 
objects  of these duties are  derived from the conditions  that  need to be fulfilled  for an 
individual to lead a human life. The first one is called the 'presumption of equality', which 
states that whatever the objects of these duties are, the default position is to secure them 
equally for all individuals. The second one is called 'respecting each individual as someone 
279 Please refer to section 4.1 of chapter 3.
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who leads a human life', which states that individuals should be respected. This involves 
addressing them in terms of the reasons for why something is worth or not worth doing. 
Although the objects of duties of minimal wellbeing are based on the conditions to 
lead a human life, because of the two requirements they also go beyond those conditions. 
Thus  it  is  not  necessarily  the  case  that  when  these  duties  are  not  fulfilled,  then  an 
individual cannot lead a human life. This is hardly surprising, since just as not having the 
conditions to lead a human life secured for one does not imply that the conditions are 
unfulfilled (as one might have other ways to fulfil them), having them unequally fulfilled 
also  does  not  imply  that  they  are  unfulfilled.  Similarly,  just  as  not  respecting  my 
grandfather  as  an  elderly  man  does  not  imply  that  he  cannot  be  an  elderly  man,  not 
respecting an individual as someone who lives a human life also does not imply that he 
cannot lead a human life. Thus it is not an objection that there cannot be such duties - or 
that  they are not  proper  duties  of  minimal  wellbeing  – because their  fulfilment  is  not 
necessary for individuals to lead a human life. We are not just in the business of fulfilling 
the necessary conditions for individuals to lead a human life. Rather, we are in the business 
of fulfilling their  entitlement  to  live a human life.  This goes beyond just  fulfilling the 
necessary conditions for them to lead a human life, just as one's right to life goes beyond 
one merely not dying.
3.2 – Constraints and Costs.
There  is  also  a  general  constraint  on  what  the  objects  of  duties  of  minimal 
wellbeing can be. They are limited to what it is empirically possible for us to fulfil.280 This 
also places severe constraints on how these objects are based on the conditions for leading 
a human life. The rationale behind this is rather obvious. The objects of duties of minimal 
wellbeing  constitute  duties  on  the  part  of  others.  But  one  cannot  have  duties  that  are 
empirically impossible for one to fulfil. Thus these objects cannot involve things that are 
280 This limitation is also advanced by those who argue for universal basic human rights. For example Miller 
2007: 186.
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empirically impossible for us to fulfil. For example, one of the conditions for leading a 
human  life  is  having  the  means  to  be  a  healthy  human  being.  If  an  individual  has  a 
currently  incurable  disease  that  prevents  him  from being  a  healthy  human  being,  the 
corresponding objects cannot involve providing him with a cure for this currently incurable 
disease of his. In cases like this, we do have a reason to further research into curing this 
currently  incurable  disease.  However,  I  do  not  think  this  reason  is  grounded  in  the 
individual’s entitlement to lead a human life.
This  also  raises  a  concern  on  the  costs  involved  in  fulfilling  certain  duties  of 
minimal wellbeing. This is particularly relevant to duties that require resources for their 
fulfilment, since our resources are finite. Take as an example the duty to secure the means 
for being a healthy human being: Imagine an individual who is so sick (he has multiple 
cancers), that although it is empirically possible to cure him, it is very costly to do so. 
What should we do in this case? That depends on exactly how costly it is to fulfil the duty.
If it is only costly in the sense that it would involve taking away so much from 
everyone  around the  world,  such that  everyone would  be reduced to  living  a minimal  
human life, then I think we should still fulfil the duty. Many would think otherwise. But I 
am against them for two reasons: First, as I have argued in section 4.3 of chapter 3, duties 
of minimal wellbeing are grounded in each individual's entitlement to live a human life; 
and they have this entitlement in virtue of the fact that they are human beings. Given the 
importance of this  entitlement  (and subsequently these duties),  I really cannot think of 
anything else that  can outweigh it.  Thus there  is  an absolute  priority  in  (non-trivially) 
benefiting those whose human life is not secured, such that it is secured for them, even if 
that  means reducing everyone else to  living a minimal  human life.  Second,  a minimal 
human life is actually not that minimal. As one shall see when I argue for the objects of 
duties of minimal wellbeing in chapter 7, even for individuals who live a minimal human 
life,  the following things  are  secured for them:  means  to  the satisfaction  of biological 
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needs, a certain level of education, physical security,  freedom of association, belief and 
expression, freedom of non-harmful conduct and not having so few resources such that 
they cannot pursue any goal or activity. On top of that, there are also duties of fairness and 
equality (as discussed in chapter 2), which fairly and equally distribute the burdens and 
benefits  of  the  schemes  of  cooperation  that  they happen to  be  participants  in.  Thus a 
minimal  human life is actually not very minimal.  Given these two reasons, it  therefore 
seems plausible that even if there are duties of minimal wellbeing that are so costly that 
fulfilling them involves reducing everyone else to live a minimal human life, we should 
still fulfil them.
But what if fulfilling the duty to that individual with multiple cancers is so costly, 
such that it would result in us being  unable to fulfil the duties of minimal wellbeing to  
other individuals? In such an extreme case, I do not think, unlike the above case, that we 
should  fulfil  the  duty to  that  individual  by default.  Rather,  we need to  adjudicate  the 
competing claims of all the concerned individuals; and what we should do in such cases, 
depends  on  the  result  of  the  adjudication.  However,  how  we  should  adjudicate  the 
competing claims of individuals in such extreme cases is a very difficult and tricky matter.
281 I cannot even pretend that I have an account of it in this thesis. I shall therefore bracket 
this  issue aside  for  further  research.  This  thesis  therefore proceeds under  the idealized 
assumption, that there are no individuals in the world where it is that extremely costly to 
fulfil our duties of minimal wellbeing to them.
3.3 – Sufficientarian Conception of Justice.
Although I have been talking in terms of entitlements and their fulfilment, I intend 
my human-life account of duties of minimal wellbeing to be a sufficientarian conception of 
justice.  Let  me  therefore  briefly  re-describe  the  above  in  terms  of  a  sufficientarian 
281 Miller 2007: 190-194 has an illuminating discussion on this issue. It is framed in terms of human rights, 
but most of it is relevant to the issue here, especially on why appealing to principles of distributive justice in 
such extreme cases is problematic. Another illuminating discussion on this issue, which is also framed in 
terms of rights, is Kamm 2007: 294-298.  
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conception of justice. The threshold for duties of minimal wellbeing is a level of wellbeing, 
under which an individual is not living a human life. This is grounded in the entitlement 
that all individuals, in virtue of the fact that they are human beings, are entitled to live a 
human life. Like other sufficientarian conceptions of justice,  e.g. the human flourishing 
account, we then ask what are the conditions that need to be fulfilled for individuals to 
have at least that level of wellbeing. The objects of duties of minimal wellbeing are then 
determined in the way I have described above.
But  these  objects  are  not  as  straightforward  as  the  conditions  that  need  to  be 
fulfilled for individuals to lead a human life. They are rather shaped by these conditions, 
together with various other considerations. Their complexity,  and the way to determine 
them that I have described above, must be borne in mind when I talk about them in chapter 
7. 
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Chapter 7
The Objects of Duties of Minimal Wellbeing
1. - Introduction.
In chapters 4 and 5, I argued for my Razian conception of wellbeing, and defended 
it  against  other  rival  accounts  of wellbeing.  In this  chapter,  I  shall  return to  duties  of 
minimal wellbeing, and determine what their objects are, under my human-life account.
Bearing  in  mind  their  complexity,  and  the  way to  determine  them that  I  have 
described in section  3 of chapter 6, I shall start by asking what are the conditions that need 
to be fulfilled for an individual to lead a human life. For the sake of clarity, I shall divide 
these conditions into three kinds, each grounded, in the first instance, in the three main 
constituents of a human life: The first kind is grounded in the satisfaction of biological 
needs (section 3), the second kind is grounded in the kind of agency that is involved in a 
human life (section 4), and the third kind is grounded in the pursuit of goals and activities 
(sections 5 to 7). For each of these kinds, we need to ask what exactly are the relevant 
conditions that need to be fulfilled, for an individual to lead a human life in that respect. 
Then we need to see how the other considerations, if any, bear on the conditions as they 
stand, before we can determine what exactly the objects of the corresponding duties of 
minimal wellbeing are.
2. - The Presumption of Equality.
Before I discuss the three kinds of conditions, and their corresponding objects of 
duties of minimal wellbeing, I would like to discuss a general requirement that needs to be 
borne in mind when I talk about them. This is what I call the ‘presumption of equality’, 
which states that whatever the objects of these duties are, the default position is to secure 
them equally for all individuals.282 
282 Cf. Miller 1998: 21-36. Miller argues for two different kinds of equality. The first kind specifies that 
justice requires the equal distribution of certain kinds of benefits; while the second kind identifies a social 
ideal in which people in a society regard and treat each other as equals. He calls the second kind of equality 
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By securing them equally for all individuals, I mean that all individuals are subject 
to the same distributive criteria; and insofar as resources are involved, they are secured 
equally for all individuals, as long as they are distributed to all individuals according to the 
same  criteria,  even  when  it  would  result  in  them  having  unequal  amounts  of  those 
resources. Take one of the objects as an example - securing education for individuals so 
that they are educated to a degree where they can be agents. This is secured equally for all 
individuals if that criterion is applied to all individuals, viz. that the resources for education 
are  distributed  in  such a  way that  each  individual,  with  his  own distributive  share,  is 
educated to the degree where he can be an agent. This might result in individuals having 
unequal amounts of resources. This is because individuals differ in their talents and innate 
abilities. Thus some might need a greater or a lesser share of the resources in order to be 
educated to the degree where they can be agents. Insisting on distributing equal amounts of 
resources would lead to the following two problems: First,  it  is possible that for some 
individuals, given their talents and innate abilities, an equal share of the resources would 
just not be enough for them to be educated to the degree where they could be agents. Since 
securing a human life for individuals involves ensuring that they are educated to a degree 
where they can be agents, we would then have failed to secure a human life for these 
individuals. And hence their entitlement to live a human would not be fulfilled. Second, if 
we increase the overall amount of resources devoted to education, so that we can set the 
equal amount of resources at a level where everyone is educated to the degree where they 
can be agents,  then it  might  be the case that  some individuals  would have a  share of 
resources  larger  than  needed  for  them  (given  their  talents  and  innate  abilities)  to  be 
'equality of status' or 'social equality' (Ibid: 23). Here, I am concerned with the first kind of equality. As one 
will see later in the discussion, my argument for equality here is an instance of what Miller calls 'manna-
from-heaven case' (Ibid: 25-26). This label is rather unfortunate when applied to my account, as it seems to 
suggest that the goods for securing a human life for individuals simply fall out from the sky. However, the 
essential idea is just that justice demands an equal distribution here because there are no relevant differences 
between individuals (ibid: 28), which in my case is the fact that they are all human beings. This also means 
that I see the first kind of equality as relating to equality of status (the second kind of equality) - not in the 
sense that is taken by Miller, which refers to social status (ibid: 31-33), but in a sense which refers to the 
status of being a human being.
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educated to the degree where they can be agents. If there are individuals whose entitlement 
to lead a human life is not fulfilled, and these extra resources can be diverted to fulfil their 
entitlement, then the equal distribution would in fact be unjust under my account. Thus by 
securing equally for all individuals the objects of duties of minimal wellbeing, I mean that 
all  individuals  should  be  subject  to  the  same  distributive  criteria  (in  the  sense  I  have 
described above), rather than distributing an equal amount of resources to all individuals. 
Conversely,  the  objects  of  duties  of  minimal  wellbeing  are  secured  unequally  for 
individuals, if individuals are subject to different distributive criteria. 
The rationale behind the presumption of equality is simply that if we look at the 
original argument for why there are such objects of duties of minimal wellbeing, we can 
see that it  does not support securing them unequally.283 Recall  that the objects of these 
duties  are  what  are  involved  in  securing  a  human  life  for  individuals.  Why  are  we 
concerned about that?  As I argued in chapter 3, if there is anything that individuals are 
entitled to in virtue of the fact that they are human beings, then they are entitled to live a 
human  life.  This  entitlement  of  theirs  is  fulfilled  when  a  human  life  is  secured  for 
individuals. Thus the argument for why there are such objects of these duties is this: First, 
individuals are human beings. Second, all human beings are entitled to live a human life.  
Third, this entitlement is fulfilled when a human life is secured for individuals. And fourth, 
the objects of these duties are what are involved in securing a human life for individuals. 
Given  that  that  is  the  argument,  the  only  way  that  it  can  support  an  unequal 
securing of the objects of duties of minimal wellbeing, is for something like the following 
283 Cf. Williams 1973: 230-249. To use his terms, I am trying to argue from equality based on common 
humanity – the equality of men as men - to equality in unequal circumstances – the distribution of goods in 
proportion to men's recognized inequalities. It is just that in my case, the goods of concern here are the 
objects of duties of minimal wellbeing, and men's recognized inequalities are their needs to lead a human life. 
I therefore disagree with Williams here that equality of men as men is an 'insufficient' claim (i.e. it cannot 
support claims that men should be equal in some substantive way which are expressed in statements of 
political principles or aims), at least with regard to duties of minimal wellbeing (ibid: 232). Besides 
inequality in needs, Williams also talks about the distribution of goods in proportion to men's recognized 
inequality of merit, i.e. equality of opportunity (ibid: 240-249). But my account of duties of minimal 
wellbeing does not necessarily result in that. This is because it only at most secures a minimal set of 
opportunities for all individuals. See section  5 to 7 of this chapter on access to goals and activities.
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to be true:
(a) Some individuals are more human or less human than other individuals, and therefore 
are entitled to live a more human or less human life than other individuals; thus more 
needs to be secured for those ‘more human’ individuals (who are entitled to live a 
more human life), while less needs to be secured for the others.
It is doubtful whether something like (a) can ever be true. There are two reasons for this:
First, as I have argued in section 4.3 of chapter 3, the concept of ‘living a human 
life’ is an all-or-nothing states of affairs. It is not a ‘degree concept’. That is to say, either 
one is living a human life or one is not. One is not living a human life when the life that  
one is living is partly a human life. If one is already living a human life, one cannot live a 
more human life. One can only make more out of the human life that one is living. But 
even if one makes more out of it, one is still living a human life. Thus it is not possible to  
live a more or less human life. It therefore follows that it is also not possible to be entitled 
to live a more or less human life.
Second, the same goes for the concept of ‘being a human being’. Either one is a 
human being or one is not. There are no degrees in being a human being.  If one is a  
gorilla, then one is not a human being. A gorilla cannot be more of a human being than a 
snake. If one is a human being, then one cannot be a more or less human being. Thus a 
mentally disabled human being is  not a lesser human being than a mentally fit  human 
being. Neither is a mentally fit human being a more human being than a mentally disabled 
human  being.  The  former  might  be  able  to  exercise  more  of  the  functions  that  are 
characteristic of human beings, than the latter. But all that means is that as human beings 
they have differing abilities, and the former happens to have more of the abilities that most  
other human beings have. This, however, does not detract from the fact that both of them 
are human beings. 
It is true that sometimes we say things like “this serial killer is less of a human 
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being than us”. But that does not seem to be a metaphysical claim, about how much the 
serial killer is a human being. Rather, it is an evaluative judgement that the serial killer has 
done something that no human beings could conceivably have done. And that evaluative 
judgement only has bite if that serial killer is as much a human being as we are.
Given the above two reasons, it is doubtful whether something like (a) can ever be 
true.  If that is the case,  then the argument  for why there are such objects of duties of 
minimal wellbeing does not support an unequal securing of them.
However, that is not to say that it is never justified to unequally secure the objects 
of duties of minimal wellbeing for individuals. I allow for the possibility that an unequal 
securing of them, on grounds other than the fact that individuals are human beings, and are 
entitled to  live a human life,  can be justified.  To give two examples:  An individual’s 
freedom of  non-harmful  conduct  might  be  restricted  as  a  form of  punishment.  Or  an 
individual’s  freedom of  expression  might  be  restricted,  because  of  the  possible  grave 
consequences that his expressions might lead to. An example of this is the expression of 
conservative nationalistic ideas in politically volatile situations. For every case of unequal 
securing, arguments must be brought forth and assessed. If the arguments justify it, then 
that specific case of unequal securing is at least permissible under my account.284 In the 
absence of any such justifiable arguments, given that the argument for the objects of duties 
of minimal wellbeing does not support an unequal securing of them, any unequal securing 
of them is therefore impermissible under my account. 
There  is  a  further  reason  for  the  presumption  of  equality.  This  concerns  the 
symbolic value in securing the objects  of duties of minimal  well-being.  Given that the 
argument for securing them concerns the fact that individuals are human beings, and are 
entitled to live human lives, equally securing them symbolises or represents the status of 
equality  between individuals.  One might  think that  even if  a  conception  of  justice  (of 
which duties of minimal wellbeing are a part) does not begin with, or is not ultimately 
284 This requires an account of reason. I intend to pursue this topic after the completion of my PhD Thesis. 
Page 168 of 222
grounded on, the idea of the status of equality between individuals, it must at least express,  
convey or aspire to that idea. As a result, to the extent that unequally securing them is 
justified on other grounds, insofar as it conveys or represents some individuals as more or 
less human beings than others (and therefore are entitled to live more or less human lives 
than others), such an unequal securing is not permissible under my account.285
2.1 – Equality of Welfare & Equality of Resources.
Note that when I argue for securing the objects  of duties of minimal  wellbeing 
equally for all individuals, I am not siding with those who endorse equality of welfare, in 
the debate between adherents of this position and those who endorse equality of resources.
286 In fact, my position has nothing to do with either view. This is because both of them 
start with the idea that the aim of justice is to secure equality in certain respects between 
individuals.  They simply disagree over what  is  the relevant  aspect  that  justice aims to 
equalize between individuals. For those who endorse equality of welfare, it is the welfare 
of individuals, while for those who endorse equality of resources, it is the resources that 
individuals have.287 My position, in contrast, does not start with the idea that the aim of 
justice is either to secure equality of welfare, or of resources, between individuals. Rather 
it starts with the idea that the aim of justice (at least from the perspective of duties of 
minimal wellbeing), is to secure a human life for all individuals, because all individuals (in 
virtue of the fact that they are human beings) are entitled to lead a human life. And it is 
285 One possible example of this is the recent incidents in the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. 
286 See Dworkin 2000: 11-119 for a detailed discussion on the two positions. Dworkin endorses equality of 
resources, and objects to equality of welfare. Rawls 1971 also endorses equality of resources, though he 
understands 'resources' in terms of what he calls primary goods, and 'equality' in terms of his difference 
principle (ibid: 60-62). Against this, Sen 1980 argues for equality of basic capability (ibid: 213-220). If we 
understand welfare simply as the quality of one's life, without committing to one specific account of what 
constitutes the quality of one's life, then Sen's position is a kind of equality of welfare (note that the kind of 
welfarism that he is attacking in ibid: 197-213 endorses a specific account of what constitutes the quality of 
one's life, namely utility understood hedonistically). For the relationship between capabilities and the quality 
of one's life, see Sen 1985 & 1993. Following Sen, Anderson 1999 argues for equality in more specifically 
the capabilities to function as equal citizens. A good criticism of Sen's  position is Cohen 1993. Pogge 2002a 
also defends equality of resources from Sen's position. Finally, there are other people that hold neither of the 
two positions. For example, Arneson 1989 defends equal opportunity for welfare. While Cohen  1989 
defends equal access to advantage.
287 Dworkin 2000: 12.
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because of this that the objects of duties of minimal wellbeing should be secured equally 
for all  individuals  (understood in the way I  discussed before).  Thus unlike equality of 
welfare and equality of resources, my position does not start with a conception of equality. 
Indeed,  my  position  falls  short  of  what  is  required  by  those  who  endorse  equality  of 
welfare. This is because, as discussed in chapter 3, my position is a sufficiency position. 
As long as a human life is secured for all individuals, it does not matter (from the point of 
view of duties of minimal wellbeing) that their welfare is unequal.288
3. - Conditions to Lead a Human Life #1: Satisfaction of Biological Needs.
With all this in mind, let me start with the first kind of condition for individuals to 
lead human lives. Since a human life refers to a level of wellbeing that is at least higher 
than  the  satisfaction  of  biological  needs,  it  follows  that  one  of  the  conditions  for  an 
individual to lead a human life is that his biological needs are satisfied. This refers to the 
satisfaction of more than merely those biological needs whose fulfilment prevents death. A 
human life does not only consist in not dying, but also in pursuing goals and activities (we 
can leave the agency part aside for now). Accordingly, the biological needs that have to be 
satisfied for an individual to lead a human life are those that are required for him to be a 
healthy enough human being (as given by our best biological theories) to be able to pursue 
goals and activities. 
However, even though the satisfaction of biological needs is one of the conditions 
for  an individual  to  lead  a  human life,  it  does  not  follow that  the object  of  duties  of 
minimal  wellbeing is securing the satisfaction of biological needs. Rather, the object is 
securing  the  means to  the  satisfaction  of  biological  needs.  This  is  because,  as  I  drew 
288 Cf. Frankfurt 1997: 21 & Crisp 2003: 757-758. Both of them hold what Casal calls the 'negative thesis' 
(2007: 296-303), according to which egalitarian concerns are not applicable in any way to individuals whose 
quality of life is at or above the sufficiency threshold (which in this case is leading a human life). However, 
unlike Frankfurt and Crisp, I do not hold that duties of minimal wellbeing exhaust the requirements of 
justice. There are also duties of fairness and equality, which are egalitarian (and fairness) concerns that are 
applicable to those who are at or above the sufficiency threshold. Thus unlike Frankfurt and Crisp, I do not 
think that justice is not concerned with the unequal welfare that individuals have, as long as they are at or 
above the sufficiency threshold, i.e. leading a human life.
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attention  to  earlier,289 some goals  and activities  require  a  temporary or  continued  non-
satisfaction of some biological needs, e.g. fasting for a political cause or being a Buddhist 
monk.  Securing  the  satisfaction  of  biological  needs  would  prevent  individuals  from 
pursuing these goals and activities. I shall argue in section 6 of this chapter that another 
object of duties of minimal wellbeing is that (barring what I call justice-violating goals and 
activities) individuals should not be prevented from pursuing all the goals and activities 
that are latent in the social form of the society in which they live. It follows that if the 
object of these duties is securing the satisfaction of biological needs, then they would be in 
conflict with those other duties of minimal wellbeing. The best way to resolve this conflict 
is to maintain that, with respect to the satisfaction of biological needs, the object of duties 
of minimal  wellbeing is securing the means for the satisfaction of biological  needs (as 
given by our best biological theories), so that individuals can be healthy human beings. I 
believe this  includes at  least  ensuring that individuals  have access to basic food, basic 
health, basic shelter and basic clothing etc.
4. - Conditions to Lead a Human Life #2: Agency.
The second kind of conditions for an individual to lead a human life is grounded in 
the kind of agency involved in a human life, which consists in three characteristics: being 
able to form ideas of what is worth doing, being able to revise them in light of further 
reasons, and being able to coordinate one’s action according to them. I believe that there 
are  three  conditions  for  individuals  to  lead  a  human  life  that  involves  such a  kind  of 
agency: education, physical security and freedom of belief, association and expression. For 
each  of  them,  I  shall  first  explain  why  they  are  so,  before  I  explain  what  their 
corresponding object of duties of minimal wellbeing are
289 In section 2 of chapter 4.
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4.1 - Education.
First, education: Education is needed for individuals to be reason-responsive, and to 
be able to distinguish what might be a reason for thinking that something is worth doing 
(and what is not). Education is also needed for individuals to interact with each other, i.e. 
for them to share the same language, and share a framework of thinking that is necessary 
for interactions etc. Accordingly, the corresponding object of duties of minimal wellbeing 
is securing education for individuals, so that they are educated to a degree where they can 
be agents. More specifically, they are to be educated to a degree where they can be reason-
responsive, and be able to distinguish between what might be a reason for thinking that 
something is  worth doing (and what  is  not).  Furthermore,  they can also without much 
trouble, if they were so educated, interact with other individuals who are also so educate.
4.2 - Physical Security.
Second, physical security: Individuals cannot be healthy human beings if they are 
murdered, raped, tortured, assaulted etc.; and arguably, they also cannot be healthy human 
beings when they are constantly threatened by such acts of violence. Thus ensuring that 
individuals  are free from such threats to their  physical  security is definitely one of the 
means for the satisfaction of their biological needs. However, once we realize that a human 
life is more than a biological life, and involves a kind of agency, this condition has an 
additional significance.
If individuals are constantly physically threatened, then they would spend most of 
their time and effort countering these threats. Thus they would have much less time and 
effort (or maybe even none at all) to get educated, interact with other people to form ideas 
of what is worth doing, let alone revise them in light of further reasons, and pursue goals  
and  activities  according  to  them.290 Indeed,  since  individuals  tend  to  refrain  from 
interacting with other people in physically insecure environments,  an environment  free 
290 A vivid description of the lives that individuals lead when they are constantly physically threatened is 
Hobbes' state of nature. See Hobbes 1996: 82-86 (chapter 13). 
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from threats to physical security is therefore needed for individuals to interact with other 
individuals, and become agents in the sense I have described.
Indeed, for individuals who are constantly physically threatened, the kind of goals 
or activities that they pursue (if they can still be said to be pursuing them), are goals and 
activities that are aimed at countering these physical threats. However, to the extent that a 
human life consists in pursuing goals and activities, we would not intuitively think that it  
solely consists  in  goals and activities  aimed specifically  at  preserving one’s life.  Thus 
threats to physical security, in fact, directly make an individual unable to live a human life.  
As one can see, it is not just with respect to the satisfaction of biological needs and agency 
that being free from threats to physical security is a condition for individuals to live a 
human life. It is also a more general condition for individuals to lead a human life. 
What is the corresponding object of duties of minimal wellbeing? Given that the 
role  of  physical  security  is  to  provide  a  stable  and  relatively  safe  environment  for 
individuals, so that they not only have the time and effort, but also are willing to interact 
with each other to form and revise their ideas of what is worth doing (rather than spending 
most of their time and effort trying to preserve their own lives), some trivial threats to 
physical security therefore do not matter at all, like the threat of your stepping on my toe in 
a very crowded bus. It is the more serious, severe and pervasive threats that matter, from 
the point of view of ensuring that individuals can be agents in the sense described - e.g. 
murder, mayhem, torture, rape, assaults, arbitrary detention and arrests, threats from the 
natural environment etc.291 Thus the corresponding object of duties of minimal wellbeing, is 
ensuring that individuals are free from such serious, severe and pervasive threats to their 
physical security.292
291 Some examples of threats from the natural environment are typhoons, tsunamis, earthquakes etc. Also cf. 
Shue 1996: 20-22. The threats that are covered by this duty of minimal wellbeing is more extensive than 
those that are covered by Shue's basic right to physical security, which only includes murder, torture, 
mayhem, rape and assault.
292 Of course, to the extent that it is possible to do so. This is because of the general constraint on the objects 
of duties of minimal wellbeing, that I have argued for in section 3.2 of chapter 6.  
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4.3 - Freedom of Belief, Association and Expression.
Third, freedom of belief, association and expression: Individuals form and revise 
their ideas of what is worth doing by interacting with other individuals and engaging in 
discursive practices about what is worth doing. For individuals to be able to do this, they 
have  to  be  able  to  associate  with  other  individuals,  and  express  their  convictions, 
commitments and beliefs.
However,  unlike  the  conditions  of  education  and  physical  security,  all  this 
condition tells us is that without freedom of belief, association and expression, individuals 
cannot be agents in the sense I have described, and therefore cannot in that respect lead a 
human life. It does not tell us exactly how much of these freedoms we should ensure for 
individuals.  Granted,  some  amount  of  these  freedoms  is  needed  for  individuals  to  be 
agents. It cannot be next to none. But should it be an x amount, or an x+1 amount? What is  
an x amount to start with? As one can see, this condition is one of those conditions where 
there are a number of ways to fulfil it. We therefore need to look at other considerations 
before we can determine its corresponding object of duties of minimal wellbeing.
Recall that a human life consists in having a level of wellbeing that is higher than 
the  level  where biological  needs  are  satisfied,  and this  is  constituted  by (among other 
things) the value of the goals and activities that individuals pursue. All other things being 
equal, goals and activities that are valuable contribute positively to the wellbeing of the 
individuals who pursue them, while other kinds of goals and activities don’t (see section 5 
in this chapter for the differing contribution, that goals and activities with different kinds of 
value have on the wellbeing of those who pursue them). This does not mean that one of the 
conditions for individuals to lead a human life is that they only pursue valuable goals and 
activities. In fact, as I shall argue later in section 6 of this chapter, one of the objects of 
duties  of  minimal  wellbeing,  is  that  individuals  should  be  allowed  to  pursue  all  the 
different kinds of goals and activities that are latent in the social form of the society in 
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which they live,  whether  they are valuable  or not,  unless they are what  I  call  justice-
violating goals and activities. Nevertheless, given the positive contribution that valuable 
goals and activities have on the wellbeing of those who pursue them, it would be most 
conducive to securing a human life for individuals to ensure that the goals and activities 
that they pursue are valuable.
Now, it seems to me that if reason-responsive individuals are free to interact with 
other  individuals,  and  are  free  to  express  their  convictions,  commitments  and  beliefs 
among themselves (in other words, have freedom of expression, belief and association), 
then most  probably the goals and activities that  they eventually pursue,  based on their 
revised ideas of what is worth doing, would be the ones that are indeed worth doing and 
therefore valuable. Furthermore, the more of these freedoms individuals have, the more 
likely  that  that  would  be  the  case.  This  is  similar  to  Mill’s  argument  for  freedom of 
expression, on the grounds that it provides a favourable environment for the discovery of 
truth.293 One might  object that this  Millian optimism is misplaced,  and that history has 
proved  otherwise.294 But  I  suspect  that  history  unfolded  against  the  Millian  optimism 
precisely because  individuals  either  were  not  educated  to  a  level  where they could be 
agents, or did not have extensive freedom of expression, belief and association (and indeed 
in certain cases, none at all). If that is the case, then it seems with respect to securing a 
human life for individuals, individuals should have the largest possible amount of freedom 
of expression, belief and association.
But  what  is  the  largest  possible  amount  of  freedom  of  expression,  belief  and 
association? Here we need to appeal to another consideration - the presumption of equality. 
It states that whatever the objects of duties of minimal wellbeing are, the default position is 
to  secure  them  equally  for  all  individuals.  Taking  all  these  different  considerations 
together,  the  corresponding  object  of  duties  of  minimal  wellbeing  is  to  ensure  that 
293 Mill 1974: 75-118.
294 For discussions on the Millian optimism, see Skorupski 2006: 78, 96-99 and Habibi 2001: 219-228.
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individuals have the largest amount of freedom of belief, association and expression that is 
compatible with all other individuals having that amount.295
4.4 – Summary: Agency.
I  therefore  submit  that  there  are  the  above  three  objects  of  duties  of  minimal 
wellbeing that are grounded (in the first instance) in the kind of agency that is involved in a 
human life. I admit that they are still rather vague. But I think this is inevitable given the 
nature of agency, viz. that it is a vague concept. Nevertheless, I believe my discussions in 
this  section  have  at  least  rendered  them concrete  and  substantial  enough  for  practical 
purposes.
5. - Conditions to Lead a Human Life #3: Access to Goals and Activities.
The third  kind of  condition  for  individuals  to  lead  human  lives  is  grounded in 
access  to goals and activities.  Since a human life  consists  in (among other things)  the 
pursuit of goals and activities, unless individuals have access to goals and activities, they 
cannot lead human lives. Thus access to goals and activities is one of the conditions for 
individuals to lead human lives. But like the condition of freedom of belief, expression and 
association, this condition as it stands does not tell us everything that we need to know to 
determine the corresponding object of duties of minimal wellbeing. We therefore need to 
look at other considerations as well.
To start with, we need to be clear on what are the goals and activities access to 
which we are considering here. Is it all the goals and activities from around the world? Or 
is  it  just  a  subset of them? The Razian conception  of wellbeing (which states  that  the 
wellbeing of individuals consists in, among other things, the pursuit of socially defined and 
determined goals and activities)  suggests that it  is not all  the goals and activities from 
around  the  world,  access  to  which  we are  considering  here.  Rather,  it  is  restricted  to 
295 Rawls also argues for this as part of his first principle of justice. See Rawls 1971: 60-91; 2001: 42-45.
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socially defined and determined goals and activities. In the following, allow me to explain 
what I mean by this, and why it should be restricted to such an extent.
By  socially  defined  and  determined  goals  and  activities,  I  refer  to  goals  and 
activities that are latent in the social form of the society in which the individual is living.296 
More specifically, they are:
• First,  goals  and  activities  that  are  widely  practised  in  the  society,  and  therefore  a 
constitutive part of the existing social form of that society;
• Second, goals and activities that are not widely practised in the society, but are based 
on the existing social form of that society.
• Third, goals and activities that are not practised in the society, but are intelligible given 
the existing social form of that society; and their practice is not incompatible with the 
continuation, and sustenance of, the existing social form of that society.
The third point requires two clarifications. First, a goal or activity is intelligible given the 
existing social form of a society, if by drawing on elements from the existing social form 
of that  society,  a story can be told as to the meaning and significance of that  goal or 
activity.297 This story might just draw on those elements as they stand; or it might creatively 
draw on them, by re-interpreting them in a way that is continuous with the existing social 
form of the society. Given that a goal or activity which has no meaning and significance is 
not a goal or activity that is a possible object of pursuit for individuals, we can therefore 
also formulate the following mark of intelligibility: A goal or activity is intelligible given 
the social form of a society when, if the goal or activity is introduced into that society, 
individuals of that society can see it as one of the possible objects of pursuit, as with other 
goals  or activities  that  are based on the social  form of that  society.  Second, given the 
importance of the existing social form of the society for the individuals who live in it (I 
296 Cf. chapter 4 nn. 175. my position here also echoes the communitarian thought that individuals are, in 
some sense, shaped by the society or community in which they live. A good discussion on this aspect of the 
communitarian position is Mulhall & Swift 1996: 13-18 & 40-126.
297 See chapter 4 nn. 179 for what I mean by the ‘meaning and significance’ of a goal or activity.
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shall be discussing this below – at least one aspect of this importance is that it gives the 
goals  and  activities  that  individuals  pursue  their  meanings  and  significances),  any 
introduction of new goals and activities into a society must therefore not be incompatible 
with  the  continuation  and sustenance  of  the  existing  social  form of  that  society.  Note 
though, by using the word ‘sustenance’, I do not imply that the social form of a society is 
static. I have discussed, in section 4.2 of chapter 4, the dynamic and reciprocal nature of 
social forms in societies. Thus the continuation and sustenance of an existing social form 
of a society, must be understood in light of the dynamic and reciprocal nature of social 
forms.298
The reason why the goals and activities in question are restricted to those that are 
latent in the social form of the society in which those individuals live, is because a goal or 
activity that is not latent in the social form of the society is not a possible object of pursuit 
for the individuals who live in that society. Recall that in section 2.2 of chapter 6, I argued 
that for all the goals or activities that are found in a society, there is a story to be told,  
among those who pursue those goals and activities, about what the meaning of those goals 
and activities is, and why they find them worth pursuing. And insofar as individuals come 
to  find  them worth  pursuing  because  they  believe  there  are  reasons  for  finding  them 
worthwhile in this way, these stories are or give the source of those reasons. However, 
what  these stories  appeal  to  are  in  fact  elements  that  constitute  the social  form of the 
society, in which the relevant individuals are living. Recall as an example, what Waldron 
says about norms (quoted in section 2.2 of chapter 6 earlier):
“… If, for example, I ask an elder of the group to which I belong why we have and 
follow a norm or monogamy, he may tell me a story about the need for reciprocity 
298 Note that the continuation and sustenance of an existing social form is only a pro tanto condition. This is 
because there might be some existing social forms that should not be continued or sustained. This might be 
for reasons of justice, as in their continuation and sustenance violate duties of minimal wellbeing. The social 
forms of Nazis is an example of this. Or it might be for moral reasons that are not related to justice, as in a 
social form that encourages individuals to frustrate each other. Or it might be for non-moral reasons, as in a 
social form that is inefficient. I take it that for the first kind of reasons, the condition is not required anymore. 
While for the second and third kind of reasons, it depends on how we weigh them with the condition. 
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and  equality  between  lovers  and  explain  why  this  is  difficult  or  impossible  in 
polygamous relationships, or he may tell me a story about the sun and the moon 
and about there being only one of each”.299 
As one can see, these stories can appeal to the shared beliefs of the society in which the 
relevant individuals live. In the above example, one such belief is the belief in the need for 
reciprocity  and  equality  between  lovers,  and  how  that  is  difficult  or  impossible  in 
polygamous  relationships.  Or  these  stories  appeal  to  the  folklore,  collectively  shared 
metaphors and imagination of that society: as in the above example, about the sun and the 
moon, and about there being only one of each. Given that the social form of a society 
consists  in  its  shared  beliefs,  folklore,  high  culture,  collectively  shared  metaphors  and 
imagination  etc.,300 these stories  therefore  in fact  appeal  to  elements  that  constitute  the 
social form of the society, in which the individuals concerned are living. If that is the case,  
and since these stories are the source of the meanings and significances of the goals and 
activities that are found in a society, it is fair to say that the meanings and significances of 
goals and activities that are found in a society, are given by the existing social form of that  
society. This is a claim I have discussed in section 4.1 of chapter 4.
Thus if we have a goal or activity that is not latent, in any of the above three senses, 
in the social form of the society in which a group of individuals live; then there is no story 
that can be told, by drawing on elements from the existing social form of that society, 
about the meaning and significance of that goal and activity. It therefore lacks a meaning 
and significance for those individuals and therefore is not a possible object of pursuit for 
them. A good example that illustrates this is the goal or activity of being an amateur race 
driver for those who live in the primitive tribes in the Amazon. 
Now, given that it is not a possible object of pursuit for those individuals, there is 
no  reason  to  consider  ensuring,  for  those  individuals,  access  to  that  goal  or  activity.  
299 Waldron 2000: 234.
300 Raz 1986: 311 See Section 4.1 of chapter 4 also. 
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Furthermore, there is a reason against it. This is because ensuring access to these goals and 
activities for individuals requires the use of resources, resources that can be diverted to 
better ensure, for those individuals, other goals and activities that are in fact latent in the 
social  form  of  the  society  in  which  they  live.  Thus  it  is  inefficient  to  ensure,  for 
individuals, access to goals and activities that are not latent in the social form of the society 
in  which  they  live.  As  a  result,  when  we  discuss  access  to  goals  and  activities  for 
individuals, we can focus only on those that are latent in the social form of the society in 
which those individuals live. Accordingly, in the rest of the thesis, unless otherwise stated, 
‘goals and activities’ shall be taken to refer to those that are latent in the social form of the 
society under consideration.301
I believe that there are two components to the condition of access to goals and 
activities:  formal  access  and  means  for  access.  Formal  access  refers  to  whether  an 
individual is allowed to pursue the goal or activity in question, whether or not he has the 
means to do so. Means for access refers to the resources that an individual will have to use 
in pursuing the goal or activity in question. By resources here, I do not just refer to all 
purpose resources. This is because there might be resources that are specific to a goal or 
activity, such that it is impossible for an individual to pursue that goal or activity without 
these  resources.  I  believe  formal  access  and means  for  access  are  both  necessary,  for 
individuals  to  pursue  the  goal  or  activity  in  question.  This  is  because  without  formal 
access,  an individual cannot pursue it,  even when he has the resources for pursuing it.  
Without the means for access, an individual also cannot pursue it, even when he is allowed 
to do so. For example, I cannot play football when I am prevented from doing so, even if I 
301 Note that I do not take the notion of latency to mean that societies need to have a reasonable range of goals 
and activities. Thus a society with a restricted social form, might just have a restricted range of goals and 
activities. Though I doubt that the range would be very restricted, given the third condition of latency. 
Nevertheless, I do not think that such societies are a cause of concern, as the range of possible objects of 
pursuit for those who live in those societies are also so restricted. But that is not to say that the range of goals 
and activities in such societies would or should never expand (recall my discussion on the dynamic and 
reciprocal nature of social forms). Rather, it is to say that the mere fact of having only a restricted range of 
goals and activities, because of the restricted social form of the society, is not in itself a reason for expanding 
its social form and its range of goals and activities.
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have a football and a pitch to play on. However, I also cannot play football, even when I 
am not prevented from doing so, if neither I nor my co-players have a football and an 
available pitch to play on. In the next sections, I shall first discuss formal access to goals 
and activities, before discussing the means for their access.
But before I do so, it might be beneficial to draw a distinction between different 
kinds  of  goals  and  activities,  and  the  differing  contributions  that  they  make  to  the 
wellbeing of individuals. This should be borne in mind in the subsequent discussion. There 
are five different kinds of goals and activities:
(a) Those that are valuable.
This means that they have a positive value. An example of this is being a pianist.
(b) Those that are dis-valuable.
This means that they have a negative value. This shall be discussed in the next section 
below.
(c) Those that are value-less.
This means that they do not possess any features or properties that can give them a 
value at  all.  An example of this  might be collecting pieces of mud for no apparent 
reason.
(d) Those that are of neutral value.
This means that their features or properties that give them a positive value, and their 
features  or  properties  that  give  them a  negative  value,  balance  each other  out.  An 
example of this might be the creation of an artwork with great value, that would destroy 
another piece of artwork that is of the same comparable value.
(e) Those that are of indeterminate value.
This means that their value is indeterminate.302 An example of this might be spending 
302 By something being indeterminate value, I mean it is indeterminate whether it is valuable, it is of disvalue, 
it is value-less or it is of neutral value. This is different and distinct from it being indeterminately more 
valuable, less valuable or of equal value when compared with another thing. 
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one’s life moving a hill from one place to another, for no apparent reason.303
Given that the wellbeing of an individual is fundamentally constituted by (among other 
things), his success in pursuing socially defined and determined goals and activities which 
are in fact valuable, it  follows that other things being equal, the following propositions 
corresponding to the above (a) to (e) are true: 
(a') If an individual pursues a goal or activity that is in fact valuable, then this contributes 
positively to his wellbeing.
(b') If an individual pursues a goal or activity that is dis-valuable,  then this contributes 
negatively to his wellbeing.
(c') If  an  individual  pursues  a  goal  or  activity  that  is  value-less,  then  this  contributes 
nothing to his wellbeing.
(d') If an individual pursues a goal or activity that is neutral in value, then this contributes 
nothing to his wellbeing. 
(e') If  an individual  pursues a goal or activity that  is  of indeterminate value,  then it  is 
indeterminate  whether  it  contributes  negatively,  positively  or  not  at  all  to  his 
wellbeing.
6. - Conditions to Lead a Human Life #3a: Formal Access to Goals and Activities.
The focus of this section is on formal access to goals and activities, which is one of 
the two components of access to goals and activities. I shall argue that besides what I call 
‘justice-violating goals and activities’, individuals should be allowed to pursue all the goals 
and activities that are latent in the social form of the society in which they live. This is 
because although we can, and indeed should, persuade them to pursue certain goals and 
303 I take it that there are three kinds of indeterminacy here: epistemological indeterminacy, semantic 
indeterminacy and ontic indeterminacy. I leave it open as to which kind of indeterminacy the above example 
falls under. If we will never be in the epistemic position to know its value, then it is epistemically 
indeterminate. If it is our concept of ‘value-making feature’ that is indeterminate, as to whether the effort 
required in moving a hill from one place to the next, is an instance of it, then it is semantically indeterminate. 
If it is indeterminate whether or not the effort required in moving a hill from one place to the next is a value-
making feature of this activity, then it is ontically indeterminate. For a discussion of these three kinds of 
indeterminacy, and the relationships between them, see Merricks 2001.
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activities (or not pursue certain goals and activities), because of the value of those goals 
and activities, individuals should not be coerced, conditioned or manipulated to pursue (or 
not pursue) them. As I shall argue and explain in the conclusion of this section, I take all 
this to basically amount to securing for individuals freedom of non-harmful conduct. I shall 
explain what exactly I mean by this freedom in the conclusion also.
6.1 – Justice-violating Goals and Activities.
Justice-violating goals and activities are goals and activities that are dis-valuable, 
because of a special kind of moral reason, i.e. they violate duties of minimal wellbeing,  
and therefore deprive other individuals of their entitlement to lead a human life. Examples 
of these goals and activities are terrorism, kidnapping, genocide etc.
As one would recall,  the objects of duties of minimal wellbeing are whatever is 
involved in securing a human life for individuals. And the function of these duties is to 
fulfil  individuals’  entitlement  to live a human life,  by securing a human life for them. 
Furthermore, these duties are not concerned with fulfilling this entitlement for only some 
individuals, but not others. Rather, they are concerned with fulfilling this entitlement for all 
individuals, in virtue of the fact that they are all human beings, and therefore each of them 
is  entitled  to  live  a  human  life  (recall  my  discussion  on  the  presumption  of  equality 
requirement in section 2 of this chapter). Accordingly, if certain goals and activities violate 
these duties (and therefore deprive other individuals of their entitlement to lead a human 
life), then these duties should also prevent the pursuit of these goals or activities, in order 
to  fulfil  the entitlement  of  those,  who otherwise  would have been deprived by others' 
pursuit of these goals and activities. As a result, that part of the object of duties of minimal 
wellbeing that corresponds to the condition of access to goals and activities should include 
the restriction that individuals should be prevented from pursuing dis-valuable goals and 
activities, when these are dis-valuable because they violate duties of minimal wellbeing.
Note however,  that not all  dis-valuable goals and activities are justice-violating. 
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Goals and activities can be dis-valuable for other moral reasons (as in the goal of making 
everyone  around you  miserable),  or  for  other  non-moral  reasons  (as  in  the  activity  of 
destroying artworks that belong to no one). Since these goals and activities do not violate 
duties of minimal wellbeing, it follows that the reasons for preventing individuals from 
pursuing justice-violating goals and activities  do not apply to these other kinds of dis-
valuable goals and activities.
6.2 – Any Further Restrictions on Pursuing Goals and Activities?
Excluding justice-violating goals and activities, we are now left with the following 
kinds of goals and activities: the remaining dis-valuable ones (those that are dis-valuable 
for reasons other than because they violate duties of minimal wellbeing), value-less ones, 
those with indeterminate value, those with neutral value and valuable ones. Given that a 
human life consists in having a level of wellbeing that is higher than the satisfaction of 
biological needs, where this is constituted by the pursuit of goals and activities with a sense 
of what is worth doing, and given the differing contribution that the various kinds of goals 
and activities have on the wellbeing of the individuals who pursue them (see section 5 
above), one might think that individuals should only be allowed to pursue valuable goals 
and activities, and prevented from pursuing the other kinds of goals and activities.
However, I believe this is a mistake. To start with, only pursuing valuable goals 
and activities, and not pursuing the other kinds, is not necessary for individuals to have a 
level of wellbeing that is higher than the satisfaction of biological needs. Thus it is not a 
condition for individuals to lead a human life. Insofar as individuals are allowed to pursue 
valuable goals and activities, they can have a level of wellbeing that is higher than the 
satisfaction of their biological needs even if they are not prevented from pursuing the other 
kinds  of  goals  and  activities.  For  example,  as  long  as  Tom  is  allowed  to  do  more 
productive  activities,  he  can  still  have  a  level  of  wellbeing  that  is  higher  than  the 
satisfaction of biological needs, even if he is not prevented from sitting at home and do 
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nothing  at  all.  This  is  because  presumably  he  can  engage  in  these  more  productive 
activities, and if we assume that such activities are valuable, he can thereby have a level of 
wellbeing  that  is  higher  than  the  satisfaction  of  biological  needs.  Thus  as  long  as 
individuals are allowed to pursue valuable goals and activities, it is not the case that if 
individuals are not prevented from pursuing the remaining kinds, then they cannot have a 
level of wellbeing that is higher than the satisfaction of biological needs. 
Of course, in a world where individuals, on top of being allowed to pursue valuable 
goals and activities, are not prevented from pursuing the other kinds, it might be the case 
that their level of wellbeing is lower than if they had been prevented from doing so. This is 
because  in  such a  world,  not  every goal  or  activity  that  they choose to  pursue  would 
contribute positively to their wellbeing. However, it does not follow from this that they 
cannot have a level of wellbeing that is higher than the satisfaction of biological needs, as 
long as they are allowed to pursue valuable goals and activities. As one can see, it is not a  
condition for individuals to lead a human life that they should only be allowed to pursue 
valuable goals and activities, and prevented from pursuing the other kinds. 
6.3 – Against Further Restrictions on Pursuing Goals and Activities.
Furthermore, it is not just that it is not a condition for individuals to lead a human 
life. In fact, there are reasons against it. In the following, I shall consider three arguments 
against it. Although I endorse the first and the second one, they are not as strong as the 
third. However, I shall argue against the usual way of proceeding with the third argument, 
and argue for an alternative approach to it.
6.3.1 – The Argument from Dis-heartedness.
The  first  argument  draws  on one  of  the  elements  in  the  Razian  conception  of 
wellbeing – dis-heartedness. As I argued in section 6 of chapter 4, when one pursues goals 
and  activities  dis-heartedly  (that  is,  with  one  or  other  of  the  following  attitudes: 
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pathological  self-doubt,  lack  of  self-esteem,  self-hatred  and  resentment),  one  is  not 
pursuing them in the relevant sense that contributes to one's wellbeing. In section 2.3 of 
chapter 6, I further explained why this is the case, by arguing that since these negative 
attitudes, that constitute dis-heartedness, undermine the kind of agency that is involved in 
leading a human life, individuals who are pursuing goals and activities dis-heartedly are 
not pursing them in a way that involves the kind of agency characteristic of a human life - 
with a sense of what is worth doing. Accordingly, an individual who dis-heartedly pursues 
goals and activities is not leading a human life. If that is the case, and if only allowing 
individuals to pursue valuable goals and activities, and preventing them from pursuing the 
remaining kinds,  would result  in  them pursuing goals and activities  dis-heartedly,  then 
there is a reason against it. Doing so would not be securing a human life for individuals, 
contra the function of duties of minimal wellbeing. 
It  does  seem plausible  to  suggest  that  by preventing  individuals  from pursuing 
certain goals and activities, it can result in individuals pursuing goals and activities dis-
heartedly, for it can lead to resentment. This is especially the case when individuals are 
prevented from pursuing the goals and activities that they want to pursue. In such cases, 
individuals would most probably not identify themselves with the goals and activities that 
they are pursuing. This is because from their  perspective,  not only are these goals and 
activities not what they want to pursue, they also would not have pursued them, had they 
not been prevented from pursuing those that they want to pursue. Indeed, even if the ones 
that an individual wants to pursue happen to be the ones that they are not prevented from 
pursuing, the mere knowledge that they would be prevented from pursuing other goals or 
activities had they happened to have wanted to would most probably also lead to feelings 
of resentment of a more general form – the person would not identify with the state that he 
is in (just imagine, for example, that you do not want to leave the house today, but you still  
know that someone is outside to force you back into the house had you wanted to leave). If 
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that is the case, then according to my above argument, individuals should not be allowed to 
only  pursue  valuable  goals  and  activities,  and prevented  from pursuing  the  remaining 
kinds.  This  is  because  doing  so  would  definitely  involve  preventing  individuals  from 
pursuing certain goals and activities. 
The problem that I have with this argument is that one must not exaggerate the 
plausible  point  here.  It  does  not  seem to  be the case that  preventing  individuals  from 
pursuing certain goals and activities  would  necessarily result  in them feeling resentful. 
There are means to prevent  this  that would not result  in them feeling resentful - as in 
education  and  (if  that  fails)  subtle  manipulation  in  contrast  to  forceful  intervention. 
Furthermore, particular individuals might not feel resentful to start with (maybe because of 
their ignorance, lack of awareness, insensitivity, or just their cheerful temperament), even 
when they are subject to restrictions on pursuing certain goals and activities, restrictions 
that would ‘normally’ lead to resentment. Thus at most, it is probably the case that when 
individuals are prevented from pursuing certain goals and activities, they would be dis-
hearted.  But if that is the case, then it does not rule out all instances of only allowing 
individuals to pursue valuable goals and activities, and preventing them from pursuing the 
remaining kinds. It really depends on whether that particular instance happens to result in 
dis-heartedness. Thus one can still argue, despite the above objection, that we should still  
only allow individuals  to  pursue  valuable  goals  and activities,  and prevent  them from 
pursuing  the  remaining  kinds,  unless  in  this  particular  case  doing  so  would  result  in 
resentment.
Indeed,  one  can  even  argue  that,  given  the  significance  of  valuable  goals  and 
activities  on  the  wellbeing  of  those  who  pursue  them,  we  should  try  to  modify  what 
potentially resentful  individuals  feel through manipulation or conditioning,  so that  they 
would not feel resentful anymore. We would then have the best of both worlds. However, 
this seems to fly in the face of our intuitions. I conclude that the above argument focused 
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on dis-heartedness is not a good argument against the claim that individuals should only be 
allowed to pursue valuable goal and activities, and prevented from pursuing the remaining 
kinds.
6.3.2 – The Argument from Overlapping Consensus.
The  second  argument  concerns  my  commitment  to  justificatory  thinness.  This 
commitment is grounded in what I take as a basic requirement: that we need to be able to 
justify  a  theory  of  global  justice  to  everyone  around  the  world.304 To  reflect  the 
heterogeneity of such an exercise of justification,  I  have taken something like Rawls’s 
overlapping consensus as a working model. According to it, we are able to justify a theory 
of  global  justice  to  everyone around the world if  the theory could be agreed upon by 
individuals  who  hold  different  and  incompatible,  but  reasonable,  comprehensive 
conceptions of the good. I argued that the less rich, and the less pervasive, the concepts are 
in a theory of justice,  the more probable that such an overlapping consensus would be 
achieved with regard to that theory of justice. Indeed, one of my arguments for my human-
life account of duties of minimal wellbeing is that it involves less rich and deep concepts 
than the human flourishing account. It is superior to the human flourishing account with 
regard to this commitment. However, one might think that we need to appeal to deep, rich 
and pervasive concepts to distinguish whether a goal or activity is valuable, dis-valuable 
yet not justice-violating, value-less, of neutral value or of indeterminate value. If that is the 
case, then to preserve my commitment to justificatory thinness, and indeed the superiority 
of my human-life account over the human flourishing account, my account should refrain 
from trying to distinguish between the kinds of value that different goals and activities 
have. Thus it should not require that individuals are only allowed to pursue valuable goals 
and activities, but prevented from pursuing the remaining kinds. This is because this would 
certainly involve distinguishing the kinds of value that different goals and activities have.
304 See section 2.1 of chapter 1. Cf. Rawls 1996: 133-172 & 2001: 32-38.
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I endorse this argument as a general strategy. However, I believe that it has two 
weaknesses. First, it is not at all clear that distinguishing the kinds of values that goals and 
activities have  necessarily requires appealing to deep, rich and pervasive concepts. Take 
the example of going out of your way to help people in need. It is definitely a valuable 
thing to do. However, explaining why that is the case does not seem to require appealing to 
deep, rich and pervasive concepts.  The fact that one goes beyond the call  of duty,  and 
incurs great sacrifices, to help others in need, can already sufficiently explain why it is a 
valuable thing to do. Second, even if  distinguishing the kinds of values that goals and 
activities have did necessarily require appealing to deep, rich and pervasive concepts, one 
might  think  that  with  regard  to  certain  goals  and  activities,  there  is  such  widespread 
agreement  on their  value  that  it  would  not  be objectionable  to  ensure  that  individuals 
pursue them (if they are valuable), or to prevent individuals from pursuing them (if they 
are  dis-valauble).  Take,  for  example,  producing  creative  works.  There  seems  to  be 
widespread agreement that it is a valuable thing to do. However, explaining why that is the 
case  seems  to  require  appealing  to  deep,  rich  and  pervasive  concepts.  For  example, 
concepts  like  spontaneity,  diversity,  transcending  the  common  and  the  accepted  seem 
necessary. Yet there is widespread agreement on the value of producing such works. As a 
result, insofar as there are goals and activities that fall into these two kinds of cases, then 
the above justificatory thinness argument will be limited in scope – it does not apply to all 
goals and activities.
6.3.3 – The Argument from Respect.
One of the most often-cited arguments against preventing individuals from acting 
in a way that they want, unless they are in some sense harming other individuals, is the 
respect  that  we should have for individuals.  As Nussbaum says  with regard to  human 
flourishing, “Even if we feel that we know what a flourishing life is, and that a particular 
function plays an important role in it, we do not respect people when we dragoon them into 
Page 189 of 222
this functioning. We set the stage and, as fellow citizens, present whatever arguments we 
have in favour of a given choice; then the choice is up to them.”305 Thus accordingly, even 
if we know for sure which goals and activities are valuable and which ones are not, and 
their  significance  on  the  wellbeing  of  those  who  pursue  them,  it  is  disrespectful  to 
individuals  to only allow them to pursue the valuable ones,  and to prevent  them from 
pursuing the other kinds, regardless of what they choose to pursue. We can try to persuade 
them to only pursue the valuable ones. But we cannot prevent them from pursuing the 
other  kinds,  and  only  allow  them  to  pursue  the  valuable  ones.  Doing  so  would  be, 
according to the argument, disrespectful to individuals.  
The difficulty with this argument is in explaining what this respect to individuals 
amounts to, and the rationale for this respect. One common way to do so is to appeal to the 
idea of autonomy. According to it, an autonomous individual is an individual who lives his 
life according to his own free choices.306 As a result, if he freely chooses to pursue a goal 
or activity that is not valuable, we should not prevent him from doing so. This is because if 
we were to prevent him, then he would not be living his life according to his own free 
choices,  and this  would  be contrary to  the  idea of  autonomy.  Accordingly,  we should 
therefore not allow individuals to only pursue valuable goals and activities, and prevent 
them from pursuing the remaining kinds.
My  concern  with  the  autonomy-based  argument  from  respect  is  not  that  it  is 
incorrect.  I  believe it  can adequately support what I  am trying to  argue for.  However, 
nowhere in my human-life account, can I ground this argument from respect based on the 
idea  of  autonomy.307 To  start  with,  since  human  beings  are  biological  beings,  the 
satisfaction of biological needs contributes positively to our wellbeing whether or not we 
305 Nussbaum 2000: 87-88.
306 See, for example, Raz 1986: 369-372. 
307 As Raz says with regard to his account of wellbeing, “The fact that our self-interest, and more generally, 
what counts towards our well-being, is to a considerable extent determined by our own actions, does not 
presuppose free or deliberate choice of options. To be sure our well-being is not served by projects we are 
coerced into unless we come willingly to embrace them. But not everything we willingly embrace is 
something we have freely or deliberately chosen from among various alternative open to us” (Raz 1986: 
369).
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choose it, as long their non-satisfaction is not constitutive of the goals or activities that we 
are pursuing.308 Furthermore, as I argued earlier,309 the human-life account does not imply 
that individuals pursue goals and activities only because they have chosen them as a result 
of deliberation. Rather, they might pursue them out of habit or entrenched daily routines, 
or because in the environment in which they were brought up, such goals and activities are 
usually or expected to be pursued. None of these necessarily involve acts of free choice. It 
does seem true that being able to make free choices, and to lead one’s life according to 
them, might be conducive to pursuing goals and activities whole-heartedly. But it does not 
seem to be necessary to it, such that one cannot pursue goals and activities whole-heartedly 
if one is not able to make free choices and lead one’s life according to them. Indeed, as one 
can see from my discussion in section 6.3.1 of this chapter, individuals can pursue goals 
and  activities  whole-heartedly  even  when  they  are  subject  to  manipulation  and 
conditioning. It is true that under my account, if individuals were to reflect on the goals 
and activities that they are pursuing, then they could offer what they believe are reasons 
that count in favour of finding those goals or activities worth doing. But this does not mean 
that they can only so if they have freely chosen to pursue them. An individual who was 
brought up as a strict Christian can have no trouble offering reasons why one should go to 
the church on Sundays, even if he had never freely chosen to be a Christian. It is also true 
that under my account, individuals are able to revise their ideas of what is worth doing in 
light of further reasons that are brought to their attention, and are able to coordinate their 
actions according to their ideas of what is worth doing. In this sense, one can say that they 
make free choices. But that notion of ‘free choice’ is narrower than the notion as it is used 
in the idea of autonomy, which  includes not just freedom from one’s appetites and desires, 
but also freedom from external impediments and certain external influences. Indeed, it is 
this latter  sense of free choice that makes the idea of autonomy such a good argument 
308 As I discussed in section 2 of chapter 4. 
309 In section 5.1 of chapter 4. 
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against preventing individuals from acting in a way that they want, unless they are in some 
sense harming other individuals. As one can see, the elements in my human-life account of 
duties  of minimal  wellbeing that  might  seem to ground this  idea of autonomy,  cannot 
actually do so. 
Of course, I can import this idea of autonomy into my account by arguing that it is 
an  external  side-constraint  when  deriving  the  objects  of  duties  of  minimal  wellbeing. 
However,  since  the idea  of  autonomy is  a  very rich  and pervasive  concept,  given my 
commitment to justificatory minimalism and justificatory thinness, I am reluctant to import 
(in any way) this idea of autonomy into my account. The challenge then is to look for 
another line of argument against allowing individuals to only pursue valuable goals and 
activities, and preventing them from pursuing the remaining kinds.
6.3.4 – A Better Argument from Respect.
Although  I  am reluctant  to  embrace  the  idea  of  autonomy,  I  do  think  that  the 
argument  from respect heads in the right direction.  As I discussed earlier,310 there is  a 
requirement of what I called 'respecting the individual as someone who leads a human 
life‘. This requirement constrains the ways in which the conditions for individuals to lead a 
human  life  are  secured  for  them.  Individuals  who live  a  human  life  are  not  mindless 
entities. They are not plants living a plant life, if plants can be said to live a life at all. 
Individuals who live a human life have a mind of their own. They are aware of their own 
existence, the existence of other individuals, and the world around them. They have their 
own thoughts and judgements on the relationship between them, other individuals and the 
world. In other words, they are agents in some sense. But if individuals who live a human 
life are agents, then we need to respect them as agents. Since individuals who live a human 
life are not mindless entities, there are constraints on how we treat them, that are grounded 
in this  feature  of  theirs.  Violating these constraints  amounts  to  not  respecting  them as 
310 In section 3.1 of chapter 6.
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agents. Such constraints do not exist, on the other hand, for plants living a plant life. Thus 
tying a plant to a pole in order to make it grow in a certain direction does not amount to 
dis-respecting that plant, yet  it would be dis-respectful to an individual (who is an agent), 
if we mould his life in a certain direction. What these constraints exactly are, and therefore 
what  it  means  to  respect  someone  as  an  agent,  depends  on  the  account  of  agency in 
question; and I shall discuss this in the next paragraph. For now, I would like to draw 
attention to the fact that since we are securing a human life for individuals, if individuals 
who lead  human lives  need to  be respected  as  agents,  then  securing  a  human  life  for 
individuals  also  involve  respecting  them as  agents.  This  is  because  otherwise,  not  all 
aspects of a human life are secured for individuals.  As a result, there is this requirement of 
‘respecting the individual as someone who leads a human life’, when we are determining 
the objects of duties of minimal wellbeing. 
But what does this requirement of respect amount to?311 As I have argued earlier, a 
human  life  involves  a  kind of  agency that  I  have  characterized  as  pursuing goals  and 
activities with a sense of what is worth doing. Someone living a human life is able to form 
ideas of what is worth doing, is able to revise them, and is able to coordinate their actions 
according to them. Thus individuals who lead a human life are individuals who (a) have 
what they believe are reasons why something is worth doing (or not worth doing), (b) are 
able to revise those reasons in light of other reasons brought to their attention, and (c) are 
able  to  coordinate  their  actions  according  to  those  reasons.  If  that  is  the  case,  then 
respecting  such  individuals  involves  addressing  them  in  terms  of  the  reasons  why  
something is worth (or not worth) doing, when we try to modify their behaviour. In doing 
so, we are trying to modify their behaviour through their ability to revise, in light of further 
reasons, the reasons that they believe they have for why something is worth doing (or not 
worth  doing),  and  through  their  ability  to  coordinate  their  actions  according  to  those 
311 The following argument is inspired by a version of the objection that punishment, understood in terms of 
deterrence, treats people merely as means and not as ends. See Duff 1986: 178-186.
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revised reasons. Thus we are recognizing that they are individuals with the above features 
(a)-(c). To the extent that we are not doing so, we are then not recognizing them as having 
the above features:  we are not trying to modify their behaviour through their ability to 
revise their reasons, and subsequently their actions, in light of further reasons. In sum, we 
do not respect people as people unless we, when trying to modify their behaviour, address 
them in terms of the reasons why something is worth (or not worth) doing.
One  might  wonder  why  it  has  to  be  specifically  in  terms  of  the  reasons  why 
something is worth (or not worth) doing, that we need to address individuals, rather than 
just any kind of reason that would motivate him to change his behaviour. For example, 
Tom might try to manipulate Sam to do something, e.g. donate money to charity, by telling 
Sam falsely that his mother would be very happy if he did it, knowing that Sam really 
wants his mother to be happy. Or Tom might try to manipulate Sam to do it by telling him 
that if he does not do it, then Tom will kill him. In both of these cases, Tom is trying to 
modify Sam’s behaviour by offering him reasons: they are are not reasons why something 
is worth (or not worth doing), but nevertheless they are reasons that would motivate Sam to 
change his behaviour. And this is done in recognition of the fact, that Sam is able to revise 
his reasons for why something is worth (or not worth) doing in light of these reasons, and 
coordinate his actions accordingly. Thus it seems he is recognizing Sam as an individual 
with the above (a) to (c) features, even though he is not addressing Sam specifically in 
terms of the reasons why something is worth (or not worth) doing. 
However, if we look at the above two cases closely, we can see that something is 
amiss in Tom’s recognition of Sam’s ability to revise his reasons why something is worth 
(or not worth) doing, in light of further reasons, and coordinate his actions accordingly. 
Presumably Tom is trying to make Sam donate money to the charity because he believes 
that there are justified reasons why it is worth doing (e.g. donating money to charity helps 
to alleviate global poverty). But if that is the case, and if Tom fully recognises Sam as 
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having  those  abilities,  then  (from Tom’s  perspective)  bringing  Sam’s  attention  to  the 
justified reasons that he has for donating money is more than enough to modify Tom’s 
behaviour. In addressing Sam in terms of other kinds of reason that would motivate him to 
change his behaviour, Tom shows that he does not fully recognise Sam’s ability to revise 
his reasons and actions in light of those justified reasons. The message that is conveyed by 
Tom when he addresses Sam in those terms is  this:  Since Sam is unable to revise his 
reasons in light of certain justified reasons, but insofar as he has the rudimentary ability to 
revise them in light of some reasons, and coordinate his actions accordingly, I shall resort 
to offering him (and indeed creating for him) any kind of reason that would best secure a 
modification in his behaviour through this rudimentary ability of his. Since the ability to 
revise one’s reasons in light of further reasons includes the ability to revise them in light of 
justified reasons, in addressing Sam in terms of other kinds of reasons that would motivate 
him to change his behaviour, Tom is not fully recognizing Sam’s reasoning ability – his 
ability to revise his reasons in light of further  justified  reasons. Indeed, especially in the 
first  case,  insofar  as Tom is  trying  to  make Sam donate money to charity  because he 
believes that there are justified reasons why it is worth doing, there is a sense of dishonesty 
and deception when he does not address Sam in terms of those justified reasons. 
Notice that it is not just in cases of manipulation which involves false reasons, or 
the creation of prudential reasons, that the manipulator is not fully recognizing the ability 
of the manipulated to revise his reasons, in light of further reasons, and coordinate his 
actions accordingly. Imagine that this time Tom, rather than addressing Sam in terms of 
what Tom believes are justified reasons for donating money to charity, manipulates Sam to 
donate money to charity by offering him justified reasons for doing some other things, 
such that  when Tom does  those things,  he  would  unwittingly  have  donated  money to 
charity  (imagine,  as  an example,  Tom asks  Sam to join Sam's  favourite  football  club, 
which unknown to Sam, donates a substantial amount of its received membership fees to 
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charities). Here Tom is also not fully recognizing Sam’s ability to revise his reasons in 
light of other reasons, and coordinate his actions accordingly. The specific part that Tom is 
not recognizing here is Sam’s ability to revise his reasons in light of the justified reasons 
for  donating  money  to  charity.  This,  as  I  have  pointed  out  earlier,  is  part  of  Sam’s 
supposed ability to revise his reasons for why something is worth (or not worth) doing, in 
light of further reasons, and coordinate his actions accordingly. Similarly, as in the above 
first cases, there is also a sense of dishonesty and deception in this case, insofar as Tom is 
trying to make Sam donate money to charity because he believes that there are justified 
reasons why it is worth doing.
As the above discussion of the three cases has shown, insofar as one addresses 
another individual who lives a human life in terms other than the reasons why something is 
worth (or  not  worth)  doing when one tries  to  modify his  behaviour,  one fails  to  fully 
recognize an ability of his: the ability to revise his reasons why something is worth (or not 
worth) doing, and coordinate his actions accordingly. As a result, respecting individuals 
who live a human life involves addressing them in terms of the reasons why something is 
worth (or not worth) doing, when we try to modify their  behaviour, rather than just in 
terms  of  any  kind  of  reasons  that  would  motivate  him  to  change  his  behaviour. 
Accordingly, this is what the requirement of ‘respecting individuals as someone who leads 
a human life’ amounts to.
If  that  is  the  case,  then  the  problem with  allowing  individuals  to  only  pursue 
valuable goals and activities, and preventing them from pursuing the remaining kinds, is 
that  it  violates  this  requirement.  We  are  definitely  in  the  business  of  modifying  the 
behaviour of individuals,  when they are only allowed to pursue the valuable ones, and 
prevented from pursuing the remaining kinds. Given the significance that the value of the 
goals and activities that individuals pursue has for their wellbeing, it  seems justifiable to 
require that they only pursue the valuable ones and not the remaining kind. However, it  
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also involves manipulating individuals. This can range from conditioning individuals to 
only pursue the valuable ones, to making it physically impossible for them to pursue the 
remaining kinds (e.g. tying them up). In these cases, we are not even attempting to address 
individuals in terms of reasons, let alone reasons why something is worth (or not worth) 
doing. Indeed, in cases of conditioning, where I have in mind as a paradigmatic example 
the reformative process that Alex went through in Stanley Kubrick’s ‘Clockwork Orange’, 
individuals are unable to coordinate their actions based on their ideas of what is worth 
doing. Thus they are not just dis-respected, they are also deprived of the kind of agency 
that is involved in a human life. And thus because of the conditioning, they cannot live a 
human life. But preventing individuals from pursuing the remaining kinds of goals and 
activities, and only allowing them to pursue the valuable ones, can also involve other kinds 
of manipulation. Just like the above three cases with Tom, it can range from providing 
people with false reasons, to providing them with justified reasons for something else, that 
would  unwittingly  lead  them to  change  their  behaviour,  and  to  issuing  them coercive 
threats (creating prudential reasons). As I have argued in the above discussion of the three 
cases with Tom, such kinds of manipulation, though they address individuals in terms of 
reasons, nevertheless do not respect individuals, because the relevant individuals are not 
addressed in terms of the reasons why something is worth (or not worth) doing. In other 
words, preventing individuals from pursuing the remaining kinds of goals and activities, 
and only allowing them to pursue the valuable ones, is forbidden by the requirement of 
‘respecting individuals as someone who leads a human life’.
6.4 – Summary: Formal Access to Goals and Activities.
In conclusion: This requirement of ‘respecting individuals as someone who leads a 
human life’ places severe constraints on the ways in which the condition of formal access 
to goals and activities can be secured for individuals. Given the significance that the value 
of the goals and activities  that individuals  pursue has on their  wellbeing,  I believe we 
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should try to modify the behaviour of individuals so that they pursue valuable goals and 
activities  and do not pursue the remaining kinds.  But  given this  requirement,  the only 
permissible way for us to do so is persuasion. This is because persuasion is the only way of 
trying  to  modify  people’s  behaviour  that  addresses  them in  terms  of  the  reasons  why 
something is worth (or not worth) doing. 
However,  one  must  note  that  this  requirement  does  not  extend  to  the  justice-
violating goals and activities that I discussed in section 6.1 of this chapter. This is because 
the pursuit of these goals and activities deprives other individuals of their entitlement to 
lead a human life. This constitutes a strong reason that outweighs the requirement, such 
that  when individuals  fail  to be persuaded to not pursue these goals and activities,  we 
should breach this  requirement  and prevent  them from pursuing them.  In contrast,  the 
reason for pursuing valuable goals and activities, and against pursuing the remaining kinds, 
does not have this outweighing effect. This is because, as I have argued in section 6.2 of 
this  chapter,  it  is  at  most  only the  case  that  individuals  would have a  higher  level  of 
wellbeing if they pursued the valuable goals and activities and not the remaining kinds, 
than if they had done the opposite. This is not strong enough to outweigh the requirement. 
That  said,  we  should  still  try  as  much  as  possible  not  to  breach  this  requirement;  so 
arguably  (all  things  being  equal)  issuing  coercive  threats  against  individuals  who still 
pursue  justice-violating  goals  and  activities  is  preferable  to  providing  them with  false 
reasons,  or  with  justified  reasons  that  would  unwittingly  lead  to  them changing  their 
behaviour. This is because the latter involve a form of deception and dishonesty. And even 
the  latter  are  preferable  to  conditioning  them,  as  in  such cases  no attempt  is  made  to 
address individuals in terms of reasons at all.
Taking  all  the  above  considerations  into  account,  I  submit  that  with  regard  to 
formal  access  to  goals  and  activities,  the  corresponding  object  of  duties  of  minimal 
wellbeing is that besides preventing individuals from pursuing justice-violating goals and 
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activities, they should be allowed to pursue all the goals and activities that are latent in the 
social  form of the society that they live in.  But we nevertheless should do our best  to 
persuade them to pursue those that are valuable, and not those of the remaining kinds of 
value.
One final remark before I move on to means for access to goals and activities. 
Since it is through their own actions that individuals pursue goals and activities, I therefore 
believe that the above object of duties of minimal wellbeing basically amounts to securing 
for individuals freedom of non-harmful conduct. This freedom is understood negatively, 
and  is  consistent  with  sincere  criticisms  of  their  actions.  Sincere  criticisms  reflect  the 
above point that  when we try to modify the behaviour  of others,  we believe  there are 
justified reasons for why they should behave otherwise. Finally, in parallel to what I have 
argued in section 6.1 of this  chapter,  conducts  are  non-harmful  insofar  as  they do not 
violate duties of minimal wellbeing, and therefore do not deprive other individuals of their 
entitlement to lead a human life.
7. - Conditions to Lead a Human Life #3b: Means for Access.
In this section, I shall turn to the other component of the condition of access to 
goals and activities - means for access. By this, I refer to the resources that individuals use 
to pursue goals and activities. As I have argued before in section 5 of this chapter, even if 
individuals are allowed to pursue goals and activities, they cannot pursue them unless they 
have the resources to do so. But if individuals cannot pursue any goal or activity, then they 
cannot lead a human life. As a result, to secure a human life for individuals in this respect, 
individuals should not have so few resources that they cannot pursue any goal or activity. 
Allow me to call this the ‘negative thesis’.
7.1 – More than the Negative Thesis?
Can we say anything more than the negative thesis? In particular, can we say what 
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amount of resources individuals should have, where this amount is more than the amount 
that is implied by the negative thesis? In the following, I shall argue that, with regard to 
duties of minimal wellbeing, we cannot say anything more than the negative thesis in this 
sense. 
The reason stems from the fact  that  a  human life  consists  in having a level  of 
wellbeing that is higher than the satisfaction of biological needs. Thus it does not matter, 
from the point of view of securing a human life for individuals, how high or how low their 
level of wellbeing is, as long as it is higher than the level where their biological needs are 
satisfied. Now, insofar as individuals do not have so few resources that they cannot pursue 
any goal or activity,  their level of success is constituted by how they make use of their 
resources, in pursuing their goals and activities. It might a minimal level of success, but 
still a level of success. In this chapter, I have argued for the following objects of duties of 
minimal  wellbeing:  means  for  the  satisfaction  of  biological  needs,  education,  physical 
security,  freedom  of  non-harmful  conduct  and  freedom  of  expression,  belief  and 
association.  With  respect  to  securing  a  human  life  for  individuals,  what  these  objects 
secure is a condition under which individuals would not only have the means to satisfy 
their biological needs, but also with a sense of what is worth doing, most probably choose 
to pursue goals and activities that are indeed valuable. This is because when these objects 
are secured for individuals, they are free to pursue any goals and activities that they want 
to, insofar as the goals and activities are not justice violating. Yet with education, physical 
security and freedom of expression, association and belief, not only do individuals form 
ideas of what is worth doing, and have the ability to coordinate their actions according to 
them, their ideas of what is worth doing would also most probably correspond to what is 
indeed worth doing.312 If such individuals do not have so few resources that they cannot 
pursue any goal or activity, then they would have - however minimal - a positive level of 
success,  that  is  constituted  by how they make  use of  their  resources  in  pursuing their 
312 Recall the Millian optimism that I discussed in section 4.3 of this chapter.
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chosen goals and activities.  This then contributes positively to their  level of wellbeing. 
Thus assuming that their biological needs are satisfied (which they can do with the means 
secured  for  them),  they  would  have  a  positive  level  of  wellbeing,  that  is  beyond  the 
satisfaction of biological needs. They thereby lead a human life. It is true though, that by 
securing more resources for them than what is implied by the negative thesis, then (all 
other things being equal) they would be more successful in pursuing their chosen goals and 
activities. This would result in them having a higher level of wellbeing. But from the point 
of view of securing a human life for them, this  does not matter.  This is  because even 
without those extra resources, they would still be leading a human life, albeit with a lower 
level  of  wellbeing  than  if  they had those extra  resources.  As a  result,  with  respect  to 
securing a human life for individuals,  there is no need to secure for them any level of 
resources that is beyond the level where they would have so few that they could not pursue 
any  goal  or  activity.  All  that  is  required  is  just  that  individuals  do  not  have  so  few 
resources that they cannot pursue any goal or activity.  If this is secured for individuals, 
then a human life is secured for them (provided that the other objects of duties of minimal 
wellbeing are secured also).
In arguing that with respect to securing a human life for individuals it does not 
matter how much resources individuals have, insofar as they do not have so few that they 
cannot pursue any goal or activity, I am not denying that it might be a good thing that we 
should give more resources to individuals. This is because their wellbeing would (all things 
being equal) be higher because of it. What I have been arguing is just that even if that is  
true, doing so is not required by our duties of minimal wellbeing. Furthermore, it is not the 
case that with respect to global justice, it does not matter how much resources individuals 
have, insofar as the negative thesis is satisfied. As I have explained in chapter 2, there are 
two aspects  to  my conception  of  global  justice.  On the  one  hand,  there  are  duties  of 
minimal wellbeing, which is the subject of this thesis. On the other hand, there are duties 
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of  fairness  and  equality.  Duties  of  fairness  and  equality  concern  the  fair  and  equal 
distribution  of  benefits  and burdens between individuals  who are  participants  within a 
scheme of cooperation. Since in our contemporary world the resources for pursuing goals 
and  activities  are  the  products  of  various  schemes  of  cooperation,  they  are  therefore 
benefits of schemes of cooperation, which should be distributed fairly and equally among 
those who participate in the respective schemes of cooperation. If that is the case, then 
even though with respect to duties of minimal  wellbeing it does not matter  how much 
resources individuals have, insofar as they do not have so few such that they cannot pursue 
any goal or activity, it does matter with respect to global justice – individuals should have 
a fair and equal share of resources for pursuing goals and activities.
7.2 – Summary: Means for Access.
I  therefore  submit  that  with  regard  to  the  condition  of  means  for  access,  the 
corresponding objects of duties of minimal  wellbeing are encapsulated by the negative 
thesis: individuals should not have so few resources that they cannot pursue any goal or 
activity.
Unfortunately,  there is no easy way to determine when individuals have so few 
resources that they cannot pursue any goal or activity.  It really depends on the kind of 
goals  and  activities  that  are  latent  in  the  social  form  of  the  society  that  is  under 
consideration, and the abilities and talents of the individuals who we happen to find living 
in that society. I believe it is therefore impossible to come up with a priori principles that  
indicate clearly - once and for all - when individuals have so few resources that they cannot 
pursue any goal  or activity (and when that is not the case).  To determine whether the 
negative thesis is satisfied, we need to look at, for each society, all the goals and activities  
that are latent in its social form; and ask for each individual in that society,  given their 
talents and abilities, do they have so few resources that they cannot pursue any goal or 
activity that is latent in the social form of their society? If our most informed and sincere 
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judgement is negative, then the negative thesis is satisfied in the case under consideration. 
On the other hand, if our most informed and sincere judgement is affirmative, then the 
negative thesis is not satisfied. We then need to make a practical judgement, as to how 
many  more  resources  should  individuals  have  for  the  negative  thesis  to  be  satisfied. 
Fulfilling duties of minimal wellbeing would then involve, in this respect, ensuring this 
amount of resources for those individuals. This is what I take the negative thesis to amount 
to, with respect to duties of minimal wellbeing.
I am aware that this is rather vague, imprecise and contextualized. However, recall 
that duties of minimal wellbeing are only one aspect of global justice. There are also duties 
of fairness and equality (which I have discussed in chapter 2).  My hope is that  in the 
contemporary world, with all its inequalities and unfairness, when duties of fairness and 
equality  are  all  fulfilled  then most  probably most  individuals  would (by any plausible 
intuitive standard) not have so few resources that they cannot pursue any goal or activity. 
Thus once all the other demands of global justice are fulfilled, there would only be a few 
instances  where  this  vague,  imprecise  and  contextualized  negative  thesis  has  to  be 
appealed to.
8. - Conclusion.
In  this  chapter,  I  have  argued that  under  my human-life  account,  there  are  the 
following objects of duties of minimal wellbeing: 
a) Securing for individuals the means for the satisfaction of biological needs.
b) Securing education for individuals, so that they are educated to a degree where they can 
be agents. 
c) Ensuring that individuals are free from serious, severe and pervasive threats to their 
physical security.
d) Ensuring that individuals have the largest amount of freedom of belief, association and 
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expression that is compatible with all other individuals having that amount.
e) Besides preventing individuals from pursuing justice-violating goals and activities, they 
should be allowed to pursue all the goals and activities that are latent in the social form 
of the society in which they live.  This basically amounts to securing for individuals 
freedom of non-harmful conduct. But this is consistent with persuading (and indeed we 
should persuade) them to pursue valuable goals and activities, and not those that are not 
valuable. 
f) Finally, ensuring that individuals do not have so few resources that they cannot pursue 
any goal or activity.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion & Further Research
1. - Summary of the Thesis.
This thesis is the first step in a research project, that I hope will lead to a robust and 
accurate theory of global justice.  To that end, the thesis began by illustrating the basic 
framework of a theory of global justice. It is a neo-cosmopolitan position, according to 
which there are duties of minimal wellbeing on the one hand, and duties of fairness and 
equality on the other. While the former are universal, the latter are associative. The reason 
why  the  latter  duties  are  associative  is  because  they  are  derived  from  the  form  of 
cooperation at hand. Thus they are (a) only held by and directed towards individuals who 
are members of the cooperation from which they are derived, and (b) only concerned with 
how individuals fare with regard to X in relation to other members of that cooperation. In 
contrast, duties of minimal wellbeing are not derived from the form of cooperation at hand. 
Rather,  as I  have argued, they are derived from each individual's  entitlement  to lead a 
human  life.   Thus  they  are  (a)  directed  towards  everyone  around  the  world,  and  (b) 
concerned with how they fare with regard to X – period. The main aim of this thesis is to  
illustrate the extent of these two sets of duties, under strict-compliance theory.
With regard to duties of fairness and equality: They are concerned with the fair and 
equal  distribution,  among the participants,  of the benefits  and burdens of a  scheme of 
cooperation. I argued that there are three kinds of them, each derived from the forms of 
cooperation  of  three  kinds  of  cooperation:  state-level  cooperation  (states),  local 
cooperation and trans-state cooperation. If they come into conflict, then for those who bear 
the  conflicting  duties,  the  ones  that  are  derived from the  form of  cooperation  of  their 
legitimate  state  trump  the  other  conflicting  duties  of  fairness  and  equality.  My  neo-
cosmopolitan  position  therefore  differs  from  other  contemporary  neo-cosmopolitan 
positions (e.g. Nagel and Blake), in asserting that it is not only within states that there are 
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these  associative  duties  of  fairness  and equality.  Nevertheless,  states  still  play  a  more 
significant  and important  role  with regard to  these duties,  than  the other  two kinds  of 
cooperation.
With regard to duties of minimal wellbeing: Against the human flourishing account 
(e.g.  Nussbaum  and  Pogge),  I  argued  for  my  human-life  account.  According  to  my 
account, all individuals are entitled, in virtue of the fact that they are human beings, to lead 
a human life. The function of duties of minimal wellbeing is to secure a human life for 
individuals. In doing so, their entitlements are then fulfilled. The objects of these duties are 
constituted by what is involved in securing a human life for individuals.
What a human life consists in is derived from my Razian conception of wellbeing. 
According to it,  the wellbeing of an individual is fundamentally constituted by:  (a) the 
satisfaction of biological needs, and (b) his success in whole-heartedly pursuing socially 
defined and determined goals and activities  which are in  fact  valuable.  Accordingly,  a 
human life consists in having a level of wellbeing that is higher than the satisfaction of 
biological needs, where this is constituted by the pursuit of goals and activities with a sense 
of what is worth doing. This in turn consists in (a) being able to form ideas of what is 
worth doing, (b) being able to revise them, and (c) being able to coordinate one's actions 
according to them. With all that in place, I argued for the following objects of duties of 
minimal wellbeing:
a) Securing for individuals the means for the satisfaction of biological needs.
b) Securing education for individuals, so that they are educated to a degree where they can 
be agents. 
c) Ensuring that individuals are free from serious, severe and pervasive threats to their 
physical security.
d) Ensuring that individuals have the largest amount of freedom of belief, association and 
expression, that is compatible with all other individuals having that amount.
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e) Besides preventing individuals from pursuing justice-violating goals and activities, they 
should be allowed to pursue all the goals and activities that are latent in the social form 
of  the  society  that  they  live  in.  This  basically  amounts  to  securing  for  individuals 
freedom of non-harmful conduct. But this is consistent with persuading (and indeed we 
should persuade) them to pursue valuable goals and activities, and not those that are not 
valuable. 
f) Finally, ensuring that individuals do not have so few resources that they cannot pursue 
any goal or activity.
2. - Further Research.
I end this thesis by illustrating a couple of areas of further research necessary for 
the development of an accurate and robust theory of global justice (a theory for which this 
thesis is the first step).
2.1 - Duties of Fairness and Equality.
The first area is pretty obvious. It concerns the other aspect of my theory of global 
justice – duties of fairness and equality. In this thesis, I have only briefly argued for them – 
that they are derived from the form of cooperation at hand. I have also identified, in our 
contemporary world, three kinds of cooperation from which they are derived: state-level 
cooperation (states), local cooperation and trans-state cooperation. As I have indicated in 
section  3.3  of  chapter  2,  the  following  issues  regarding  these  duties  have  yet  to  be 
resolved: How and in what way are duties of fairness and equality derived from the form of 
cooperation at hand? What are the different kinds of forms of cooperation? Are they all 
reducible to one form? Or should all schemes of cooperation be set up to fit one particular 
form of cooperation? Do we have a duty to set up schemes of cooperation with a particular 
form of cooperation? As I said before, an affirmative answer to the last three questions 
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might  undermine  my  opposition  to  the  cosmopolitans  and  my  affiliation  to  the  neo-
cosmopolitans. 
Another  related  issue  that  I  have  not  raised  before  concerns  the  relationship 
between the specific aim of a scheme of cooperation and its general aim (which just is its 
form of cooperation). I have argued that the latter is abstracted from the former. But how 
and in what way? Furthermore, this distinction, and talk of abstraction, works quite well 
for certain kinds of specific aims: for example the achievement of impartial ends (example 
(b)  in  section 3.1 of  chapter  2),  or  securing  certain specific  goods for  each individual 
(example (c) in the same section).  But they do not work quite well  for other kinds of 
specific aims; for example consider the aim of realizing among cooperating participants a 
life that is only authored by each person themselves (example (a) in section 3.1 of chapter 
2). In what sense is the form of cooperation – to only mitigate the effects of the 'natural 
lottery' in each individual's pursuit of their own ends - abstracted from the specific aim of 
that cooperation? As one can see, much more needs to be done with regard to duties of 
fairness and equality.  
2.2 - Basic Human Rights & Duties of Minimal Wellbeing.
The second area concerns the relationship between my duties of global justice and 
human rights - in particular, the relationship between my duties of minimal wellbeing and 
universal basic human rights. It is almost universally held that there are universal basic 
human rights. Not only are they ratified in international conventions,313 they are also taken 
to constitute an essential part of any theory of global justice.314 Some have even argued that 
they are the criteria for state autonomy.315
In some sense, my theory of global justice is a (human) rights-based account of 
global justice. This is particularly true with duties of minimal wellbeing, since they are 
313 For example UDHR and ECHR.
314 For example Rawls 1999, Pogge 2002b and Miller 2007.
315 For example Altman & Wellman 2009.
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grounded in individuals' entitlement to lead a human life. One might therefore think that 
correlative  to  these duties  that  have the above (a)  to  (f)  objects,  individuals  also have 
(basic) human rights to those objects. In principle, I am not against that. But I wonder 
whether the move from duties to rights can be established that easily. Many believe that 
directed duties and rights are correlative.  Thus not only do rights imply corresponding 
duties  that  are  directed  towards  the  right-holder,  duties  that  are  directed  towards  an 
individual  imply corresponding rights  that  are  held  by that  individual.316 But  there are 
considerations that count against this latter implication. Take, for example, the fact that I 
am a good friend of yours. In virtue of that, you have a duty that is directed to me, i.e. to be 
concerned with my wellbeing. However, it seems counter-intuitive to suggest, because of 
this, that I have a right against you to be concerned with my wellbeing. Indeed, if I were to 
claim this right against you, it seems that I will have destroyed the grounds for this right,  
i.e.  our  friendship.  One  might  respond  to  this  by  drawing  a  distinction  between  the 
existence of a right, and the appropriateness of claiming a right; and argue that in this case, 
I do have a right against you, yet it is inappropriate for me to claim it. As one can see, this 
is a complicated issue that merits further research.
Now, even if my duties of minimal wellbeing do imply (basic) human rights, which 
are held by those towards whom these duties are directed, there are still several issues that 
need resolving:  First,  how revisionary would this  account  of  (basic)  human  rights  be? 
Second, would such an account of (basic) human rights assume an interest theory of rights? 
If so, is that a plausible meta-theory of rights?317 Third, if O'Neill's criticisms of the human 
rights discourse are sound,318 we also need to know who exactly bear the correlative duties 
to these (basic) human rights (see section 2.4 of this chapter).
316 Hooft, for example, holds such a view, when he argues for human rights as deriving from certain 
obligations. See  Hooft 2009: 55-81 (chapter 2). 
317 Interest theory of rights holds that an individual A has a right to X, because it is in A's interest to X. For a 
discussion of it and other meta-theories of rights, see Wenar 2010: n. pag.
318 O'Neill 2005.
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2.3 – Partial Compliance Theory.
As I said in section 2.2 of chapter 1, this thesis concerns our duties of global justice 
under strict compliance theory. But strict compliance theory is not yet a complete theory of 
global  justice.  There  is  also  partial  compliance  theory,  which  is  concerned  with  what 
global justice demands when there are injustices. This is the third area of further research. 
In particular, I am concerned with what global justice demands of us when people fail to 
fulfil  their  duties  of minimal  wellbeing or duties of fairness  and equality – as is  most 
probably the case in the real world. 
With  respect  to  this,  I  find  Miller's  discussion  of  remedial  responsibility  very 
illuminating.319 Thus I would like to look into it in more detail in the future. Related to this 
is also the issue of self-determination of states, nations etc. One might think that given the 
importance of duties of minimal wellbeing, it is not particularly troubling to allow (if not 
obligate) intervention by 'others' or 'outsiders', when people fail to fulfil these duties of 
theirs. In fact, one might even hold a stronger thesis here: analogous to universal basic 
human rights (see section 2.1 above), their fulfilment of their duties of minimal wellbeing 
is a criteria for their self-determination.320 But the same, it seems, cannot be said for duties 
of fairness and equality.  If participants in a scheme of cooperation do not fulfil the duties 
of fairness and equality that they owe to each other, is it permissible (if not required) for 
non-participants to intervene? Intervention might sound fine for local cooperation and tran-
state cooperation.  But it  might be more problematic for states (state-level cooperation). 
This is because it is then in tension with the self-determination of states. As one can see, 
partial compliance theory raises many interesting issues that require further research.
2.4 - Individuals as Primary Duty Bearers.
The fourth area of further research concerns another assumption in this thesis: the 
primary bearers of duties of minimal wellbeing, and duties of fairness and equality,  are 
319 Miller 2007: 81-90 (chapter 4). 
320 Cf. Altman & Wellman 2009.
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individuals. As I have argued in section 2.3 of chapter 1, this is consistent with holding 
other entities, e.g. states, as the secondary bearers of these duties, because of a variety of 
instrumental reasons.
In this thesis (section 2.3 of chapter 1), I have only briefly considered an alternative 
view to my own – that the primary bearers of these duties are states rather than individuals 
–  by raising  some doubts  about  Rawls's  arguments  for  it.  But  I  have yet  to  present  a 
positive argument against it. I have a general idea of what such an argument looks like, and 
I shall briefly discuss it below. This should form the basis of my further research in this 
area.
Let us start with the alternative position that it is states, rather than individuals, who 
are  the  primary  bearers  of  duties  of  justice.  The  problem is  basically  this:  Unless  its 
citizens (individuals) also already have these duties, then it seems very hard to justify to 
them the actions that the state takes to discharge its duties of justice (e.g. when it requires 
its  citizens  to  pay taxes  which  are  then  used  for  humanitarian  purposes).  Presumably, 
saying that we are coercing you to pay your taxes, in order to fulfil our duties is not a good 
enough justification. But if citizens already bear these duties, then it would be easier to 
offer a justification here, by appealing to these pre-existing duties of theirs. Note however, 
this cannot be the whole story. This is because we still need to explain why, in this case, 
states are legitimate in coercing their citizens with respect to pre-existing duties that they 
have. And consideration of the duties among friends – to be concerned with each others' 
wellbeing -  is sufficient to show that it is not always legitimate for states to so coerce.
One might respond to the above problem in the following way: We do not need the 
claim that citizens already bear these duties to solve the above justification problem. If 
individuals  have  a  duty  to  obey  their  state  (or  correlatively,  their  state  has  legitimate 
authority over them – the right to rule them), then we can easily justify the actions that the 
state takes to discharge its duties of justice. The justification would consist in the general 
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argument for why they have a duty to obey their state (or correlatively, why the state has 
legitimate authority over them). What exactly it is, depends on which is the most plausible 
theory of political obligation.321 
However,  I  have  two  worries  with  this  response:  First,  insofar  as  a  theory  of 
political obligation aims to argue for a content-independent duty to obey one's state, then 
the justification for the actions that the state takes to discharge its duties of justice would 
be the same as (and therefore on a par with) other (justifiable) actions that the state takes, 
whether  or not they are related to justice.  However,  given that the actions  in  question 
concern  duties  of  justice,  one  might  think  that  it  is  better  for  their  justification  to  be 
different  from (and therefore  not  on  a  par  with)  the  justification  for  other  non-justice 
related actions that the state takes.  Second, even with illegitimate states, we intuitively 
think that the actions that it takes to discharge its duties of justice can still be justified to its 
citizens. However, the above response cannot accommodate this. This is because in this 
case,  unlike  the  case  with  legitimate  states,  citizens  do  not  have  a  duty  to  obey  this 
illegitimate state. The only way to accommodate this, it seems to me again, is to argue that 
the citizens already bear these duties of justice.
 Another  response  that  is  immune  to  my  above  two  worries,  is  to  argue  that 
individuals have a natural duty of justice - something like a duty to support just institutions 
(and maybe even a duty to assist in abolishing unjust ones and establishing just ones).322 
Since  a  state  that  fulfils  its  duties  of  justice  (whether  or  not  it  is  legitimate)  is  a  just 
institution,323 a justification for the actions that it takes for discharging these duties can be 
offered, by appealing to this natural duty of its citizens, even when it has no legitimate 
authority over them. Furthermore, presumably this natural duty cannot be appealed to for 
justifying other non-justice related actions that the state takes. Thus the justification for the 
321 For a survey of the contemporary theories of political obligation, see Dagger 2010: n. pag.
322 Rawls, for example, holds such a view. See Rawls 1971: 334.
323 As I said before in nn. 87, I take issues of legitimacy and issues of justice as two separate and different 
sets of issues.
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actions that the state takes to discharge its duties of justice will be different from (and 
therefore  not  on  a  par  with)  the  justification  for  its  other  non-justice  related  actions. 
However, the problem with this response is that it is not at all clear what are the grounds 
for this natural duty of justice, and what the extent of this duty is.324
All this forms the basis of my further research, in trying to build a case against the 
alternative  view  that  the  primary  bearers  of  duties  of  justice  are  states  rather  than 
individuals,  and in  support  of  my view – that  the  primary  bearers  of  these  duties  are 
individuals rather than states. 
324 For these and other objections against the natural duty of justice, in particular Rawls's and Simmons's 
arguments for it, see Klosko 1994.
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